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 This dissertation reconsiders the relationship between fiction and slavery in American 
literary culture.  “Prisoners of Style” shows how writers from the middle of the nineteenth to the 
middle of the twentieth century, including Hannah Crafts, Mark Twain, Charles Chesnutt, and 
William Faulkner, wrestled with enslavement.  They found it not only a subject to be written 
about, but also a problem of characterization.  Slavery and the ontological sorcery through which 
it produced a new kind of individual—the individual who is also a thing—led these authors to 
rethink basic formal assumptions about realist fiction, especially about what constitutes a literary 
character.  The writers I discuss did not set out to argue for the slave’s humanity or to render her 
interiority, but instead sought to represent the systematic unmaking of black personhood 
perpetrated by the laws and institutions that governed chattel slavery in the US.  They set out to 
reveal the ideological violence perpetrated against enslaved blacks, and they did so by writing 
characters who embodied the categorical uncertainty of the slave, characters who were not 
allegories for real, full people.  The tradition of writing I describe does not represent the fullness 
of enslaved “persons”; instead it renders something far more abstract: the epistemology that 
undergirded enslavement—those patterns of thought that preconditioned slavery itself. 
 The authors I study understood fictionality as a thorny ethical, epistemological, and 
political problem.  In my chapter on Crafts, for example, I look at The Bondwoman’s Narrative 
alongside a set of non-fiction texts about Jane Johnson, the slave who preceded her in John Hill 
Wheeler’s household.  Reading the novel against legal documents, pamphlets, and histories 
about Johnson and her escape from Wheeler, the chapter explores what fiction could do that 
these other modes of writing could not.  In moments of sleep, amnesia, and daydreaming, Crafts 
resists the normative logic of subjecthood and individual rights that underpins the representations 
of Johnson.  In the second half of the project, I demonstrate the significance of fictionality to 
American literary realism’s evolution into modernism.  The final chapter, on Faulkner, places 
two of his Yoknapatawpha novels within the context of his interest in modernist painting and 
sculpture.  Work by Picasso, Matisse, and other visual artists inspired his concern with surfaces 
and flatness, leading to a meditation on artifice that runs throughout his major novels. I argue 
that his flatness—his insistence on the non-referential quality of fiction—is crucial for 
understanding his characterization and philosophy of history history, in particular the history of 
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The Poetics of Evasion 
 
And we may, as poets, wish to impersonate and 
imagine situations of extreme captivity for reasons 
that are not merely selfish; wanting to ask questions 
of horror, to know where it begins and how it might 
end, we may have a compulsion to touch, with 
respect and terror, the zero-degree instances of 
desubjectification that remind our fingers of the 
possibility of frost.  
 
 –Wayne Koestenbaum1 
 
 
Readers of Adventures of Huckleberry Finn have long wanted to help free Jim.  Many 
have found his treatment in the novel (and by the novel) troubling, especially his incarceration at 
the end of the book, where he finds himself stuck in a shed, waiting for Tom Sawyer to plan and 
execute an excruciatingly complex emancipatory plot.  The episode stretches on for long 
chapters, which unnecessarily extend Jim’s captivity for the sake of what appears to be merely a 
game.  Tom hijacks the plot of the novel from Huck’s control and all the gravity of the situation 
drains out of the text; it becomes just another one of Tom’s beloved adventure stories.  Those 
final chapters appear to relinquish real-world moral seriousness in favor of a game of make-
believe and draw the novel’s fictionality to the surface.  The distance between the reader and the 
																																																						
1 Wayne Koestenbaum, Humiliation (New York: Picador, 2011), 135. 
	 	
	 2 
characters stretches too far, leading critics to wonder whether those pages have anything to tell 
us about the non-fictional past of slavery or the present of its aftermath. 
During a pause in their scheming, Huck asks Tom, why, when Jim could be freed with 
little effort, they are using huge amounts of time to concoct an escape plot worthy of an 
adventure novel.  Tom replies, “When a prisoner of style escapes, it’s called an evasion.”2  What 
Tom means is not immediately clear, in part because there are at least two distinct ways of 
reading the sentence: Jim is a “prisoner of style” both in the sense that he is being imprisoned in 
or with style, that is, stylishly, and in the sense that he is imprisoned by style, to the extent that he 
is being treated like a literary character in a story authored by Tom.  Twain brings Tom back at 
the end of the novel in order to introduce an authorial avatar who can bring to our attention the 
ethical problems of writerly power, or the ways in which the novelist aspires to a God-like 
control over the world of his making—including over the characters who populate that world.  
To be a prisoner of style is the condition of all literary characters for whom there can be no 
escape from the bounds of the text.  Thus, the novel forces the reader to confront the falsity of 
the fiction and consider the ethical implications of being a reader—of being a kind of witness to 
another’s enslavement.  Twain is, after all, asking us to be entertained by, to take pleasure in, 
prolonged scenes of Jim’s oppression, raising questions about the ethical status of fiction.  Do we 
have ethical obligations to fictional characters?  And if we do, what are those obligations?  How 
do characters hail us?  Does it matter when we put a text down and abandon a character?  Or find 
pleasure in his pain?  Or dominate him through our obsessive desire to know him better than he 
knows himself?   
																																																						
2 Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (Penguin Classics, 2002), 282. 
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Tom’s alternative to escape, the literary character’s perpetual evasion without the 
promise of freedom, allows us to confront freedom as an impossible and even dangerous concept 
in the context of the history of slavery in the US. Evasion, in other words, levels a critique of 
freedom by offering an alternative framework.  It understands and throws into unmistakable 
relief the utopian quality of absolute freedom and posits itself as a conceptual alternative.  
Forgetting the emancipatory fantasies of “freedom,” evasion becomes the fraught realm in which 
action negotiates discourse, in which the subject becomes, is always becoming, intelligible as a 
subject.  Another name we might give “evasion” is “subjectivization.”  
“Prisoners of Style” makes the argument that for us to think about the ethics of novel 
reading, we must first define the relationship between readers and characters in terms other than 
those of sympathy or identification.  Like much of the work that I read in this dissertation, the 
evasion sequence in Twain’s novel questions the contracts forged between author and character, 
and reader and character; a triangle whose apex is the fictional character’s body, the entity on 
and through which certain powers of manipulation and domination meet and overlap.  For Twain 
and the other writers I discuss—Hannah Crafts, Charles Chesnutt, and William Faulkner—
characters are abject figures subject to the creative forces of both producer and consumer—but 
they are not powerless.  I use the term “contract” precisely to emphasize the strange sort of 
agency characters possess.  If as critics we honor the phenomenology of novel reading, we must 
acknowledge that characters are just like real people in that they call for our attention, we form 
affective bonds with them as if they were human subjects and often mourn their loss.  We can 
insist on the limits of this resemblance to “real people”—characters approximate people in the 
“real world,” but they end with a text or set of texts—yet we still suspend our disbelief, as we 
must in order to care as deeply as we do about the fictions we study and read. Instead of 
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attempting to resolve the ontological paradox of fictional beings, this dissertation takes the 
ambiguity of the status of characters as a given, a starting point for a critical method that attends 
to characters as complicated points of identification that confuse the distinctions between 
objecthood and subjecthood.  This leads to my distinctive claim:  I find a structural affinity 
between literary character and the slave as a legal entity, because both closely resemble persons 
while at the same time failing certain fundamental tests of real humanity.  
 What is sayable in Adventures of Huckleberry Finn changes over the course of the 
evasion episode.  Here is Huck’s assessment of the evasion after all of the facts have come to 
light about Jim’s legal status: “The first time I catched Tom, private, I asked him what was his 
idea, time of the evasion?—what it was he’d planned to do if the evasion worked all right and he 
managed to set a nigger free that was already free before?”3  Even though the evasion does not 
“work,” a new form of paradox and a new question become possible in the world of the novel 
when Huck speaks of a kind of freedom from which one may yet be freed—a freedom that 
retains its name while remaining entirely incomplete.   Much of the criticism of Huckleberry 
Finn has focused on the utopian or emancipatory possibilities suggested by the novel’s scenes on 
the raft, making the river the site of Twain’s formulation of a kind of radical politics that puts 
pressure on the logic of the law, but I think, in contrast, that the most radical formulation comes 
during these lines that Huck speaks to Tom, where Huck suddenly utters a new grammar of 
freedom:  His question distinguishes between degrees of emancipation instead of intermixing 
two senses of freedom, which we might call absolute and liberal individualist.   A discourse 
other than the discourse of legal freedom distinguishes itself in the wake of evasion, providing 
																																																						
3 Ibid., 306. 
	 	
	 5 
that platform for critique on which Huck might stand in order to speak of freedom differently 
than he could before, to speak of it as something more complex than as a right or set of rights 
one does or does not have.  His paradox, spoken twice, suggests that certain forms of domination 
persist after legal emancipation and in fact inhere in the freedom of the freed slave and in the 
rights he wields as a (partial) citizen-subject.  Legal freedom presupposes other forms of 
“unfreedom” that exist beyond the purview of the law.  Put simply, Jim’s captivity in the shed 
dramatizes the unfinished quality of emancipation and points to the need to remake the meaning 
of freedom in light of formal emancipation’s realities. Saidiya Hartman describes the historical 
context for the text’s destabilizing of the concept when she writes that  
[t]he nascent individualism of the freed designates a precarious autonomy since 
exploitation, domination, and subjection inhabit the vehicle of rights. The divisive and 
individuating power of discipline, operating in conjunction with the sequestering and 
segregating control of black bodies as a species of body, permitted under the guise of 
social rights and facilitated by the regulatory power of the state, resulted in the 
paradoxical construction of the freed both as self-determining and enormously burdened 
individuals and as members of a population whose productivity, procreation, and sexual 
practices were fiercely regulated and policed in the interests of an expanding capitalist 
economy and the preservation of a racial order on which the white republic was founded.4  
 
Twain draws our attention not only to these continuities between bondage and freedom, but also 
to the conditions under which that continuity becomes apparent, sayable, and (to the reader) 
intelligible.  Evasion makes possible a new way of speaking about the liberal subject of rights 
and disturbs the narrative structure of emancipation.   
 I aim not simply to historicize Huck’s statement about “setting a nigger free that was 
already free before,” to make a claim about how the novel comments on its historical context, but 
also to suggest that when we read Huck’s interpretation of Jim’s incarceration, the novel presents 
																																																						
4 Saidiya V. Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-
Century America (Oxford University Press, 1997), 117. 
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its own fictionality as problematic by offering two competing readings.  On the one hand, the 
paradox of the free slave who can still be freed makes sense because of the distribution of 
knowledge in the story: Huck and Jim simply do not know that Jim has been freed in law, so they 
continue to act as if Jim’s enslavement is legally salient.  On the other hand, the meaning that 
makes sense in the realm beyond the text has less to do with the world of the fiction and what 
characters know and more to do with the historical world of the newly emancipated subjects who 
are hugely burdened subjects of rights—the world in which Twain found himself writing (and we 
find ourselves reading).  When Twain calls attention to their contrasting truth conditions, the 
world of the fabula and the “real” world where the reader encounters the sujet pull apart and the 
stability of the ontological status of characters begins to disintegrate.  The evasion episode puts 
pressure on the text’s fictionality by appearing to distinguish characters from their discursive 
origins.  
 In this sense, the “prisoner of style” names a certain problem of the aesthetic theory of 
character—specifically, that literary characters are both functions of a text and mimetic figures, 
that they are imprisoned by text and, at the same time, seem to exceed the bounds of textuality 
rather easily.5  For example, when a novel’s narration turns its attention from one character in a 
room to another in the same room, the first character does not simply disappear from our 
imaginations but instead persists, continues to exist in the imaginary space.  Moreover, at least 
since Greek tragedy, literary characters have displayed a tendency to leave their original texts, 
finding their way into sequels, prequels, adaptations, fan fiction, and so on.   
																																																						
5 John Frow’s recent book, Character and Person, is in part devoted to this duality (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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 “Prisoners of Style” argues for the significance of fictionality and fictional character to 
the projects of four authors who grapple with the aftermath of slavery.  By introducing the role of 
US racial history in fiction in new terms, “Prisoners of Style” reveals the ways American literary 
culture did and does wrestle with slavery’s legacy not simply as a topic, or something to be 
written about, but also as an aesthetic problem.  It draws out the ways in which enslavement is 
integral, in theory, to the history of the Western novel and, for this dissertation in practice, the 
American realist novel.  It examines the political and ethical status of literary characters in the 
period, and considers what it meant (and means) to reflect on slavery and its legacy by reading 
about fictional people.  Through readings of novels depicting slavery in retrospect—one written 
by an author who escaped enslavement, the others composed after legal emancipation—I 
develop a method for looking afresh at what has been called “the afterlife of slavery.”  As 
readers, we have certain ethical obligations to characters.  They make certain demands and have 
certain rights within the text, and Twain like the other writers I discuss wishes to explore those 
claims as an alternative to the legal and moral discourses surrounding enslavement.  Huck would 
have us believe that we are given a choice between two systems: heaven and hell, citizen and 
outlaw, morality and immorality.  But this dichotomy is false, and there are good reasons why 
the novel continues on so long after his choice to “go to hell.”  The language of the law 
conditions Huck’s notion of freedom, and when he exclaims, “Tom Sawyer had gone and took 
all that trouble and bother to set a free nigger free!” he reminds us that “freedom” was not Tom’s 
preferred word to begin with; as textual functions, literary characters know no conception of 
freedom for they are always already bondsmen.  Evasion is the condition of characters.  They 
know no life beyond their texts.  Under Tom’s direction, the plot gives up its aspirations toward 
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emancipation, abandons the motor propelling it toward an ahistorical utopian freedom, and 
transforms into a study in radical fugitivity—unending evasion without the promise of escape.  
*** 
 As scholars such as Bryan Wagner and Colin Dayan have recently shown, the nineteenth-
century slave of US law is less a person transformed into a thing and more accurately a being 
suspended between those two states, a body held in wait between personhood and thingliness.6  
Slavery relied not merely on the transformation of persons into objects, but upon the irresolution 
of a paradox written on racialized bodies which were legally granted certain characteristics of 
both classes, a situation that was sustained by a perpetual and ritualized process of making and 
unmaking that continually reconfigured what forms of sentience, affect, willfulness, 
consciousness, embodiment, and so forth could be alchemized to justify the institutionalized 
abjection of enslavement.  Slavery occasions an ontological crisis that must be perpetually 
managed, kept alive and unresolved, through the epistemological acrobatics of racist legal 
interpretation.  In Virginia on the eve of the Civil War, for example, “what most occupied the 
thoughts of lawyers and judges in cases about personal rights…was not to affirm the slave as 
property, but to articulate the personhood of slaves in such a way that it was disfigured, not 
erased.”7 
 The broader context for the legal alchemy of slave law is, as Dayan shows, an increasing 
anxiety in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries over the significance of legal fictions within 
																																																						
6 Colin Dayan, The Law Is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons 
(Princeton University Press, 2011); Bryan Wagner, Disturbing the Peace: Black Culture and the 
Police Power after Slavery (Harvard University Press, 2009). 
7 Dayan, The Law Is a White Dog, 140. 
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both the system of the US law and the British common law that serves as the American system’s 
roots.  Whereas William Blackstone wrote in the Commentaries on the Laws of England (1764-
1769) that “arbitrary fictions and expedients” are “troublesome” but not dangerous, Jeremy 
Bentham spent much of his career railing against this very aspect of common law: “A fiction of 
law may be defined a willful falsehood,” he explained, “having for its object the stealing 
legislative power, by and for hands which durst not, or could not, openly claim it; and but for the 
delusion thus produced, could not exercise it.”8  Legal fictions, he worried, are the sleight-of-
hand that makes the law vulnerable to becoming a tool of injustice.  “In Bentham’s critique, the 
history of the common law was evidence of a world gone spectral, with laws and language 
obscured by ‘the pestilential breath of Fiction.’”9   
 Despite Bentham’s cultural influence, the necessity of fictionality in legal discourse 
would only appear to escalate in the nineteenth century due to the need for increasingly abstract 
notions of what counted—and therefore could be legislated—as property.  As Martin Sklar puts 
it, the second half of the century in the US saw “the conversion of capital from fixed tangibles 
into fluid intangibles” as the economy transformed into one grounded in a collective belief in 
credit as an imaginary quantity.10  Stephen Best writes,  
All inference and immateriality, prognostics and predictability, promise and obligation, 
property lost reference to actual goods and use values and, arguably, acquired the 
characteristics of a set of “instruments” and securities central to an emerging speculative 
market capitalism: of contracts or “options” that granted the “privilege” to buy (a “call”) 
or sell (a “put”) a commodity at a future date; of hedges for and against the anticipated 
price of a commodity (“futures”), which either over-valued (selling “long”) or 
																																																						
8 Quoted in ibid., 14. 
9 Ibid., 15. 
10 Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The 
Market, the Law, and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 50. 
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undervalued (selling “short”) the commodity in question; of the setting of a floor and 
ceiling to rates of return on the wager either that futures rates would exceed the 
established limits (a “straddle”) or remain comfortably nestled within their confines (a 
“collar”).11  
 
As Best goes on to show through a series of readings that shuttle between legal and literary texts 
in The Fugitive’s Properties: Law and the Poetics of Posession, the vast economic and 
technological changes that occasioned jurists’ revisions to the definition of property are also 
deeply entwined with notions of personhood.  Crucially, in the case of Santa Clara v. Southern 
Pacific Railroad (1883), the US Supreme Court deemed corporations legal “persons” under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.  The personification of the corporation 
illustrates if nothing else dominant legal doctrine’s continuation of the work of slave law to the 
extent that personhood became further estranged from the material bounded corporality of the 
human body.  The body’s allegorical function—its ability to correspond to a person—loses 
salience in decisions such as Santa Clara, and this loss of thingliness marks an amplification of 
personhood’s status as a legal fiction.  Along with Best, I emphasize that the crisis of personhood 
is not unique to slave law but persists long after in other corners of the discursive field of 
jurisprudence, including copyright and contract law.  And these legal conditions help to give rise 
to literary experimentation with fictionality and personhood—the combination that produces 
inventive strategies of characterization.  
*** 
As post-bellum novelists sought to represent the enslaved, who stood outside or on the 
border of the privileged realm of personhood, the question of literary character took on a special 
																																																						
11 Stephen M. Best, The Fugitive’s Properties: Law and the Poetics of Possession (University of 
Chicago Press, 2010), 32–33. 
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urgency.  Thus, a legal, political, and ethical problem became literary.  For all of the novelists in 
this dissertation, literary characters hold interest in part because they replicate the necessary 
failures of immanent personhood that concentrated and cohered on the bodies of real slaves.  Not 
fully “there” and without the constancy of embodied selfhood, literary characters reveal the 
exclusionary force through which modern selfhood was and is made.  
Critics have usually discussed literary characters without any attention to the historical 
development of slavery.  Arguably, that line of thinking reached its apex the last time a number 
of aesthetic theorists gave the topic a significant amount of attention, during the height of 
structuralist criticism.  In Roland Barthes’s earlier writing, as in the work of Hélène Cixous, 
Colin MacCabe, and Michael Riffaterre, character was a “myth” or a “cog in the literary 
machinery.”12 Alternately, attempts to historicize character have, as Deidre Lynch points out in 
The Economy of Character, collapsed the developments in characterization with the 
establishment of modern selfhood, only reifying the idea that characters are simply mimeses of 
persons and making “a variety of disparate practices appear as versions of a singular form.”13  
“What happens,” she asks, “if we do not assume that the history of character and the history of 
the individual are the same thing?”  My own answer to this question leads me conclude that the 
history of literary character in the US and the history of slavery should be thought together 
without being collapsed.  The writers I discuss respond to particular moments in the history of 
legal and political personhood often by reimagnining the figure of the human through their black 
																																																						
12 Hélène Cixous, “The Character of ‘Character,’” New Literary History 5, no. 2 (Winter 1974): 
384. 
13 Deidre Lynch, The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and the Business of Inner 
Meaning (University of Chicago Press, 1998), 1. 
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characters.  “Given the histories of slavery, colonialism, segregation, lynching, and so on,” 
writes Alexander Weheliye, “humanity has always been a principal question within black life 
and thought in the west.” 14  Because of the historically vexed relationship between blackness 
and humanity, he argues, when placed in the context of that history, universalized “Man’s 
conditions of possibility lose their ontological thrust because their limitations are rendered 
abundantly clear.” Because literary characters depend upon a mimesis of the epistemological and 
perceptual conditions that make the human intelligible, they are uniquely suited to representing 
these limitations.  The fictional black bodies that I focus on dramatize through a play of aesthetic 
figuration and disfiguration the discursive processes that make any body human, parahuman, or 
non-human.  And in this way, the texts I examine flaunt their fictionality.   
These texts are emphatically implausible.  Faulkner, as many have noted, does not write 
“rounded” or even plausibly human black characters.  Instead, his Yoknapatawpha novels, like 
the other fictions I read here, give us a critique of the very desire for plausibility among readers 
of anti-racist literature.   
When the novel Archy Moore, the White Slave, or, Memoirs of a Fugitive was first 
published in 1836, Lydia Maria Child compared it to the recently published memoirs of Charles 
Ball, a former slave: 
It is said in your paper that some think Charles Ball equal to Archy Moore.  The extracts I 
have seen from Charles Ball are certainly highly interesting; and they have a peculiar 
interest, because an actual living man tells us what he has seen and experiences; while 
																																																						
14 Alexander G. Weheliye, Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black 
Feminist Theories of the Human (Duke University Press, 2014), 19. 
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Archy Moore is a skillful grouping of incidents which, we all know, are constantly 
happening in the lives of slaves.  But it cannot be equal to Archy Moore!15  
 
While Charles Ball’s work succeeds on the basis of its particularity—the fact that it is of 
“peculiar interest” because of its status as non-fiction—Archy Moore remains the better book.  
For Child, the fictionality of the latter matters far less than its ability to be representative of 
slavery in general and, more importantly, plausible.  It gives us what “we all know” already to be 
“constantly happening.”  Paradoxically, at the same time that it purports to be the Northerner’s 
window into the unfamiliar world of Southern plantation slavery, it confirms her expectations 
about that world.  By 1861, Child was the editor of Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a 
Slave Girl, where she proclaimed the authenticity of the narrative and vouched for its author’s 
trustworthiness.   
 At that point plausibility had become encoded in the strict generic conventions of the 
slave narrative.  As James Olney has shown, “[t]he conventions for slave narratives were so early 
and so firmly established that one can imagine a sort of master outline,” which includes a portrait 
signed by the narrator, a title page that includes the words “Written by Himself,” and so forth.16  
Olney goes so far as to map out the twelve distinct parts common to most slave narratives, 
illustrating the genre’s rigid laws as well as the fact that abolitionist readers were not searching 
for novel information as much as they wanted somewhat standard descriptions of familiar scenes.  
Ostensibly, the photographs, portraits, signatures, and authenticating documents buttress the 
																																																						
15 Quoted in Richard Hildreth, Archy Moore, the White Slave: Or, Memoirs of a Fugitive (New 
York ; Auburn: Miller, Orton & Mulligan, 1856), xiv, 
http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011609784. 
16 James Olney, “‘I Was Born’: Slave Narratives, Their Status as Autobiography and as 
Literature,” Callaloo, no. 20 (1984): 50. 
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narrative’s truth value, its authenticity, but the generic sameness of slave narratives themselves 
evinces the way that readers came to these texts not wondering whether they were true but 
instead whether they were believable.  The question was less “did these events really take 
place?” and more “do these kinds of events really take place?” This is to say that the issue of 
authenticity was inextricably entangled with the narrative’s plausibility, meaning, the body in the 
engraved portraits and photographs that served as the fronticepieces of the mid-nineteenth-
century slave narrative would not have been meaningful as an individuated or particularized 
body but as a representative body.  This idea about the representative function of the slave 
narrative is often rehearsed in the literary criticism of the period, but what I am trying to get at is 
something more specific about the representation of black embodiment: the way that authenticity 
attaches to the black body at the expense of individuated, subjective experience.  As Olney notes, 
the slave narrative is distinguished from other autobiographies by being almost entirely episodic 
(besides some final reflections on slavery in general) and containing fewer second order 
reflections on the nature of memory itself than other forms of autobiography: “it is assumed to be 
a clear, unfailing record of events sharp and distinct that need only be transformed into 
descriptive language to become the sequential narrative of a life in slavery.”17  A discussion of 
authorial memory in Augustine, Wordsworth, or Thoreau “makes both memory itself and the 
narrative it surrounds fully symbolic,” and thus reveal the writer to be imagining, a function that 
is necessarily jettisoned by ex-slaves in exchange for the reader’s absolute belief in the events 
described.18   Without minimizing the massive importance of the slave narrative as the primary 
																																																						
17 Ibid., 49. 
18 Ibid., 48. 
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source of political energy for the abolitionist movement in the US, we should also attend to the 
ways that the field of abolitionist literature constructed blackness as to some degree opposed to 
imagination, defining and curtailing the horizons of possibility for black cultural production.  
This helps to explain why early black fictions like Our Nig and The Bondwoman’s Narrative 
failed to find an audience.      
It also helps to explain how authenticity itself came to be further inscribed on the black 
body, a phenomenon that has persisted across centuries into our present moment.19  At this point 
it will be useful to distinguish further between the authentic and the plausible as categories.  The 
authentic presents itself as self-evidently so.  The slave narrative begins with “I was born” 
because the narrative requires an existential claim before it can commence, before it can make 
any claims about what truthfully happened to its author.  It begins by establishing the subject’s 
“natality,” to use a term from Hannah Arendt, in order to locate the “I” within the real world of 
the reader, establishing the ontic materiality of the authorial body.20 (This is what Charles 
Twitchell Davis and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. are referring to when they states that literacy 
afforded the black slave “one giant step up the Great Chain of Being; the ‘thing’ became a 
human being.”)21  The reader either believes that the author actually exists, or she doesn’t.  
																																																						
19 See, for example, recent discussions of the controversy over the conceptual poetry of Vanessa 
Place and Kenneth Goldsmith: Ken Chen, “Authenticity Obsession, or Conceptualism as 
Minstrel Show,” Asian American Writers’ Workshop, accessed July 30, 2015, 
http://aaww.org/authenticity-obsession/; John Keene, “On Vanessa Place, Gone With the Wind, 
and the Limit Point of Certain Conceptual Aesthetics,” J’S THEATER, May 18, 2015, 
http://jstheater.blogspot.com/2015/05/on-vanessa-place-gone-with-wind-and.html. 
20 For her definition of “natality,” see: Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (University of 
Chicago Press, 2013), 9. 
21 Charles T. Davis and Henry Louis Gates, eds., The Slave’s Narrative (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), xxix. 
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Plausibility, in contrast, demands a different kind of thinking.  To say whether something is 
plausible or not requires that the reader take a skeptical, speculative posture toward the object in 
question.  As Catherine Gallagher has written, the novel as a genre is unique in that it calls for a 
consumer well trained in an incredulity that other genres do not necessarily require.  “Novels,” 
she states, “seek to suspend the reader’s disbelief, as an element is suspended in a solution that it 
thoroughly permeates. Disbelief is thus the condition of fictionality, prompting judgments, not 
about the story’s reality, but about its believability, its plausibility.”22  In Gallagher’s view, the 
novel reader’s ability to stand in judgment of the fiction’s plausibility, its resemblance to the 
real, affirms the reader’s sense that, unlike the characters in the novel, she possesses the 
durability, vividness, and immanence that characterize non-fictionality.  Contrasted with the 
partial, flimsy qualities of literary characters, she experiences the wholeness of an embodied 
subject who constitutes the phenomenology of the real.  If the authentic body demands belief on 
the part of the reader, the plausible character demands disbelief. Gallagher’s primary point here 
is that fictionality’s rise to prominence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries tended to 
readers’ desire for the feeling of their own immanent subjectivity.  Fiction is one technology for 
policing the boundaries of the real and ensuring that the reader is always on the right side of that 
boundary.  
Perhaps the best illustration of this from the canon of abolitionist literature is Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s follow-up to Uncle Tom’s Cabin, A Key to Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which included 
																																																						
22 Catherine Gallagher, “The Rise of Fictionality,” in The Novel, ed. Franco Moretti, vol. 1 
(Princeton University Press, 2006), 346. 
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“FACTS AND DOCUMENTS UPON WHICH THE STORY IS FOUNDED.”23  Stowe retroactively shored up 
the plausibility of her fiction by producing a non-fiction text that assured readers of their sense 
that what they had read in the novel was indeed what slavery was like.  And later, Josiah Henson 
would write a narrative that was promoted as being by “the one from incidents in whose life Mrs. 
Stowe drew some of the most intensely interesting and thrilling scenes in her world-renowned 
story of ‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin.’”24  These texts show the anti-slavery novel’s capacity to summon 
not a different, alien territory where slavery was instituted but the reality-effect of the reader’s 
own subjectivity, her ability to correctly assess the believability of abolitionist claims.  The 
fictional slave’s body becomes the thing against which a norm-creating consensus about slavery 
as an institution established itself.  And more importantly, the fictional slave’s body easily 
corresponds to other real-world bodies.  The autobiographical slave narrative depended for its 
plausibility on the reader’s belief in the authenticity of the author’s particular body; in contrast, 
novels about slavery were tasked with presenting readers with plausible fictive bodies, which 
could potentially stand in for many other actual black bodies.  
This dissertation about implausible bodies starts chronologically with Hannah Crafts, 
because around the time she was writing The Bondwoman’s Narrative (probably in the 1850s) a 
shift was taking place in US letters whereby the romance began to equate conspicuous 
fictionality with prestige.  Unlike what were then called “novels,” romances urged readers not to 
focus on the literal truth of the story, encouraging them instead to admire the narrative’s other, 
																																																						
23 Harriet Beecher Stowe, A Key to Uncle Tom’s Cabin: Presenting the Original Facts and 
Documents Upon Which the Story Is Founded. Together with Corroborative Statements 
Verifying the Truth of the Work (John P. Jewett & Company, 1853). 
24 Quoted in Laura Browder, Slippery Characters: Ethnic Impersonators and American Identities 
(Univ of North Carolina Press, 2000), 21. 
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more abstract truths about the human condition.25  There is, as Jonathan Arac has noted, a 
significant generic distinction to be drawn in mid-century American prose fiction between what 
he calls “national narrative,” which directly engages the socio-political issues of the 
contemporaneous reader’s world, and the romance’s “literary narrative,” which focuses on more 
insular imaginary spaces that establish their discontinuity from the social realities of the time.26  
Literary narrative—like the work of Melville and Hawthorne, and unlike that of Stowe—is more 
self-consciously fictional, argues Arac.  Unfettered by the obligation to create realistic mimeses 
of people, writers of romances experimented with literary character and used language to remake 
the corporeal and psychic contours of personhood.  By representing what Sharon Cameron calls 
“impersonality,” they applied pressure to notions of the self, the human, the citizen, and the 
person in ways that were impossible for earlier generations of American writers.27  
  The first two chapters of this dissertation, on Twain and Crafts, introduce the project’s 
central concern: how characterization served as a way to explore the making and unmaking of 
black personhood that has been necessary for the establishment and perpetuation of legal slavery 
in the US.  Chapter one lays out the major concerns of the project—the ethics of reading fiction 
and the ways that novels produce or fail to produce the bodies and subjectivities of literary 
characters. Along the way, the chapter builds an argument about the representation of Jim, in 
particular, the strategies Twain gives the reader for animating or vivifying him (or not). Reading 
several major commentaries on the evasion sequence as well as Twain’s journals from the 
																																																						
25 Jonathan Arac, The Emergence of American Literary Narrative: 1820 - 1860 (Harvard 
University Press, 2005).   
26 Ibid. 
27 Sharon Cameron, Impersonality: Seven Essays (University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
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period, I claim that the novel critiques the readerly desire to both appropriate Huck and imbue 
Jim with the fullness of interiority.  Chapter two continues to wonder what it means for a 
character to be present or absent, available or not, to a reader, but in this case I juxtapose a close 
reading of the novel, The Bondwoman’s Narrative, with a discussion of Jane Johnson, the slave 
who preceded Crafts in John Hill Wheeler’s household.  Johnson became a somewhat well-
known figure for abolitionists of the period when she testified against her former master on 
behalf of William Still, who had helped her to escape.  Examining both representations of 
Johnson and Crafts’s novel, the chapter explores what fiction could do that these other modes of 
writing could not.  In moments of sleep, amnesia, and daydreaming, Crafts resists the normative 
logic of subjecthood and individual rights that underpins the representations of Johnson. 
 In the second half of the dissertation, I demonstrate the significance of fictionality to 
American literary realism’s evolution into modernism with chapters on Chesnutt and Faulkner.  
The third chapter, on several of Chesnutt’s conjure tales, shows how their fantastical 
metamorphoses of characters into objects reimagine the contours of the figure of the human.  The 
final chapter places two of Faulkner’s novels, The Sound and the Fury and Absalom, Absalom!, 
within the context of his interest modernist visual art, arguing that this interest inspired his 
concern with surfaces and flatness, leading to a mediation on artifice and the non-referential 
quality of fiction that runs throughout his major works.   If critics are accustomed to thinking 
about modernist prose in terms of its disruptions of traditional narrative, I draw attention to the 
ways modernist literature disrupts the novel at the level of characterization as well. 
Of course, there exists a much larger context for thinking about fiction and captivity, a 
longstanding intimacy between illusion and coercion in the West, and one could begin tracing 
such a genealogy with Plato’s cave-dwelling prisoners, or with Pliny’s account of man's first 
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mimetic efforts (an attempt, he claims, to mitigate the disturbing unpredictability of other 
humans coming and going in and out of our perceptual world). One could also speak of Freud's 
imaginary child, captivated but struggling with the same frustration: the swing from fort to da; or 
our habit of incarcerating hallucinators; or about Marx’s camera obscura; or for that matter a 
whole slew of theories of ideology. The Western imagination has—and of course many have 
contributed to the writing of this history—a longstanding uneasiness about the possession of 
imagination—and about imagination's possessions and dispossessions. My dissertation tells the 
story of this preoccupation as it gets expressed in American fiction on either side of the turn of 
the century.  
My writing about character in particular draws on a wide range of theoretical sources 
from Aristotle to Jacques Rancière.  Among the literary critical works on character from the last 
two decades, I am especially indebted to those of Lynch, Blakey Vermeule, and Alex Woloch, 
all of whom connect the aesthetic with the political in ways that have been formative to my own 
linkage of post-bellum characters to the history of slavery in the US.  However, beyond 
periodization and nation, the readings in “Prisoners of Style” are distinct from those other texts 
in method. For example, Vermeule has asked, Why Do We Care about Literary Characters?, 
finding her answer in the realm of cognitive science.  She argues that we care because there are 
evolutionary benefits to performing the mental functions necessary to in some way believe in 
fictional beings.  Just like when we gossip about real people behind their backs, we suspend our 
disbelief and give of our attention and in return we get lots of social information about intentions 
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and interests, which is precisely what we need to be able to do to be good social competitors.28  
Among the reasons I think Vermeule is drawn to cognitive science is the difficulty of 
historicizing the problem of fictionality. Thinking about the problem in the deep time of human 
evolution provides a way to write the history of our affinity for the fictional by placing the rise of 
the novel in the eighteenth century within the frame of humans’ longstanding reliance on 
gossip.29  I want to shrink this historical frame and change its focus.  While Vermeule’s 
argument is compelling, if the answer to the question, “Why do we care about literary 
characters?” is, “Because we are evolved to do so,” then I am more interested in how we care 
about literary characters—and how writers use our cognitive predisposition for fictional beings 
in order to illuminate the ethical demands posed by the possession of such a mind.   
Indeed, unlike Woloch and Lynch, who make arguments about the relationship between 
literary and political representation, my larger claim is about the ethics of reading fiction.  The 
writers I look at respond to their period’s theories of aesthetic politics that emphasize sympathy 
for characters (based upon their resemblance to humans) by pointing to the epistemological 
violence enacted by readers’ inevitable desire to transform a character into what Riffaterre has 
called “a truth conquered.”30  Character here is less a question of representation and more one of 
relationality or how readers use characters to understand and fashion themselves as ethical 
subjects.  As one theorist describes this relationality,  
																																																						
28 Blakey Vermeule, Why Do We Care about Literary Characters? (Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2009), 14. 
29 Here she draws from Catherine Gallagher’s account of “The Rise of Fictionality.”Ibid., 8. 
30 Michael Riffaterre, Fictional Truth (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 20. 
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What is at issue is character as an effect of desire, understood not as “someone’s” desire 
but as a structure forming the imaginary unity of objects.  To say this is to argue that 
there can be no separation between an objective textual construct and something (desire) 
brought to it by a reader; rather, “character” is an effect of the self-“recognition” of a 
subject which is not preconstituted but which assumes a specific identity in the 
identification of an, hence, identification with the identity of a character.31  
 
Throughout I emphasize “ethics” rather than “morality.” This is because I want to shift focus, 
following Michel Foucault, away from morals (the social code of acceptable conduct) and 
toward the readerly subject, or “the practices by which individuals were led to focus their 
attention on themselves, to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge themselves” as subjects.32  
Hopefully at this point it has become clear that my argument does not privilege any one character 
as a (good or bad) moral actor; rather, I am interested in the way the fictions I examine reproduce 
the conditions of ethical thinking. Indeed, Chesnutt’s point is never that any one of his characters 
learns to be a good (moral, political) person either within the conjure tales or as a result of 
hearing the tales; morality merely imposes a set of rules that the subject chooses to follow or 
reject.  The ethical realm, on the other hand, takes into account the productive side of 
subjectification—the paradoxical freedom (to choose how to live within the bounds of 
subjecthood) that is produced in and through subjection.  Foucault refers to the practice of ethics 
as the “aesthetics of existence.”33  
In Must We Mean What We Say? Stanley Cavell writes about the experience of seeing a 
tragedy unfold from the darkness of the theater audience: the strange status of the spectator who, 
																																																						
31 John A. Frow, “Spectacle Binding: On Character,” Poetics Today 7, no. 2 (1986): 238–39. 
32 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley, 
Reissue edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 5.  The connection I make between character 
and ethics is also influenced, throughout the dissertation, by Leo Bersani, A Future for Astyanax: 
Character and Desire in Literature (Columbia University Press, 1984). 
33 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2, 11. 
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despite being absorbed in the action on stage, knows not to intervene to save the tragic hero no 
matter how strong her desire to assist, to avert catastrophe.  “We cannot approach him,” Cavell 
writes, “and not because it is not done but because nothing would count as doing it.  Put another 
way, they and we do not occupy the same space; there is no path from my location to his.”34  To 
rush down the aisle and leap onto the stage would only have the effect of pausing the fiction, not 
dissolving it, since one univocal speech act cannot survive the jump from the realm of the 
spectator into the universe of the play.  The conditions for action to become meaningful as 
speech, for action to matter and be intelligible and accounted for by other actors, are so different 
in these two spaces that there is no form of translation capable of carrying an audience member 
genuinely into the presence of a character in the play.  It seems to me that something similar can 
and should be said about reading novels and short stories, because there too the fiction shuts us 
out from its circle of action, resisting realism’s continuities and keeping us in the knowledge that 
fiction is “there” in our imaginations and we “here.”  Cavell goes on: “Their fate, up there, out 
there, is that they must act, they are in the arena in which action is ineluctable.  My freedom is 
that I am not now in the arena.  Everything which can be done is being done.  The present in 
which action is alone possible is fully occupied.”35  To not intervene in the face of a character’s 
suffering or even the threat of her extinction is the foundation for a form of freedom that, like all 
modern freedoms, relies upon what he calls “the final fact of our separateness,” the originary 
splitting that forms the ground of subjectivity. 
																																																						
34 Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 334.  Of 
course, Cavell is also aware of the myth of the spectator who, for example, is moved to rush onto 
the stage and save Desdemona.  His point, however, is that fulfilling this salvific wish is 
impossible. 
35 Ibid., 338. 
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  To extend Cavell’s point one step further, the position of the reader initially appears to 
be amoral, to be separate from the ethical fabric of the fiction seeing as there is ostensibly no 
room for choice and moral freedom, for care or assistance, in the audience, but it is more 
accurate to say that the spectator and reader are affirmed in this schema as the ethical subject.  
Fictional worlds, with their constant game of proximity and distance—holding us at once in their 
thrall and at an ontological distance—recapitulate the possibility of ethical thought.  Fiction 
forces me to acknowledge an experience of suffering that is recognizable but elsewhere—
suffering and action not of my own.36     
*** 
Scholars of African-American Literature tend to justify reading about fictional slaves by placing 
them in the service of a historiographical project.  That is, they search for the historical “truth” 
embedded within a novel by focusing on the real event that likely inspired its fictional 
counterpart or by treating the fiction as a set of clues about the more general realities of slavery 
and its aftermath.  In this way, critics usually subjugate the fictive to the historical, the fantasy to 
reality, and treat these texts as screens to be punctured or obstacles to be moved aside.   
Why and how have African Americanists’ ethical and political commitments to 
historicism suppressed or devalued fabulation?  And at what cost?  I want to argue that by 
rearing away from the fictive, the critical conversation about fictional portrayals of slaves has 
neglected a literary tradition defined by its demurrals from, and outright rejections of, 
historiography’s imperatives to contribute to an official, collectively-held story about the past—
																																																						
36 The problem of fictional character has often been connected to questions of freedom, as in 
Harvey, William J., Character and the Novel (Cornell University Press, 1965). 
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by a reluctance to make the past present.37  As Best has asked in a recent essay about the history 
of black critical thought, “Why must we predicate having an ethical relation to the past on an 
assumed continuity between that past and our present and on the implicit consequence that to 
study the past is somehow to intervene in it?”38 He goes on to show how equating remembrance 
with political redress has occluded implicit assumptions underlying both—assumptions about 
what remembering entails and about what types of action constitute redress.   
We should not mistake Crafts’s escape into imagination, for instance, for escapism, with 
its connotations of resignation and complicity; instead, we ought to view it as her means of 
distancing herself from the structural impossibilities produced by racialization and enslavement.  
A novelist herself, Hillary Mantel never considers Crafts’s retreat from reality into fiction as a 
retreat from material history and politics, for her argument in a 2002 review holds that Crafts’s 
excursions into literature’s dream life evince a writer longing for absent political possibilities and 
mourning her alienation from the knowledge of a fuller freedom.39  Mantel is one of the only 
writers to ask why Crafts would choose to write a work of fiction in the first place.  If the book 
comments on social and political life, Mantel suggests that the commentary cannot be understood 
apart from the story’s gothic and sentimental extravagances.  When critics avoid fictionality or 
make excuses for it as though it indicates a writerly compromise (as if all language isn’t just one 
infinite set of compromises, anyway), they presume that nonfiction engages more directly with 
																																																						
37 Doris Sommer makes a similar observation about certain writers’ resistance to making their 
characters fully knowable.  Doris Sommer, Proceed with Caution, When Engaged by Minority 
Writing in the Americas (Harvard University Press, 1999). 
38 Stephen M. Best, “On Failing to Make the Past Present,” Modern Language Quarterly 73, no. 
3 (September 1, 2012): 453–74, doi:10.1215/00267929-1631478. PAGE 
39 Hilary Mantel, “The Shape of Absence,” London Review of Books, August 8, 2002. 
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politics because—the argument goes—fictional worlds at best only provide a mimesis of 
political action, an imitation cut off from the realm of actual politics.  In this way, the fictive 
highlights everything taken to be politically irresponsible about the whole of the aesthetic: its 
resemblance to ideology’s falseness and its tendency to atomize or remove the subject from the 
“real” of everyday social life, of which the perceptual stuff of the ink-stained page is part.    
Perhaps more than any other kind of encounter with an object, being absorbed by a piece of 
literary fiction dramatizes the Kantian argument that the aesthetic carries us elsewhere, away 
from the perceptual material and categories in which it is grounded.   
Therefore, rather than trying to reclaim Hannah Bond (her real name) as a historical 
subject in chapter two, my aim is to revive the extra-aesthetic meaning of the text’s fictionality—
to show that Hannah Crafts understands the withdrawal from everyday experience to be political 
and social in ways that are less intuitive to twenty-first century critics.  In other words, the 
readings throughout this entire dissertation start with a familiar version of the aesthetic realm—
protective, homogenous, and at best vestibular to the world of “real politics”—and expand 
outward into a theory of aesthetics in which even the most intensely autonomous aesthetic 
experiences are instrumentalized by the author for far more radical political ends than 
establishing the normative subjectivity of a writer or character.  The novelists I focus on illustrate 
how these experiences can instruct readers to assume certain social orientations by training them 
to preserve the object’s alterity and to discourage the more aggressive impulses of 
demystification.  
Huckleberry Finn, The Bondwoman’s Narrative, Charles Chesnutt’s conjure tales, and 
William Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha novels rewards readers who embrace worlds of fantasy for 
their potential to disperse the rationality that had systematically divested black bodies of 
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selfhood and sentience.  Reading a novel (especially a literary narrative), an ostensibly solitary 
and inward activity, becomes a way of accessing the dream life of a racist legal code along with 
other institutionalized instantiations of white supremacy.  Crafts, Twain, Chesnutt, and Faulkner 
uncover the unexpected sociality of those racist fantasies that clung to and structured public life 
on the eve of the Civil War and then in its wake.   
In order to clarify the methodological arguments that unfold in the pages that follow, let 
me take up a brief case study of the criticism on Crafts.  All of the contributors to In Search of 
Hannah Crafts, the first major collection of critical essays on The Bondwoman’s Narrative, take 
the imperative of the volume’s name very seriously in one way or another—usually by 
historically contextualizing the novel or situating Crafts within either an Anglophone canon or 
American generic tradition.40  This is not to dismiss any of the essays, all of which are excellent.  
Rather, my point is a meta-critical one concerning what kinds of scholarship appeared most 
urgent and necessary for an emergent body of commentary during the first decade after the 
manuscript’s publication, and which were not.  What are the ethical stakes of this type of 
historicism and generic stabilization?  What does it mean to be “in search of” an author, real or 
implied, who comes to us—who becomes a minor celebrity—by virtue of her fugitivity?  And 
why do the methodological possibilities appear to be only two: on one side, an over-investment 
in Crafts’s identity and body, and, on the other, a facile version of post-structuralism’s dismissal 
of the author? 
Gates closes his introduction to the first edition of the novel with a set of questions about 
the historical person who penned the manuscript, followed by a statement of purpose: “Only 
																																																						
40 Henry Louis Gates and Hollis Robbins, eds., In Search Of Hannah Crafts: Critical Essays On 
The Bondwoman’s Narrative (Basic Civitas Books, 2004). 
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further research can determine the answer to these questions.  To facilitate that process and to 
restore Hannah Crafts to her rightful place as the author of the first novel written by a female 
fugitive slave, I have decided to publish this fascinating novel.”41  These sentences assume the 
reader assents to three things: that authorship is a “right,” that such a right ought to be enforced, 
and that it is the duty of literary scholars to be the enforcers.  When the New York Times broke 
the news in 2013 that the mystery of Hannah Crafts was “solved,” this idea surfaced again in 
scholars’ comments about the finding.   
“I think there was some suspended judgment because we didn’t have a traceable 
historical person,” said William L. Andrews, a professor of English at the University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill. “We had leads. We had all sorts of interesting inferences. 
But we couldn’t talk about the book with any confidence of authorial intention if we 
didn’t know who the author was.”42 
 
Prior to the “discovery,” the possibilities for reading the novel were curtailed by the archival 
absence of the woman we now know as Hannah Bond.  To use Gates’s term, Bond’s 
nonappearance indicated that she was being denied her “right” to authorship—in which case we, 
the critics, were authorized to “restore” and enforce this right—and now that we have 
reestablished this right that inaugurates all other rights, we have also proven our critical 
sovereignty, or the authority to “talk about the book with…confidence.”  This is a heroic notion 
of critique in which the critic must continually produce his own indispensability for the text’s 
survival.  
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The critical consensus formed around the desire to seek a “reality” behind, beneath, latent 
in the text functions only by suppressing the truly remarkable fact of the novel’s fictionality, 
easily leading one to forget what is most manifest, that Hannah Bond disguised herself and her 
life through fiction.  Fictionality was—and remains inextricable from—the artistic expression of 
her disenfranchisement and fugitivity.   As difficult as it may be to define fiction positively, 
readers often know it when they see it because of its shadow-like negative relation to the real, 
which is easier to speak about than the fictive itself.  This reliance on the oppositional 
relationality to the real is not a problem to be solved by critics but an indication of the fictive’s 
essential removal from an inhabitable reality, its otherness or resistance to any attempt to fully 
integrate it into the space and temporality of reading.  Fictional characters resist the attributive 
impulse, then, insofar as attribution always asks, What is real about this fiction?—a question that 
functions as an invitation to violate the text in the name of an external truth.  And even if one 
fails to see such a violation as an ethical problem (it’s just a book), it must be conceded that the 
attributive project contains a logical conflict insofar as it claims to uphold the rights, historicity, 
and intentions of the author at the same time as it ignores her desire to represent a world where 
she herself does not fully exist.  Even semi-autobiographical fiction effaces the author, and 
without this effacement there can be no fiction, so to ground criticism in the authority of an 
attribution—to draw the “confidence” required for “judgment” from, as Andrews would have it, 
the traceability of the historical person—is to violate the very rights and intentionality one claims 
to protect.  It is to grant Crafts a right to compose an autobiography at the expense of other 
positive liberties, including the right to express fantasy or unreality, the right to a form of 
publicity that is not also an expression of selfhood.  It is to disregard her claim to the title of 
novelist and reinstate the impossibility that such a right could ever be hers, and to some extent to 
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return her as a novelist to the shadowy realm of inconceivability, where she composed the 
manuscript and where it remained virtually unnoticed for over 150 years.  My own reading of the 
book relies on certain biographical facts about Crafts, so clearly I am not trying to do away with 
attribution or biographical criticism altogether; I am more interested in the way that her 
characters defy attempts to exactingly equate fiction with history or to ground all critical 
judgement in the authority of historicity and identity. 
What makes it possible for Gates to write of a “rightful place” in the narrative of 
American letters?  And if it is the duty of the critic to restore her to the realm of rights, what 
other forms of critique does such a project foreclose?  Jacques Derrida poses very similar 
questions of attribution and artistic rights in his well-known essay on a disagreement between 
Meyer Shapiro and Martin Heidegger about the ownership of a pair of shoes painted by Van 
Gogh.  Refuting Heidegger’s argument in “The Origin of the Work of Art” that the shoes belong 
to a peasant woman working in a country field, Shapiro marshals several historical sources to 
support his claim that the boots are actually Van Gogh’s own and that he lived in the city at the 
time, not the country.  When Derrida weighs in on the disagreement, he rejects both arguments 
as misreadings, and more significantly, he shows them to be misreadings of a kind, both seeking 
“restitutions,” he points out; they both want to fill the empty shoes with a wearer, tying them 
back onto the body of an owner that the painting has purposefully displaced.  He writes,  
In order to do this, [Heidegger and Shapiro] both have an interest in identifying, in 
identifying the subject (bearer or borne) of these shoes, in tying up, tying back together 
stricto sensu, in their right sense, these objects which can’t do anything about it—in 
identifying and reappropriating (for themselves), in using in their turn this strange out-of-
use, this product productive of so much supplementary surplus value.43 
 
																																																						




Because the painting permanently and conspicuously displaces the wearer/owner/subject from its 
frame, identifying the bearer of the shoes—the absent subject—treats the boots as objects of 
property and utility, and violates the painting’s divestiture of the wearer.  In the process, Derrida 
also identifies a more central claim in “Origin,” a line of argumentation against restitution which 
Shapiro misunderstands: Heidegger claims that the painting shows the shoes to be doubly un-
wearable, doubly useless—both because they lie discarded and unworn within the mimesis and 
because they are merely a painted representation of the real thing.  They remain unavailable and 
unassimilable to reality both at the level of the image and at the level of the picture.  As Derrida 
puts it, the painting’s “interlacing” of one kind of uselessness or unavailability with another 
reveals the “usefulness of the useful”: the ground upon which the user and used, wearer and 
worn, subject and object distinguish themselves.44  The painting presents to the viewer a pair of 
entities as they cross over the threshold into epistemological frameworks of utility, 
possessiveness, and even particularity, as they are lifted out of the absolute freedom of 
formlessness and solidified into discrete and knowable objects for the taking.  
Derrida’s essay resonates with Gates’s formulation when he (Derrida) dissects the logical 
structure of restitution, a structure that ultimately only makes sense within the terms provided by 
possessive individualism.  “Without even looking elsewhere or further back,” he states, 
“restitution reestablishes in rights or property by placing the subject upright again, in its stance, 
in its institution.”45  The language of rights proves neither insignificant nor incidental in Gates’s 
call for restitution.  The conditions of the rights-bearing subject (the “right to have rights,” as 
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Arendt puts it) has already been structurally embedded within the restitutive project.46  Historical 
narratives are fortresses built to protect a subject of rights who is always under attack.  
Yet, if modern historiography works by transforming the past into a lost object to be 
found and carefully wrapped up as a gift for the present, then the aesthetic reveals a counter-
tendency to resist the “hypostatization” or objectification of the past. 47  The shoes, after all, are 
neither anyone’s to wear nor anyone’s to lose.  By virtue of its counter-facticity, the aesthetic 
situates the past before us without allowing anyone to claim it as her own, for it belongs to no 
one and exists altogether outside of the possibility of belonging.       
When Gates legitimates The Bondwoman’s Narrative’s publication by presuming 
Crafts’s “rightful place” and demanding her return, he assumes the truth-value of authorship at 
the expense of the novel’s irreducible untruth: its fictionality.  He empties the past of its alterity 
in the name of literary history by circulating a literary historical artifact that can only remain 
stable as long as readers forget both its literariness and its historicity.  “Searching for Hannah 
Crafts,” elaborating a system of authorial rights, and feeling relief over her supposed restitution 
all seem like very good ways of excusing ourselves from the difficulty of formulating 
sufficiently elastic critical methods.  What I want to demonstrate instead in the following 
chapters is a replacement of the duality of history and fiction with a textual negotiation of form 
and formlessness at the level of character, a criticism that may be best described as an account of 
the object relations involved in novel reading—or novel reading as a crisis of object constancy.  
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47 Best, “On Failing to Make the Past Present,” 461. 
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Revisiting assumptions about how and where we locate enslavement in American novels 
suggests a different account of post-bellum fiction's ethical dimensions. Fictionality has a 
history, too; the chapters of this dissertation reconstruct the context in which the novelists Crafts, 
Twain, Chesnutt and Faulkner experimented with a mimesis rather than the real thing, with 
characters instead of actual people.  These writers respond to the period’s dominant aesthetic 
discourses about realism and sentimentalism by resisting the ideas that fiction ought to be a 
perfectly transparent window into other, more abject worlds and that sentimentalism has moral 
authority because it cultivates sympathy for characters.  They emphasize instead the 
epistemological violence of readers’ desire to know characters better than they know themselves, 
to transform characters into conquered objects.  Ultimately, “Prisoners of Style” sees authors’ 
and readers’ mastery over characters as an ethical problem. The readerly conquest of characters 
may be a condition of realist fiction, but I suggest that certain fiction writers understand it to 
have affinities with the discursive apparatuses that keep slavery and its legacy of incomplete 
emancipation alive.  And indeed the pairing of characters and slaves lasts long past the turn of 
the century; an American writer as late as Vladimir Nabokov called his characters “galley 










How to Have Style in an Emergency:  




Imagination is the freedom that reveals itself only in its works. 
—Derrida, “Force and Signification”1 
 
 
For readers disappointed by the final chapters of Adventures of Huckleberry Finn—and 
they are legion—the first, better part of the book is about the possibilities and costs of acting 
morally in an immoral system; of choosing, as Huck does, to assist an escaped slave despite the 
legal and social realities of his time and place.  “And then,” as E. L. Doctorow puts it, 
“something terrible happens—terrible for Huck, terrible for American literature.”2  Tom Sawyer 
returns and commandeers the plot to “free” Jim; all seriousness drains out of the narrative; and 
the whole thing, in Doctorow’s words, turns to “doddering shtick.”  For Doctorow, the novel 
unravels both politically and aesthetically in these final chapters.   
Without a doubt, the episode fails to “work” both in the sense that Tom’s efforts to 
liberate Jim actually extend his incarceration and in the sense that those chapters feels as though 
they could be the orphans of a different novel.  However, to dismiss them as “shtick” is to 
overlook a crucial part of the novel’s ethical critique.  “When a prisoner of style escapes,” Tom 
																																																						
1 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (University of Chicago Press, 1978), 7. 
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Sawyer explains to Huck, “it’s called an evasion.”3  What readers have always found disturbing 
about this episode in Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is Tom’s cavalier hijacking of the plan to 
“free” Jim, a strategy that effectively turns the former slave into a character from one of Tom’s 
adventure stories.  The action becomes a set of tropes and scripts authored by the boy, and, in the 
process, the fictionality of the novel itself rises to the surface.  To be a prisoner of style—subject 
to the absolute powers of author and reader—is the condition of the literary character, Tom 
reminds us.  Twain brings him back at the end of the novel at least in part to introduce an 
authorial avatar and draw our attention to the ethical stakes of writerly power, especially the 
God-like audacity required for a novelist to call a world into being and declare himself 
sovereign.  To be a prisoner of style is the condition of all literary characters, who wander within 
the bounds of textuality without any promise of escape.  The evasion sequence, then, marks the 
culmination of something that runs throughout Twain’s masterpiece: a complex meditation on 
the ethics of reading about a world other than our own filled with people who don’t actually 
exist; and the frustration many feel over the ending is better understood not as an aesthetic 
appraisal (Is this a success or a failure?) but as the aesthetic experience of reading a realist novel 
that abruptly and deliberately abandons its aspirations to verisimilitude.4 Beneath Twain’s 
fascination with deception, disguise, and trickery lies an uneasiness about the form of the novel’s 
mimetic aspirations, about the ways that it produces or fails to produce the bodies and 
subjectivities of literary characters.  I want to reexamine the representation of Jim in particular 
and consider the strategies Twain provides the reader for animating or vivifying him as a 
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character—as well as what Twain withholds.  I show how the novelist’s own evasions disrupt the 
smooth functioning of characterization.  And more fundamentally, I argue that those disruptions 
denaturalize the notion that a literary character is a mimesis of a person.  The text frustrates the 
reader’s longing to fully saturate Jim’s imaginary body and imbue him with the fullness of 
interiority, and in doing so, it dramatizes the limitations of realism’s representations of normative 
personhood.   
Nearly every critic of Adventures of Huckleberry Finn has weighed in on the debate 
about Twain’s characterization.  In the second half of the twentieth century the issue was taken 
up by a list that includes Louis Budd, Bernard DeVoto, T. S. Eliot, Ralph Ellison, Leslie Fiedler, 
Shelley Fisher Fishkin, Earnest Hemingway, Leo Marx, Toni Morrison, and Lionel Trilling.  
Despite the diversity of their treatments, at one point or another each of them comments on 
whether or not the novel’s characters are sufficiently real—whether they are as psychologically 
complex or capacious, as round or deep, as ambivalent or conflicted as actual human beings.  For 
Marx, Huck and Jim sadly “become comic characters” in the ending; for Ellison, the novel 
succeeds when we observe “Jim’s dignity and human capacity” from “behind this stereotype 
mask”; Fishkin examines what Trilling and many, many others see as the novel’s overriding 
achievement, Huck’s narrative voice, arguing that the boy speaks with the “cadences,” 
“rhythms,” and “attitudes” of people Twain knew in real life.5 Marx, Ellison, and Fishkin 
provide very different readings and conclusions, to be sure, but they also share an investment in 
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the real.  In Marx’s and Ellison’s view, the novel rises or falls based on how plausible or 
believably human the characters are, while Fishkin connects Twain’s vernacular experiments to 
real-life conversations.  Indeed, Fishkin’s Was Huck Black? helped to usher in a wave of new 
historicist critiques of Huckleberry Finn that still continues, and while it has become 
unfashionable to assess whether Twain succeeds as a realist, literary scholars keep looking for 
the reality hidden behind the fiction.  As Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt have 
written about the turn to new historicism in general, “We wanted to recover in our literary 
criticism a confident conviction of reality.  […] We wanted the touch of the real in the way that 
in an earlier period people wanted the touch of the transcendent.”6  Historicists want to know 
who are Huck and Jim, really?  
This chapter is an attempt to reverse the subjugation of the fictive to the real.  Instead of 
anchoring Huck or Jim in the firm ground of materialist history, I show the novel’s most 
powerful ethical exploration to take place at the level of fantasy, of mimesis.  That is, by calling 
attention to the immateriality of the Jim produced in our minds, and by undermining the solidity 
of his body and the fullness of his interiority, Huckleberry Finn denaturalizes the notion that a 
literary character mimetically refers to a person.7  
																																																						
6 Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt, Practicing New Historicism (University of 
Chicago Press, 2001), 31. Audrey Jaffe addresses the relationship between realism and new 
historicism when she glosses Gallagher and Greenblatt’s statement this way: “New historicism’s 
claim on the real—or at least some portion of it—constitutes no small part of its allure; the 
suggestion that one can borrow from the authority of the historical and at the same time remain 
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irresistible.” “Introduction: Realism in Retrospect,” Journal of Narrative Theory 36, no. 3 
(October 1, 2006): 310–11.  
7 This argument echoes to some extent Jane Thrailkill’s emphasis on “realization” over “realism” 
in “Emotive Realism,” Journal of Narrative Theory 36, no. 3 (2006): 365–88. For instance, we 
agree that “prevalent understandings of literary realism…associate it with ‘cognitive value’ 
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Scholars of US literature tend to write about American realism in terms of its inability to 
reproduce reality, often describing it as a “failed” aesthetic.  8 “With imperial relentlessness,” 
Eric Sundquist writes in the introduction to American Realism: New Essays, authors of the 
period between the Civil War and the First World War “sought to master a bewildering society 
that seemed always, in turn, to be mastering them.”  However, defining realism as an impossible 
ideal indicates, first, that every realist text is conditioned by a dream of mastery and, second, that 
the story of realism always ends in authorial defeat.  Huckleberry Finn exemplifies a somewhat 
different version of this story, one less about mastery and aggression.  The novel demonstrates 
why it may make more sense to describe some realist experiments not as aesthetic failures but in 
terms of their aesthetics of failure: a form of aesthetic experience through which one longs for—
feels one’s distance from—“the touch of the real.”9  For when Twain’s characterization doesn’t 
																																																						
different directions. She looks at how realism affects the phenomenology of embodiment, or how 
reading a novel “entails being ‘moved’ in the dual sense of emotionally engaged and 
repositioned with respect to the world” (366). I, too, am interested in the reader’s relationship to 
her own sense of selfhood, but whereas Thrailkill examines how it seeks to reorient the reader’s 
experience of her own material existence, I focus more on how the novel effects certain 
imaginative operations. (I don’t disavow cognition in favor of the body.)  
8 Eric J. Sundquist emphasizes this term in American Realism: New Essays (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1982), 7. See also Amy Kaplan, The Social Construction of American Realism 
(University of Chicago Press, 1992); Michael Davitt Bell, The Problem of American Realism: 
Studies in the Cultural History of a Literary Idea (University of Chicago Press, 1996). Among 
these major works, the claims of this chapter are perhaps closest to Kenneth Warren’s. He states 
that “in the 1880s…the implications of realism’s political critique outstripped the capacity of 
editors, society, and realists themselves to absorb the full political import of their literary 
practices.” Black and White Strangers: Race and American Literary Realism (University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), 15. 
9 I want to make clear that, to my mind, this chapter’s argument is not at all in conflict with any 
of the other writing about American literary realism that I reference. Instead, I am arguing for a 
method of reading that might open up additional insights into what kinds of political critique 
were possible in the period.  
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produce believable persons, something is still represented.  As in the experience of seeing a 
photographic negative of “reality,” the reader glimpses the exclusionary force through which any 
political regime establishes personhood’s primacy.  Put another way, if the drive to historicize 
has led many to examine what is political about the novel’s aesthetic, I am arguing that the novel 
presses us to consider what is aesthetic about politics.  Twain throws into relief what novelistic 
description and politics share in common: a need to distinguish persons from nonpersons and to 
establish the conditions upon which personhood is predicated.   
 
The Neat Plot and the Stylish Plot 
In his classic essay, “Come Back to the Raft Ag’n Huck, Honey,” Leslie Fiedler writes 
about Huckleberry Finn’s “myth” of homoerotic intimacy as a fantasy of racial healing: Jim 
“will fold us in his arms saying, ‘Honey’…he will comfort us, as if our offense against him were 
long ago remitted, were never truly real.”10  The river serves as a liminal world where Huck and 
Jim may slough off the sediments of racial history, turning the novel into the fulfillment of the 
reader’s post-racial wish.   The novel becomes essentially anti-historical, rendering life on the 
raft in all the optimistic colors of liberal equality, the work of anti-racist politics becoming less 
pressing because, in this narrative, racial healing already exists as part of our manifest social 
destiny.   There is no real need for action of any political or ethical consequence during the 
chapters that take place on the raft; the novel moves forward in time not because Huck or Jim do 
anything to propel the plot forward toward any kind of telos, but by virtue of the river’s steady 
and inevitable force.   What makes the evasion sequence worth revisiting is the fact that, back on 
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land, the question of action reemerges with a special urgency as Huck and Tom disagree over 
what actions should lead the book to its conclusion.   The sequence and its conflict between 
Huck and Tom is a study in different ways of conceiving of moral action and the epistemological 
prerequisites for such action.   In literary critical terms, they disagree over how emplotment 
should unfold and what logic should guide it.    
 The issue of how one ought to plot action arises very early in the novel, also on land, 
when Tom tries to teach Huck to make believe and scheme “with style,” which Huck never fully 
masters.   After he escapes to the river, Tom’s absence hangs over nearly every episode on the 
voyage as Huck finds himself moving through the world without much style at all: “I reckon 
Tom Sawyer couldn’t a done it no neater himself,” Huck reflects after he devises his plan to 
expose the fraudulent Duke and King.11  “Of course he would a throwed more style into it, but I 
can’t do that very handy, not being brung up to it.”  If stylishness represents one ideal of action 
epitomized by Tom, and Huck lacks style, his schemes have their own admirable quality, 
“neatness.”  With regard to the plot to keep the King and Duke from stealing Mary Jane’s 
inheritance, neatness signifies a minimizing of risk and collateral damage, a commitment to 
truth, and a particular calculus of justice.   A neat plan produces a consensus among all involved: 
a truth is revealed and through that revelation all disagreements over identity or rightful 
ownership find resolution; the King and Duke are exposed as the villains that they really are.   
Guided by neatness, punishment comes only to the deserving while the innocent remain 
unscathed.   The neat plot, therefore, requires an unquestioning belief in the unambiguous nature 
of goodness and badness and of the regimes required to make such a world legible.   In other 
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words, Huck’s famous proclamation of “All right then, I’ll go to hell” is not a rebellion against 
the moral system he inherits, but rather the opposite, a formal pledge to the structures of that 
system.12 
 Neatness, moreover, has its own logic of meaning, its own way of producing entities as 
morally significant.   Consider Huck’s response to Tom after he suggests that case-knives are not 
only the best (slowest, most inefficient) but also the most moral tool for digging a hole into the 
shed where Jim is held prisoner:  
I don’t care shucks for the morality of it, nohow.  When I start in to steal a nigger, or a 
watermelon, or a Sunday-school book, I ain’t no ways particular how it’s done so it’s 
done.  What I want is my nigger; or what I want is my watermelon; or what I want is my 
Sunday-school book; and if a pick’s the handiest thing, that’s the thing I’m agoing to dig 
that nigger or watermelon or that Sunday-school book with; and I don’t give a dead rat 
what the authorities think about it nuther.13   
 
Neatness requires a commitment to the use value of the material world: Huck replaces morality 
in this passage with an ethics of efficiency, the ability to accomplish one’s goal through the least 
amount of labor.   The question of neatness versus style proves to be a contest between different 
ways of intervening in the material world, of how one ought to understand labor as a moral force.   
Neatness, as opposed to style, bestows meaning retroactively: the pick, rather than the case knife, 
becomes the better choice after the fact, in retrospect, because of its efficiency in performing the 
task at hand.   Neatness dictates that one chooses one’s tools or strategies for entering the realm 
of the social by attempting to predict the utility of these tools, or by calling upon inherited 
knowledge about use value.   There is no room for improvisation, for practice, within an 
economy of neatness: the outcome is already defined.   Thus, it seems hardly a coincidence that 
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here Huck so easily places Jim in a catalogue that includes a book and a watermelon.   His world 
is in every sense a world of objects to be utilized, acted upon, and acquired.   His moral 
awakening belies an intensely narcissistic form of subjectivity in which entities in the world exist 
entirely for him and enter his consciousness as objects solely by virtue of their “handi[ness].” 
 Now, it would be easy to suggest that neatness and style are opposed in Huckleberry 
Finn, but this would trample the nuance of the distinction that Twain makes between the two.   
More accurately, neatness is itself a style even as it masquerades as its absence or dearth in the 
same way that minimalism, with its refusal of adornment, considers itself both a style and lack of 
or resistance against it.   Neatness accomplishes its function without calling attention to its own 
machinations and stylistic maneuvers, occluding the fact of its ideology.    
In his 1956 essay on the novel’s indebtedness to landscape conventions, Leo Marx argues 
that the book’s greatest achievement is its vernacular style, which allows Huck as narrator to 
integrate two observational positions: knowing the object of description and taking sensual 
pleasure in it.   “In this person,” writes Marx, “Clemens reaches back to a primal mode of 
perception undisturbed by the tension between art and science.   It does not occur to Huck to 
choose between beauty and utility.”14  In both his schemes and his narration during the bulk of 
the river journey, Huck collapses the aesthetic with the functional—but I would add that the 
episode with the King and the Duke begins a transition that entails a departure from this 
integrated form of seeing and narration.   After coming ashore and resolving to depart from the 
more excessive, ornamental aspects of Tom’s style, Huck abandons the generosity with which he 
imbibes the “gloriously imperfect actuality” of the world and begins to advocate a staunch 
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scientism, a calculus of cost and benefit in which there is no place for beauty.15   Thus it is left to 
Tom to revive what has been cast off by Huck—an investment in beauty and in the aesthetic as a 
whole—and to in turn initiate the tension between the previously integrated observational poses.   
As is probably become clear by now, Tom’s understanding of style has very little to do 
with what we normally conceive of as style—narrative language—and much more to do with the 
dynamics of plot.   Indeed, while, as Marx shows, style on the river is very much a matter of 
language and the possibilities of language to bridge the divide between subjectivity and 
objectivity, back on land, the narrative no longer performs such feats.   Style does not simply 
disappear, though.   Rather, we might even say that a concern for good style gets sucked out of 
the narrative and made material within the world of the fiction; style turns into the stuff of plot.   
It ceases to be Huck’s concern as narrator because Tom takes over the role of stylothete the only 
way he can, in a medium other than language: “evasion.”  Tom’s plan produces a profusion of 
materiality: silverware, shirts, food, a sheet baked into a pie, rodents in bags, snakes dropping 
from the rafters, and more.   As a result, in these chapters, style reveals its unique material 
character, accreting an effusion of objects whose only purpose is to manifest style.   Style is 
ornamental, inessential, but still very much part of the “furniture of the real world.”  It creates 
new abundances, but, as I will discuss at length in the next section, it also leaves holes in the 
fabric of the everyday, and, as a result, the absence, just as much as the presence, of objects and 
individuals vexes the adults in the story.   
 Neatness requires an ethic of efficiency; it is motivated by its end goal, and it organizes 
events or actions in relation to that end goal.    We might see it as subtending plot, as the 
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operational principle of emplotment.   Style, in contrast, requires a very different relationship 
between the end goal and the middle.   It has a more oblique relationship to the end and instead 
takes a round about route toward any terminus, producing a disorganized, overly expansive 
middle that resists our desires to get on with it and move forward.   One way to conceive of these 
apparently contradictory operational principles might be to see them through the conceptual 
frame of the  “double logic” of narrative.16  Peter Brooks describes the duality this way:  
 …prior events, causes, are so only retrospectively, in a reading back from the end.   In 
this sense, the metaphoric work of eventual totalization determines the meaning and 
status of the metonymic work of sequence—though it must also be claimed that the 
metonymies of the middle produced, gave birth to, the final metaphor.17 
 
Plot makes possible two different readings that move in opposite directions: one forward, in 
which the middle is an accumulation that makes the ending possible, and one backward from the 
totalizing telos that is the end.    
Neatness makes perfect sense in this light, and Huck demonstrates his mastery of the dual 
logic of endings and middles when he provides what could be read as emplotment’s guiding 
principle: “I ain’t no ways particular how it’s done so it’s done.”18  The thing done makes the 
“how” of it meaningful while the “how” produces the only thing that matters, has meaning: the 
end.   To say that he is not particular is, in a way, to say that he is especially particular about the 
arc of succession that appears only in light of completion, that he comprehends the 
distinctiveness of plot as more than a series of events, as an intentional structure weighted toward 
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the future, an “operation elicited by, and made necessary by, those meanings that develop 
through succession and time.”19  
 Huck points toward the relationship between desire and plot—the desire for plot as well 
as plot’s ability to generate desire when his plots curtail it.   Not only do we (along with Huck) 
need and want plotting in order to make sense of the world and in order to manipulate it, we also 
engage in plotting to produce and magnify our desires by lending duration to a series of events 
that would otherwise only exist in a structural, non-durative relation to one another.   As Brooks 
argues, plot locates the horizon of satisfaction elsewhere and so makes desire possible.   
Neatness, however, in its drive toward efficiency minimizes the space between here and there, 
between the initiation of desire and its fulfillment; it shrinks duration, action, imagination, and 
force to a minimum without being rid of them.    
 Style, or what Twain calls “style” in the evasion episode, works differently.   Tom, our 
paragon of style, forestalls the end of the novel for several chapters so that he can insert new 
actions.   Though he still moves toward the end that both readers and Huck have in sight—Jim’s 
escape—he performs a complex dual operation of approaching and moving away from that end 
point.   Style expands plot from the middle, self-consciously postponing Jim’s escape, moving 
the beginning and the end further and further apart while still moving in the same direction.   It 
attempts to maximize duration and, in turn, desire and imagination.   It transubstantiates action 
into stylization, an aesthetic effort that only reveals Tom’s freedom—a freedom purchased at 
Jim’s expense. 
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Always possessing a strange power over the material, style both expresses and suppresses 
authorship.   For example, the letters written as part of the evasion are signed, “Unknown 
Friend.”20   Part of Tom’s strategy for dissemblance is to make visible the absent center of the 
sequence.   Roland Barthes’s and D.  A.  Miller’s theorizations of style echo this characteristic of 
style we find in the novel.   Barthes, for his part, places style on the side of particularity, pinning 
it to the writer’s material existence.   He writes that it springs “from the body and the past of the 
writer and gradually” becomes “the very reflexes of his art.”21  But while style may be an 
emanation of the authorial body, while it may reproduce the author’s body in the text, D.  A.  
Miller reminds us that it effaces her identity as well.  In his book on Jane Austen’s style, Miller 
writes that, to call a fictional economy into being, style undertakes a “renunciation of the world” 
by repressing what is external to the text, including the author, all in an effort to deny the 
“linguistic fluidity that endangered the possibility” of style’s authority in the first place.22  What 
he terms “the melancholy of Austen Style” bears similarities to the theory of style we find in 
Huckleberry Finn in the sense that Twain’s notion of style (as exercised by Tom) also labors to 
deny the world beyond, and then to efface that labor, establishing its own “extraterritoriality” 
beyond history.   Miller describes Austen the stylothete as simultaneously everywhere and 
nowhere, as the god-like “No One.”  Though I do not mean to suggest that Twain, Barthes, and 
Miller all share the exact same notion of style, all three seem to agree on one thing regarding 
style’s materiality: the fact that style exists only to produce a kind of hole in the world of the 
																																																						
20 Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, 283. 
21 Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero (Macmillan, 1977), 10. 
22 D. A. Miller, Jane Austen, or The Secret of Style (Princeton University Press, 2005), 67, 84. 
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text, a conspicuous absence in the shape of the authorial body.  This, of course, results in much 
of the evasion sequence’s humor.  Style wants to have it both ways: to be everywhere and 
nowhere at once, to be everything and nothing for the reader.   If the neat plot makes legible the 
truth of identity, revealing, for example, the King and Duke’s deception, the stylish plot throws 
representation into crisis, blurring the divide between Tom and Huck, imprisonment and escape, 
presence and absence.    
 
Fugitive Objects 
Twain was fascinated by the formation and deformation of imaginary individuals.  After 
working on Huckleberry Finn on and off for years, he took up the manuscript again in the 
summer of 1883 and finished it in a flurry of productivity.  In a notebook entry from a few 
months prior, he wrote the following story idea:  
A dozen young people privately agree that during a whole evening they will deceive one 
of their numbers by pretending they see & hear nothing which he sees & hears—& they 
will glance wonderingly at each other & seem to make furtive comments.  An hour after 
he goes to bed they (the males) slip up & peep into his room & find him avoiding 
imaginary creature—a staring-eyed maniac.23 
 
Versions of this prank appear throughout Twain’s work, but this example from the period just 
prior to the novel’s completion is especially useful as evidence of his interest in the social 
production of the real.24 (The entry directly beneath this one refers to an idea that he eventually 
																																																						
23 Mark Twain’s Notebooks and Journals, ed. Frederick Anderson, Lin Salamo, and Bernard L. 
Stein, 3 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 2:510. 
24 Richard E. Peck gives an overview of research on the construction of the novel’s ending and 
offers some interesting revisions to that earlier work in “The Campaign That... Succeeded,” 
American Literary Realism, 1870–1910 21, no. 3 (1989): 3–12. 
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incorporated into chapter twenty-three of Huckleberry Finn.)25  I take the notebook entry about 
the prank as a parable about the limits of visuality and the interpellation of subjects through 
spectacle, and it prompts two possible readings.  In the first, the victim of the prank finds himself 
excluded from the visible world inhabited by the rest of the characters, and his subsequent 
insanity dramatizes what Martin Harries calls “destructive spectatorship”—the fantasy that 
certain spectacles, instead of triggering the Althusserian scene of subject making and remaking, 
have the opposite ability to destroy the subject.26  Confronted with his inability to join the 
group’s consensus about what is visible, the man is violently ejected from the realm of good 
subjecthood, making him insane and transforming him from a viewer into the object of 
surveillance who shores up the spectatorial power of the tricksters.  “A staring-eyed maniac,” he 
becomes a bad visual subject.  In the second reading, we might just as easily take the tale to be 
an illustration of interpellation’s power to enfold everything it touches into a singular reality.  
From this perspective, the scenario is about the absolute coercion that produces the visible world 
and forms good subjects.  Even though the initial visions (what the victim sees and the pranksters 
deny seeing) are “really there,” the communal scene of viewing and their attendant pressure to 
assemble consensus about what does and does not exist leads the victim to bend his perceptual 
world to match the socially agreed-upon reality.  The political pressure to see what others see 
remakes the subject’s visual field to align with the others.’ If in the first reading the “maniac” 
represents the bad subject who must be excluded from the privileged realm of the real, in the 
second he proves the perfect and sufficiently plastic raw material for subjectivization.  In Slavoj 
																																																						
25 Mark Twain's Notebooks and Journals, 2:510. See footnote 260. 
26 Martin Harries, Forgetting Lot’s Wife: On Destructive Spectatorship (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2007). 
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Žižek’s words, he “enters the subject’s fantasy frame” in order to share its relation to the real.27  
Through both of these readings—and one ought to give them equal weight—we see Twain tying 
together aesthetic practices (“pretending” and making an “imaginary creature”) with political 
concerns about consensus and coercion (whether one is part of the fragment’s initial 
“agreement”).  
Aesthetics, writes Jacques Rancière, “is a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible 
and invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and stakes of politics 
as a form of experience.”28  It shares with politics a concern with “the sensible delimitation of 
what is common to the community” and with the distribution of what is visible in relation to 
what is understood as meaningful action.29  Twain’s notebook entry enacts this same connection 
between aesthetics and politics.  It shows what fiction and any project of domination (or 
emancipation) have in common: the mapping of a “distribution of the sensible” that defines what 
is and is not intelligible to a community, what is and is not a “creature” worthy of regard, what is 
and is not contained within the landscape of the real.  Further, the entire scenario highlights the 
liberal fantasy of sociopolitical life as a competition of disembodied voices that communicate 
otherwise unknown (interiorized) perspectives and motivations.30 Indeed, the plot turns on a 
meeting of minds and a disregard for that which is physically present.  Their collective action 
																																																						
27 Slavoj Žižek, “Psychoanalysis and the Lacanian Real,” in Adventures in Realism, ed. Matthew 
Beaumont (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 222. 
28 Jacques Ranciere, The Politics of Aesthetics (New York: Continuum, 2006), 13. 
29 Ibid., 18. 
30 Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht argues for this view of politics in his excellent Production of 
Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). 
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proves more effective than they anticipate because they take advantage of the political realm’s 
preference for Cartesian subjects who suppress embodiment and prioritize precisely that which is 
absent or invisible: interiority.  In both readings of the scene Twain describes, when wills, 
perspectives, and inner life cease to be knowable, fictionality becomes operative.31 So, first the 
group refuses to share what they actually perceive, and this becomes the premise for their game 
of make-believe.  Then the opacity switches to the other side, the maniac’s mind becomes 
unreadable, and the group “sees” the “imaginary creature.”  Thus, the message that hangs over 
both readings is that situations where individuals will not or cannot make their interior 
experience known can only be represented as asocial, make-believe, imaginary—as fiction.32  
Huckleberry Finn’s most obvious variation of the same gaslighting trick occurs when 
Huck steals a spoon from Aunt Sally by alternately removing and replacing one from the set over 
and over until she no longer trusts her own ability to count, throwing her hands up with weary 
frustration.  Huck remarks, “Now she couldn’t ever count them spoons twice alike again to save 
her life; and wouldn’t believe she’s counted them right, if she did.”33  Like the prank in the 
notebook fragment, the game with the spoon scrambles the logic of accounting and even 
destabilizes the presence of objects by animating them, bathing them in the shimmering light of 
the uncanny, keeping them radically out of reach in the way things are unreachable when they 
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a limited, vague, or no awareness at all of the motivations that guide their behavior.”  In play or 
fiction, “rules—either preexisting rules or rules that are being made up as the play unfolds—take 
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32 Ibid., 84–85. 
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prove unassimilable to everyday patterns of thought.34  And more specifically, the scene in the 
novel illuminates the constant machinations of memory—the belief in the persistence of objects 
from which we have averted our eyes—by disrupting the flow of the image-making process.  
Imagination becomes the subject of critical attention in the moment of its malfunctioning.  The 
fugitive spoon interferes with Aunt Sally’s “sense of something received and simultaneously 
there for the taking” that is vital to the veracity of both perceptual and imagined objects.35  Her 
confusion marks a moment when imagination fails to round out a durable account of an 
environment, precisely because Huck makes any kind of consensus about the spoon’s existence 
impossible.  Indeed, Sally cares about the portable and recursive phenomenon of the spoon’s 
existence, what Heidegger calls the “ready-to-handness” of “equipment”: its appropriateness for 
a task and availability to circumspection, its visibility and solidity.36  If the spoon were simply 
missing, escaped, it would still have a kind of stable presence signified by the shadow of its 
absence (she would know both that something is missing and what it is), but it “evades,” instead 
of escapes, meaning, it refuses any mode of accounting that would offer it up as ready-to-hand.  
And as a result, she finds it impossible to make a claim to the object; she finds the world 
illegible, unstable, dispossessed, and unable to return her gaze.  The spoon’s evasiveness shows a 
																																																						
34 Here I draw on Colin Dayan, The Law Is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake 
Persons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).  
35 Elaine Scarry, Dreaming by the Book (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 34. 
36 The “ready-to-hand” object does not need to be solid or visible for Heidegger (wind can be 
ready-to-hand), but my point is that for a spoon to be available in this way it must be solid, 
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resistance to human concern and an unwillingness to be knowable and available.  Whereas the 
other spoons live to be counted and mimetically reproduced in the human imagination so as to 
persist in memory and affirm the specular function of the world, anchoring Sally’s sense of 
locatedness, the evasive spoon foils that operation.  Like the prank victim from the notebook, she 
experiences the outside of what, in a different context, Audrey Jaffe has called “exclusionary 
realism.” 37  “The realist landscape, knowing how to give the subject (or native) what he wants 
(the return of his image), also knows how to refuse it,” she writes.  Jaffe’s version of destructive 
spectatorship is “negative interpellation,” and she contends that it always shows the bounded 
nature of the real: “if your surroundings can keep you out, you were never more than 
provisionally in.”  
Ultimately, the spoon trick is only one emblem of a much larger preoccupation with the 
presence and absence of individuals in Huckleberry Finn.  Consider the difficulty both characters 
and readers have accounting for bodies.  There is the search for Huck’s body; Huck’s and the 
reader’s failure to recognize Pap’s dead body; the confusion over how bodies are gendered in the 
cross-dressing episodes; the constant swapping and invention of names so as to divorce bodies 
from their “proper” identities; and, maybe most significantly, the question of what kind of body 
Jim inhabits—of who owns his body.  The goal here is not simply to argue for the instability of 
identity; more to the point, characters and readers collectively struggle over the discursive 
																																																						
37 Audrey Jaffe, “‘Outside the Gates of Everything,’” Novel: A Forum on Fiction 43.3 (Fall 
2010): 384. Many of the critics I engage with here specialize in British fiction because fewer 
Americanists have written about fictionality. There are, I think, reasons for this that deserve 
exploration, but they lie beyond the purview of this chapter. Hopefully it will suffice to say I am 
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meaning of bodies—their status as present or absent, dead or alive, named, gendered, and so 
on—emphasizing the social making of human signification and the objectivity of identity.   
By drawing so much attention to fakery and the limits of perception, Twain arouses the 
reader’s wish to read “into” the text, to know more and more.  Sacvan Bercovitch has written 
about the readerly stance taken toward Huck in particular, observing that we are initially driven 
by an urge to protect the boy from his own naiveté, leading us to “[reach] between the lines” of 
the narrative for a truer, more moral meaning: “he says, trembling, ‘I’ll go to hell’ and we think 
‘he’s saved!’”38  Bercovitch continues: “And our act of protection is in turn a claim to 
ownership.  It makes Huck ours.  […] We adopt him; we take him into our hearts; we interpret 
him in our likeness; we rewrite his text.”39  The whole process of interpreting Huck quickly turns 
into a means of appropriating the character and remaking him in our own image, of always 
proceeding under Twain’s guidance to symptomatically read and insist upon the submerged 
meaning beneath Huck’s narrative—the meaning that returns us to ourselves.  This hermeneutic 
process gives us precisely what we want.  We come to the text expecting to find our reflection 
and the text dutifully complies.  But as Bercovitch compellingly argues, the novel is openly 
critical of this kind of reading, giving us the opportunity to laugh at the narcissism of seeking 
“political resolution in the act of exposé” as the familiar models of symptomatic reading and 
ideology critique would have it.40  Huck Finn renders visible the liberal ideological structures 
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39 Ibid., 118. Jonathan Arac’s Huckleberry Finn as Idol and Target: The Functions of Criticism 
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propelling the hermeneutic act, the driving fantasy of an ideology that presents itself as all 
ideologies do—reified through an apparent vulnerability to puncturing, to a demolishing critique, 
to transcendence and a vision of itself disguised as the “real.”  The readerly desire to appropriate 
Huck and nearly all the characters in the novel presents itself as the impulse to penetrate the 
exterior, the ironic, and discover an interior unknown even to the character himself, all in the 
service of a salvific sympathy.  And as Bercovitch’s analysis implies, Twain uses the novel to 
critique this form of critique, as it were, as well as this way of relating to characters.  He 
estranges us from the topographical figuration of characters as psyches embedded within the 
plane of the page.  The reader instead turns against her own impulse to pierce the surface of 
Huck’s narration and make a claim to a deeper, more essential version of the character.   Twain 
draws her up from the depths of some buried meaning toward what Huck manifestly says.  
Bercovitch’s reading exemplifies what Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus have called “surface 
reading,” and specifically, the “embrace of the surface as an affective and ethical stance.”41 This 
reading practice “involves accepting texts, deferring to them instead of mastering or using them 
as objects, and refuses the depth model of truth, which dismisses surfaces as inessential and 
deceptive.” If, for Bercovitch and Twain, the reader’s penetrating mastery of a character is a ruse 
of dominant ideology, then we might focus on the surface of Huckleberry Finn by returning to 
the scene of reception through a self-criticality that cuts through any absorption in the text.  The 
reader catches herself in the act of appropriation, mitigating the epistemological violence of 
interpretation.   
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This insistence on manifest content or appearances comes through clearly during the 
evasion sequence when the boys sign the letters they write, “Unknown Friend.” 42  The first one 
reads, “Beware.  Trouble is brewing.  Keep a sharp lookout.” Part of Tom’s strategy for 
dissemblance is to call attention to Jim’s impending flight, to draw everything to the surface by 
announcing the future absence that propels the reign of terror he brings down upon Aunt Sally.  
If Huck makes legible the truth of identity, revealing, for example, the King’s and Duke’s 
deception earlier in the story, Tom’s plan flaunts his lack of interest in the hermeneutic search 
for hidden truth.  Tom replaces the logic of identity with the logic of presence and absence.  And 
as a result, he throws revelation and representation itself into crisis, blurring the divide between 
Tom and Huck (who pose as each other during the evasion), imprisonment and escape, presence 
and absence.  “Jim’s got to do his instruction and coat of arms,” Tom insists, convincing the 
other two that they need to write the history of Jim’s captivity.43  When it comes to actually 
recording the inscription, though, Tom uses a nail to first scratch the words into a grindstone 
before the illiterate Jim traces over them and carves a more permanent message into the stone.  
“Here a lonely heart broke,” Tom writes, “and a worn spirit went to its rest, after thirty-seven 
years of solitary captivity.”44  Tom professes to write the history of Jim’s evasion, but in 
actuality he proleptically records Jim’s death.  The hermeneutics of exposé would uncover the 
truth of what is “really there,” make a presence when faced with an absence of manifest 
information.  In contrast, Tom’s stylish plot divulges a more immediate political reality right on 
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the surface of the story: the near impossibility that Jim’s self-representation could be anything 
other than a reiteration of a script or the impasse of a character whose presence always takes the 
form of an inscription of his own absence.   
Twain estranges the reader from Jim, calling attention to his fictionality.  Because realist 
novels tend to take advantage of the reader’s desire for omnipotence, they risk indulging the 
illusion that, if one just reads the right way, a character will become fully knowable.  Twain 
reminds us how illusory this phenomenon really is.  The point becomes clearer in light of another 
short example from the body of criticism that faults the evasion sequence for its representation of 
Jim, specifically, the way the critique understands character.  Wayne C.  Booth’s The Company 
We Keep is about the relationship between literature and ethics.  Booth writes that Huckleberry 
Finn, “like the mischievous Tom Sawyer, simply treats Jim and his feelings here as expendable, 
as sub-human—a slave to the plot, as it were.”45  This one sentence contains a complicated set of 
critical moves.  Booth implies that Jim, unjustly handled by the novel, ought to be represented 
otherwise, as a human and full of feeling.  In other words, Jim has an emotional life, is in 
“reality” human, whereas the novel works to hide these facts from view.  This reading seeks to 
reclaim Jim’s lost subjectivity—as though the novel’s discourse works like a keyhole, limiting 
the view of the story—tacitly forgetting the fact that, like all characters, Jim is not simply 
confined in the novel; he is of the novel as well.  After the em dash, however, Booth rises to the 
level of form, to the discourse of the novel, to argue that the violence practiced on Jim occurs 
when it privileges plot over character.  But if we agree with Aristotle when he says that character 
necessarily exists logically subsequent to plot (and I think we should), we know that this is 
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always the case: character unfolds through plot.  While Booth would have us believe that Jim’s 
subjugation to plot is a special instance and that other characters like Huck and Tom possess 
some kind of freedom from emplotment, in actuality none of the characters in the novel differs in 
this particular way, that is, in the structural relationship between character and plot.  What does 
make the novel distinct, I think, is the fact that readers care for Jim as Booth does, as a slave to 
plot, and that they do so far more intensely and self-consciously than they do for other literary 
characters.  In the evasion sequence Twain brings plot to readers’ immediate attention, leading 
them to experience it as Booth does, as if it exerts a force upon character, as if Jim would exceed 
the stifling constraints of textuality and his subjectivity would expand if only form somehow fell 
away.  Character and plot, then, cease to exist in a simple structural relation to one another, one 
supporting the other (as they do in the Aristotelian formulation) because of this addition of force.  
We begin to experience the interaction of plot and character as an exercise in power.  But what 
does it mean to conceive of a character as contained and imprisoned within a text as opposed to 
understanding it as a mere textual function? 
 
Huck’s Voice/Jim’s Body 
In thinking about characterization as a relation of power—as though the reader is both 
witness to and participant in a play of freedom and subjection—I find a pair of sentences in 
Frank Kermode’s The Sense of an Ending helpful.  In the first he states that “[characters] have 
their choices, but the novel has its end,”46 and a couple of pages earlier, without too much 
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explanation, he asserts that if a character “were entirely free he might simply walk out of the 
story.”47  I bring up these passages not only because they seem to agree with my assertion that in 
relation to realist fiction we can at times feel the limitations of a character’s freedom but also 
because they push us to wonder what makes it possible to talk about characters this way in the 
first place—as entities who walk about in the story with a certain amount of volition and 
freedom, until they come up against freedom’s limits in the instant they are confronted by certain 
formal boundaries of the novelistic discourse.  Think of Jim tracing over the text Tom prepares 
for him; form, that moment powerfully suggests, is a practice of confinement.  For Kermode, 
endings vividly mark these boundaries because with regard to characters they practice a certain 
kind of ontological violence by constraining subjectivity, choice, the ability to amble out of the 
text or speak without its script.  When we finish a novel, we abandon its characters and choose, 
at the suggestion of its form, to move on with our lives, carrying with us only memory’s faded 
version of the reading experience.  (But of course endings are not the only way in which novels 
guide our regard.) Kermode’s attention to the limitations of characters’ freedom proves 
provocative in a way he may not have intended when it leads him to suggest that novels take an 
interest in negotiating freedom and its curtailment, that we should attend to these negotiations, 
and, finally, that novels implicitly raise ethical issues about the treatment of characters at the 
hands of their texts and their readers. 
Similarly, whereas critics are used to thinking about characters in terms of a “system” or 
a distribution of majorness and minorness, roundness and flatness, the Victorianist critic Alex 
Woloch has recently written about character as a “technology of attribution.” Narrative portions 
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out its attention to different characters, who “jostle for limited space within the same fictive 
universe.”48  Far from inevitable, the intense visibility of a protagonist and the near invisibility of 
a minor character are matters of a social process enacted by the narrative’s power to represent or 
suppress what it chooses.  One could say that the final chapters’ conflict between Tom and Huck 
amounts to a disagreement over discursive turf, with Tom attempting to evade the book’s ending 
and Huck trying to bring it closer, Tom demanding more discursive space and Huck resisting.  
The narrative would conclude sooner, in other words, were it not for the insubordinate power 
grab by the formerly minor Tom, who insists on more representation—a move readers find hard 
to forgive because it is purchased at the expense of Jim’s freedom and subjectivity. 
While I agree with that account of how power works in the novel, I also want to reassess 
readings that view Jim’s characterization as an arc from minor to major, or flat to round, before 
the evasion sequence flattens him again.  By emphasizing his position as a literary character, 
Twain’s representation of Jim serves as what Fred Moten has called “an improvisatory 
suspension of subjectivity, and of a certain desire for subjectivity, and of any prior understanding 
of subjectivity’s differentiated ground.”49 I take Moten to mean that certain textual practices exist 
in which the question of individual narrative subjectivity gives way to questions about the 
possibilities that inhere in the objectivity of the narrative, or in our case the objecthood of the 
enslaved character.  Moten writes specifically about nonfiction texts in this case, like WPA 
narratives, where the speaking subject comes to our attention only through a process of 
translation that we might understand otherwise as a “predatory erasure” of originary subjectivity.  
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But what if we didn’t understand the narrative as an erasure, he wonders, and instead viewed it 
as “the echo of that already extant loss inherent in intelligibility, translation, and transcription, 
whose presence is and allows the meditational ‘ethics’ of ensemble”?  From this perspective, the 
narration becomes a record of the gains and losses that mark every entrance into history, or the 
site where an “ensemble” of textual forces meet and negotiate the cost of becoming intelligible.  
While Moten’s essay does not concern itself with fiction, I want to suggest that Huckleberry 
Finn dramatizes something similar to his “mediational ‘ethics’ of ensemble.” Though fictive, the 
representation of a black slave still risks being read through the lens of identitarian politics as an 
erasure of subjectivity that occurs at the cost of Huck’s narrative and Tom’s hijinks.  Alternately, 
thinking about the text as a practice of ensemble allows, as Moten writes, for an ethics to emerge.  
It makes possible questions about the relational stance we take toward Jim: what is at stake when 
a novel imagines the life of a fictional slave, brings an imaginary slave into being?  And how 
should we think about ourselves as readers of such a novel, often taking pleasure as we witness 
his continued enslavement?  
This last question is especially complicated because the nature of literary characters 
makes it difficult to say what we really mean when we talk about “witnessing” or “viewing” or 
being privy to a “spectacle” involving a fictional individual because, after all, strictly speaking, 
there is nothing to see when we are reading novels except for words on paper.  Any account of 
the ethical encounter with prose fiction must consider the peculiarities of reading and the 
imaginative process undertaken by the reader under the careful “instruction” of the author, to use 
a term from Elaine Scarry.50  As she points out, the verbal arts, “especially narrative, is almost 
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bereft of any sensuous content” beyond the black marks and the feel of the pages, meaning that 
the reader’s encounter with character should be thought of differently from the encounter with a 
photograph or a painting or a theatrical performance.51  Like other media, the text guides the 
creation of the representation, but unlike the others, that guidance serves a mimesis that occurs 
much closer to the consumer’s imagination than to the work of art; novel readers “make” 
characters in a much more literal sense than other consumers of art, or at the very least they have 
more agency in the formation of fictional persons’ “embodied” existence.  In this way, the 
phenomenology of reading fiction sits closer to the experience of memory, of conjuring and 
vivifying a set of entities in the face of a near absence of sensuous information.   
From this phenomenological perspective, we are able to speak of the “objectivity” of 
characters even while insisting that the issue of ontology is irrelevant or perhaps secondary to the 
experience of novel reading described by critics like Kermode and Woloch—the sense that 
characters walk around in the theater of imagination, which is a proscenium architected by the 
limits of the text’s form.  Literary character comes into focus as an ensemble formation, 
something other than merely, on the one hand, a product of reception or, on the other, something 
bestowed upon the reader.  In most sympathetic critical appraisals of Huckleberry Finn the 
reader supposedly experiences Jim’s sentience (focalized through Huck) and reassesses him as a 
character organized by the division between exteriority and interiority, a shift that gives rise to 
moral accountability.  To have an interior is to be an object of moral thought, these readings 
propose.  These interpretations rest upon “the received idea of the novel as devoted to the all-
importance of interiority” and suggest that we read into Twain’s characters as efflorescences of 
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psyche, treating consciousness as a place we can go and novels as if they are the vehicle that take 
us there.52  While some novels do uncritically represent the “thingliness” of consciousness, 
Twain is interested in complicating the topography of the novel by resisting the critical posture 
that assumes fiction is organized by an inside and outside, a surface and its unseen depths.   
My own strategy for reading Huckleberry Finn accords with Bercovitch’s in that it seeks 
to highlight some of the ways the text frustrates the critical drive to access the invisible interior 
of fictional individuals, leading the reader toward a different experience from that of sympathy: 
something closer to what Kermode and Woloch get at when they write about communities of 
characters strolling around in texts that function as containers.  I read “with an eye for [the] 
institutional erotics” of the novel.53  This means giving an account of the encounter with a 
character as, in some way, an “embodied” individual who remains at a distance and to an extent 
unknowable rather than inhabitable; if characters have their freedom, they must have their 
secrets, too.  Rather than orienting our reading along a vertical axis of individual subjectivity, the 
novel encourages a reading that skates along a horizontal axis of ensemble or institutionality.54 
																																																						
52 David Kurnick, Empty Houses: Theatrical Failure and the Novel (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 21.  
53 Ibid. 
54 My argument that Twain’s realism evinces a concern with persons as well as the social 
processes through which personhood itself gets constructed and deconstructed is supported by 
the reassessments of realism that have taken place in the last thirty years. In a review essay about 
a number of books, including The Social Construction of American Realism by Amy Kaplan, 
American Realism: New Essays edited by Eric Sundquist, and Writing Realism by Daniel H. 
Borus, John C. Hirsh writes, “Most American Realists maintained a continuing regard for 
biography, and a consequent disinclination either to trust unconditionally the exercise of 
institutional power, or to ignore the effect of class discourse and the requirements of readership. 
Still, as recent studies have emphasized, the critique of the forces which impinge upon person is 
informed deeply by the sense that certain forms of institutional power (economic, for example) 
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This way of thinking about literary character is probably most closely related to the 
theoretical paradigms of René Girard, Leo Bersani, and Sharon Cameron, who all think more 
horizontally than vertically as a means of establishing a clearer distinction between encounters 
with literary characters and encounters with real persons.55  Cameron’s work, for example, shows 
how a number of nineteenth-century American writers create characters lacking a clearly 
bounded and interiorized consciousness, thereby disrupting the metonymic operation by which 
readers link a literary character to an embodied and interiorized person.56  This strain of literary 
scholarship reveals fiction’s ability to lead a reader outside the normative frameworks of identity, 
subjectivity, individuation, and personality; it seeks a representational art severed from the 
violence of selfhood.  It evinces character’s impersonality (a term used by both Bersani and 
Cameron).   
																																																						
were inescapable.” John C. Hirsh, “Realism Renewed,” Journal of American Studies 25, no. 2 
(1991): 238. 
55 René Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1966); Leo Bersani, A Future for Astyanax: Character and Desire in Literature (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984); Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips, Intimacies (Chicago: 
University Of Chicago Press, 2010).  
56 Sharon Cameron, The Corporeal Self: Allegories of the Body in Melville and Hawthorne (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Sharon Cameron, Thinking in Henry James (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991); Sharon Cameron, Impersonality: Seven Essays (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009). Susan Stewart states, “The body is our mode of perceiving 
scale and, as the body of the other, becomes our antithetical mode of stating conventions of 
symmetry and balance on the one hand, and the grotesque and the disproportionate on the other. 
We can see the body as taking the place of origin for exaggeration and, more significantly, as 
taking the place of origin for our understanding of metonymy (the incorporated bodies of self 
and lover) and metaphor (the body of the other). It is this very desire of part for whole which 
both animates narrative and, in fact, creates the illusion of the real.” Susan Stewart, On Longing: 




And if there is a genealogy of American writing committed to impersonality, as Cameron 
suggests there is, Huck Finn belongs in that category.  It is worth making this distinction because 
of the long critical tradition focusing on the politics of voice—both Huck’s and Jim’s.  As 
Fishkin puts it, commentators “tend to concur on the question of how Huckleberry Finn 
transformed American literature.  Twain’s innovation of having a vernacular-speaking child tell 
his own story in his own words was the first stroke of brilliance.”57  Twain’s realism pulls focus 
away from Huck’s interior life, giving us a character who is constituted primarily through his 
speech, that is, in and through social language rather than within the confines of a private 
interiority.  And many who criticize Twain’s racial politics have noted the child-like quality of 
Jim’s speech.  In both cases, voice serves as the measure of personhood; a character’s voice 
should individuate him sufficiently and be a kind of linguistic accretion of his humanity; voice 
signifies a character’s capacity for political regard.  It tells us how seriously to take him as a 
person.  In contrast, I am trying to get at the novel’s powerful critique of personhood itself, 
which raises a different set of issues about the kind of regard we lend in the absence of a fully 
developed voice and without the usual signs of political legitimacy.  I would argue that 
Huckleberry Finn does not valorize voicedness as much as it asks us to consider the fact that we 
live within a sensible regime where certain kinds of voices earn the legitimacy of speech while 
others fail to do so—where certain voices are politically intelligible and others fall beneath the 
threshold of audible speech.  Partly because the politics of voice and the politics of personhood 
are bound so tightly, in the essay’s final section, I have chosen instead to dwell on Jim as a body 
by looking closely at several descriptions of him. 
																																																						




Regarding the Solidity of Literary Characters 
The struggle to reproduce the givenness of absent persons is Twain’s larger concern.  
With this in mind, it is worth going over some very well-known territory in the novel for the sake 
of a reading that will then attend to some less familiar passages.  Here is the famous moment 
when Huck lays down the letter to Miss Watson and decides to help “free” Jim: 
But I didn’t do it straight off, but laid the paper down and set there thinking—thinking 
how good it was all this happened so, and how near I come to being lost and going to 
hell.  And went on thinking.  And got to thinking over our trip down the river; and I see 
Jim before me, all the time, in the day, and in the nighttime, sometimes moonlight, 
sometimes storms, and we a floating along, talking, and singing, and laughing.  But 
somehow I couldn’t seem to strike no places to harden me against him, but only the other 
kind.  I’d see him standing my watch on top of his’n, stead of calling me, so I could go on 
sleeping; and see him how glad he was when I come back out of the fog; and when I 
come to him again in the swamp, up there where the feud was; and suchlike times: and 
would always call me honey, and pet me, and do everything he could think of for me, and 
how good he always was; and at last I struck the time I saved him by telling the men we 
had small-pox aboard, and he was so grateful, and said I was the best friend old Jim ever 
had in the world, and the only one he’s got now; and then I happened to look around, and 
see that paper.58  
 
As moving and as compelling as many find this passage, a closer look at its representation of 
compassion shows Twain struggling, groping for something on which to hang his novel’s theory 
of ethical and political thought.59  He leads Huck along a string of carefully plotted moves from 
the narrator’s hand on the paper—Huck’s immediate physical environment—through a series of 
remembered encounters with the absent Jim, and back to an awareness of the paper.  Jim first 
enters Huck’s mind as a strictly visual presence: Huck suddenly “sees” Jim before he considers 
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the perceptual conditions of his memories—the daylight, the moonlight, the fog that clears and 
makes way for Jim’s appearance.  The narrative next takes that embodied image of Jim and 
animates it when Jim pets Huck.  And finally it projects a small amount of interiority onto the 
enslaved man’s body, which appears “grateful.”  However, that interiority—if interiority is the 
right word for such a vague rendering of sentience—does not lead Huck further into the inner 
chambers of Jim’s mind, because it instead manifests a centrifugal force, pushing the boy 
outward into the context of “the world” and then to a survey of his own environment, to his 
embodied position and, thus, back to Jim’s absence.  To be sure, Huck projects himself into the 
“there” of imagination, but this only serves to return him to the “here” of his perceptual self.  The 
point of this passage, it seems to me, is not to walk the reader through a kind of instruction 
manual for the structure of feeling that will generate responsibility and, ultimately, ethical action; 
instead, it frankly, even movingly, limns the impossibility of summoning the idea of another’s 
consciousness without returning to one’s own sensuous world, especially when the task of 
making a simple, durable, inert, consciousness-less image of another human body is already so 
difficult.60  Twain understands moral thought, and specifically the regard for persons out of 
perceptual reach, as a chain of imaginary exercises: producing a mimesis of the other’s body, 
animating that body, and projecting affect onto it.  And the strain of this undertaking most 
concerns him.  This is one of several moments in the novel when Huck’s imagination falters 
before returning him (and us) back to the firm ground of the here and now of the story’s present.  
“It was a close place,” Huck remarks after he notices the paper, as if to emphasize the severe 
placelessness of his imagined Jim. 
																																																						




 So how does the novel understand imagination’s role in ethical thinking, or how does it 
figure imagination as a specific mode of attending to distant entities?  How does the imagined 
world gain its optic, haptic, and aural coherence; its objectivity?  And how does it remain 
coherent, memorable, for characters with a dearth of sensory information?  What exactly 
happens in those moments when imagination fails to produce the real?61  I argue that when 
image-making stops manufacturing recognizable objects, one confronts the flimsiness of the 
imagined things and bodies upon which we project subjectivity.  Projection becomes nearly 
impossible, the question of subjectivity is suspended, and the objectivity of fictional entities rises 
to the level of our attention.  In other words, Twain throws a wrench into the operations of the 
novel’s mimesis in order to reveal its underlying structures or the means of producing fictional 
characters’ subjectivity.  He is interested in imagination as a space where the author, reader, and 
character enter into the contract that, paradoxically, vivifies the image of the character.  To echo 
an earlier point, he is interested in the character as the reader experiences him: as simultaneously 
a product of and a participant in the fictional contract, as a willful object.62  
 Before coming back to the issue of readerly imagination, I want to return to the 
representation of Huck’s imagination.  Twain begins Huck’s recollection of Jim through a 
curtain of fog for a very specific reason.  That is, in producing an imagined body, the most 
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imaginary work entailed in reading realist fiction.  
62 My analysis brackets the ontological issue of what type of object a character is.  I begin from a 
different point of departure, the idea that characters are indeed objects while they also appear to 
have agency.  This dual nature arises because, when we suspend our disbelief, we activate the 
following conundrum: characters are both logically antecedent and logically subsequent to the 
fictional contract, both “given” and a product of our reading.  
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difficult feature to reproduce from the perceptual world is solidity, and fog helps with the task.63  
Fog (like gauze or blurry rain) has “features that more closely approximate the phenomenology 
of imaginary objects,” writes Scarry.  “The four key ways in which light ordinarily exposes the 
structure of the material world—slant, reflectivity, intrinsic color, illumination—are absent or 
‘indeterminate’ in fog; we might say that in fog the physical universe approaches the condition 
of the imagination.”64  Imagination (and literary fiction), Scarry contends, often takes advantage 
of one object passing in front of another to solidify both.  “But unlike other instances of visually 
inferred solidity, such as a solid passing over a solid (my hand passing over my face), [fog] has 
the second feature of drawing on the imagination’s own properties.  It precisely capitalizes on, 
rather than disavows, the ordinary feebleness of the imagination.”65  When an author instructs the 
reader to imagine fog passing over a solid, the solid seems to have that feature more intensely 
precisely because of the fog’s diffusion of light and lack of density.  Twain draws on the 
properties of imagination and the very process of solidifying images in order to lay bare the 
workings of imagination as they occur in Huck’s mind.  The narrative moves deeper into Huck’s 
interiority in order to represent the production of Jim’s solidity by recapitulating the mental 
process that introduces density and opacity, the emergence of Jim as a solid object out of the 
undifferentiated thinness of imagination.   
 I discuss Jim’s imaginary presence as a solid and opaque body at such length because 
those are the only material properties his body seems to have in the novel’s instructions for 
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imagining him.  When Huck first sees Jim, he views him “setting in the kitchen door; we could 
see him pretty clear, because there was a light behind him.”66 Twain introduces Jim in silhouette, 
describing this vision as “pretty clear” despite the fact that the light emanates from behind his 
figure, as though to see Jim clearly means viewing him as an opaque, negative body without any 
positive visual features.  His body is the only one in the novel to be introduced in this way.  
Usually characters’ bodies are viewed through a window, a hole in the foliage, or behind a 
curtain of hair and lit from the front; the description places them at the center of an interior that 
the reader enters from the outside, passing through a threshold to get to the figure.  Jim, however, 
stands on that threshold, blocking passage into the interior.  And the descriptions of him 
consistently work the same way, carrying his body through the fictional environment without 
ever imbuing it with any real positive visual presence; he is all solidity without color, all density 
without reflectivity.  In this way he resembles the landscape on the river, which also often 
appears to the reader in silhouette: “It was a monstrous big river here, with the tallest and the 
thickest kind of timber on both banks, just a solid wall, as well as I could see, by the stars”;67 “I 
rose up and there was Jackson’s Island…big and dark and solid, like a steamboat without any 
lights”;68 “I see the moon go off watch and the darkness begin to blanket the river.  But in a little 
while I see a pale streak over the tree-tops, and knowed the day was coming.”69  All of these 
negative images serve a vital imaginative purpose by ushering the reader’s imagination out of 
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uniform darkness, carving out the first silhouettes that will serve as not only the visual backdrop 
for the action but also the stable walls that keep the entire visual and haptic world of imaginary 
objects from collapsing in on itself, delimiting an initial space where the rest of the world will 
come to life and reside, propped against these solid barriers.  Inverting the characteristic visual 
trope of realism, the window, they emphasize the circumscription that establishes the real of the 
story.  And it is as though Jim’s body, cutting between formless light and Huck’s gaze so as to 
situate the reader in the fictional space, serves as part of this imaginative shell, as another figure 
in the silhouetted landscape that creates the novel’s interiority (in the more general sense of the 
word).  Jim does not possess an interior life in any meaningful sense because he is the very 
ground upon which the novel’s interiority establishes itself.  He makes the world safe for the set 
of imaginative acts demanded by the novel.  We invest our trust in him and almost literally build 
the world of the book on his back.  He reveals the affective dimension of all fiction reading in 
which we feel thrown into a world of descriptions we hope to be solid enough to withstand the 
weight of our fantasies.70  
 But as Huck knows from his attempt to imagine Jim in the moment of his “conversion,” 
all imaginary entities evaporate or evade us; novels have their endings.  Thus, Jim exemplifies 
something true of all characters, that our relationship to them is one of “cruel optimism,” to use a 
term from Lauren Berlant.  With fictional people, one forms an attachment to an object 
optimistically in that the object “ignites a sense of possibility,” but this optimism is cruel “insofar 
as the very pleasures of being inside [the] relation [are] sustaining regardless of the content of the 
relation, such that a person or a world finds itself bound to a situation of profound threat that is, 
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at the same time, profoundly confirming.”71  A reader lends fictional characters attention even 
though they are bound to disappoint, to escape her regard.  The benefit of Berlant’s formulation 
is that it links affect with politics by identifying the “affective structure” underlying political 
commitments to fantasies that are sustaining yet ultimately unsustainable, fragile, and costly.  
Imagining literary characters seems to me to be all of these things, and when fictional individuals 
ultimately fail us, as they inevitably will, we find ourselves at what she calls an “impasse.”72  
 Those are the moments that interest me in Huck Finn—when the reader or a character has 
invested herself in an object that suddenly loses its solidity and givenness, becoming evasive, 
unaccounted for.  In visual terms, it is not so much that a vision recedes as much as visuality 
itself recedes.73  Consider Huck lying down in his canoe, looking straight up into the night 
without any horizon to anchor his gaze: “The sky looks ever so deep when you lay down on your 
back in the moonshine; I never knowed it before.  And how far a body can hear on the water 
such nights! I heard people talking on the ferry landing.  I heard what they said, too, every word 
of it.”74  For Huck, this is a moment of vertiginous looking, of gazing upon a landscape that has 
depth but no bounds, that one can see and see into without seeing through because it lacks 
apparent boundaries.  Looking toward the sky does not lead him to any visual point or boundary 
that locates him in the visual world.  The visual recedes and he lives for the remainder of the 
paragraph in a world of pure sound.  What is more, the reader, too, experiences this passage as a 
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74 Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, 45. 
	 	
	 72 
recession insofar as the infinite depth of the sky explodes the haptic and optical ground of the 
mimesis by dissolving its solidity.  Solidity “prevents not our further sinking downwards” (or, I 
would add, outwards) “but our further sinking inwards,” Scarry writes.75  It lets us perform “the 
projective act without vertigo or alarm, and thereby lifts the inhibitions on mental vivacity that 
ordinarily protect us.”  Imagining the sky through Huck’s narration leads the reader not out into 
an imaginary abyss but inwards toward herself, imposing those inhibitions that keep her from 
activating the mimetic content of the fictional landscape.  The encounter with the sky precipitates 
the dissolution of the imagined world of the novel and marks a readerly confrontation with the 
raw materials or “properties” of one’s own imagination, and with the precarity of all imagined 
entities.   
 Similarly, in the fog, which Huck will later rely on for imagining Jim, the mimesis meets 
its match: “I couldn’t tell nothing about voices in the fog, for nothing don’t look natural nor 
sound natural in a fog.”76  Huck goes on: 
I kept quiet with my ears cocked, about fifteen minutes, I reckon.  I was floating along, of 
course, four or five miles an hour; but you don’t ever think of that.  No, you feel like you 
are laying dead still on the water; and if a little glimpse of a snag slips by, you don’t think 
to yourself how fast you’re going, but you catch your breath and think, my! how that 
snag’s tearing along.  If you think it ain’t dismal and lonesome out in a fog that way, by 
yourself, in the night, you try it once—you’ll see.77 
 
The direct address to the reader at the end of this passage is significant.  “You” must “try it” to 
understand, he claims in an attempt to overcome the insufficiencies of his descriptive power.  
And even then “you’ll see” only to the extent that you won’t see.  But, in a way, the reader 
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already has had the isolating experience of a mimesis collapsing, of a fictional landscape 
shrouding itself in fog and refusing her “gaze,” triggering a “sinking inwards.” (Despite what 
Huck says, even the densest fog is easy to imagine.) What actually troubles him as a narrator is 
that, in approaching the condition of imagination, the fog entails a vivid mimesis of perceptual 
failure that undoes the prior work of making a world inhabitable by solid, weighty characters.  
This liquefaction is not a failure of the reader’s imaginary powers but a triumph of readerly 
imagination over the narrator and the author’s aspirations to omniscience, control, good style.  
“You’ll see” marks an eruption of authorial vulnerability, a place where style breaks down.  If 
most description relies for its success on the reader “suppressing awareness of volition”—
forgetting the fact that she chooses to follow the author’s instructions—the phrases “you’ll see” 
and “you try it” unearth that volition.78  “You try it” means that the author offers instructions and 
the reader may or may not agree to accept them; it means that a contract exists prior to the 
mimesis.  Style normally disguises the reader’s agency as authorial coercion, but “you try it” 
uncovers the truth of the matter.   
 If in fog we approach the conditions of our own imaginations, we also approach the 
unreality of the novelistic mimesis—that which keeps us ineluctably separate from literary 
characters.79 Huck wants nothing more than “the touch of the real,” but what he finds instead are 
the limits of his perception.  Along with him we feel how impossible it is to act in any 
meaningful way upon what at the moment our senses have no access to.  Because nothing would 
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count as action, and because action is the fundamental unit of politics, a political relation 
between a reader and a fiction cannot exist.80  Instead, the separateness we experience is a 
relation prior to politics proper; it is the very condition of ethical life.   
 It is no coincidence that Jim has all but fallen out of our discussion at this point.  What 
Huck desperately seeks in the fog, what we seek, is Jim’s body, but he evades.  He defies our 
wish for a “coherent, unified, describable self.”81  Characters compete for space in the discourse 
of novels and for our attention, but they also hide and aspire to fugitivity.82  They dissemble or 
become too mimetically fragile; or we neglect them or put the book down.  Characters have their 
freedom, but novels have their ends—to which I would add, characters have their freedom 
because novels have their ends.  “Stealing,” Huck’s word for winning Jim’s freedom, implies a 
possessive relationship to objects, needless to say.  It relies upon a world of entities “for the 
taking.”  Even “stealing away” requires a possessive posture toward one’s own body, the posture 
of personhood.  The realistic novel can only imagine escape as a move further inward, deeper 
into the confines of “personal space”; it can only represent freedom as an intensification of 
subjectivity.83  In contrast, to be evasive or aid in evasion in the way Tom Sawyer understands 
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exactness as an aesthetic value: “Exactness is a mirror, not of the world, but of the ideology of 
the world. And what is described exactly in the realistic novel is ‘personal space,’ the space of 
property, and the social relations that take place within that space.” On Longing, 4–5. 
	 	
	 75 
the word is to imagine an alternative distribution of the sensible that renders the world of objects 
“for the taking” in terms other than those of ownership.  Evasion replaces politics with an 
aesthetic practice, a practice of style.84  
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[One who is errant] plunges into the opacities of 
that part of the world to which he has access. […] 
The thinking of errantry conceives of totality but 
willingly renounces any claims to sum it up or to 
possess it.  
  –Édouard Glissant1 
 





When Jane Johnson escaped from John Hill Wheeler in Philadelphia in 1855, he sued the 
abolitionists who had assisted her escape in two nationally publicized trials that were among the 
first challenges to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.  During one of the trials, Johnson testified 
against her former master, giving a statement that was transcribed and published in an 
abolitionist pamphlet that circulated widely around Philadelphia before it was reprinted in 
William Still’s 1872 The Underground Railroad, a successful compilation of stories about ex-
slaves’ flights from bondage.  Just before Wheeler died in 1882, the New York auction house 
charged with dispensing his library, Bangs & Co., discovered and catalogued a copy of The 
Underground Railroad among his books.  Johnson and her two sons had won their freedom in 
the trial, and nearly two decades later she would be ensconced as an important abolitionist 
																																																						




success for posterity.  And yet, the presence of The Underground Railroad in Wheeler’s 
library—an archive built with slave labor and full of books defending the institution—also 
highlights the commodification of ex-slaves’ speech, the potential for certain kinds of political 
speech to be neutralized, robbed of their potential force and historicity.  It presages, as I argue 
below, Hortense Spillers’s reminder that “to rob the subject [of slavery] of its dynamic character, 
to capture it in a fictionalized scheme whose outcome is already inscribed by a higher, different, 
other, power, freezes it in the ahistorical.”2  
 After Johnson escaped, Wheeler purchased another female slave to replace her, one who 
would escape as well; one who, remarkably, would also become a celebrated chronicler of 
American slavery and fugitivity: Hannah Crafts.  Unlike her predecessor, Crafts failed to find 
fame in her lifetime.  She remained nearly unknown until 2002, when Henry Louis Gates, Jr. 
published her semi-autobiographical novel, The Bondwoman’s Narrative, for the first time, 
earning her celebrity for being the first known female fugitive slave novelist in the US.  Scholars 
soon found myriad intertextual links with books in Wheeler’s library (which they could 
reconstruct in part because of the 1882 catalogue).  Whereas Johnson was illiterate, Crafts’s 
work shows her to be a voracious and unconventional reader of an already idiosyncratic library, 
where she likely found fiction by the Brontës, Charles Dickens, and Walter Scott, in addition to 
scientific periodicals, compilations of “beauties” from Shakespeare, and treatises like John 
Gauden’s 1662 Discourse on Artificial Beauty.  Wheeler’s library serves as a good starting point 
for this chapter about two very different literary figures, one whose story became fodder for the 
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anti-racist political movement throughout the second half of the 1800s and another whose work 
took a century to find an audience.  In the first half of this chapter I discuss Johnson, and in the 
second I perform a reading of Crafts’s novel.  My purpose in organizing the chapter as a diptych 
is to explore the relationship between non-fiction and fiction, and, ultimately, to argue that 
Crafts’s work would have posed an unusual challenge to contemporaneous readers.  The 
Bondwoman’s Narrative resists providing its reader with a coherent image of the enslaved body 
and, unlike the prevailing representations of slavery, counterbalances the imperative to recall the 
slave’s story with a complex meditation on forgetting, withholding, and dissemblance.  To adapt 
Spillers’s words, it achieves a “reinvention of the discourse of ‘slavery’”—“its horizon, its limits, 
its enabling postulates, and its placement in perspective with other fields of signification”3—
through “a repertory of strategies that denote, that circumlocute, a particular cluster of discursive 
acts.”4   
This is a dissertation that is primarily about character.  I am reluctant to say that it is 
about “characterization,” however, because that term would imply that I am concerned with what 
characters do and think—how their actions, motivations, and inner lives are threaded together 
over time to produce coherent individuals who are believable analogues for real people.  Rather 
than taking the category of “character” for granted—that is, rather than assuming that all 
characters are fully embodied in our imaginations as we read—I am interested in considering 
how certain texts, like Crafts’s, emphasize the difficulty of producing a character’s body in the 
mind of the reader.  In other words, this dissertation is more concerned with descriptions of 
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characters, or the instructions we receive for imagining them.  Description, as Gerard Genette 
puts it, “spreads out narrative in space.”5  It stalls or arrests the temporal movement of narrative 
in order to more fully render the world of the text or its inhabitants, producing “images,” 
“places,” “bodies” and so forth, as though the narrative’s resources pool in one location; it is the 
narrative’s way of organizing and defining the limits of fictional space, of miming “the figurative 
dimensions of history.”6  But as we saw in chapter one, description can also be a tool for 
unmaking or exploding the boundaries of the fictional world and fictive persons, spreading the 
narrative too thinly over too great an area.  Bodies lose their visual and haptic coherence and 
dissolve in fog or sky or even sound.  Or, as in Crafts’s work, they disappear into darkness and 
defy description altogether. 
 I ended the last chapter with a lengthy discussion of fog, and I begin my reading of The 
Bondwoman’s Narrative by continuing that discussion in order to show how, like Twain, Crafts 
plays with the limits of literary description’s figurative dimensions.  I then turn my attention to 
Crafts’s preoccupation with the fictive—her interest in the production of fantasies, visions, and 
hallucinations in the novel—in order to argue that the novel is deeply interested in its own 
fabulation and the possibilities that fabulation carries for redefining how we think of both the 
category of the slave and slavery itself.  How does the novel ask its readers to imagine slavery as 
an abstract concept, as a unified institution inseparable but also somewhat conceptually divorced 
from the material practices that delimit it?  Finally, I will circle back to the issue of the enslaved 
body and the fugitive slave body in an attempt to elaborate what I call Crafts’s “poetics of 
																																																						
5 Gérard Genette, “The Frontiers of Narrative,” in Figures of Literary Discourse, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 127–43. 
6 Saidiya Hartman, “Venus in Two Acts,” Small Axe 12, no. 2 (2008): 11. 
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disfiguration,” which draws attention to the horizontal play of form and formlessness: the forces 
that distinguish the legible from the illegible—how one comes to be figured both in the aesthetic 
sense and in the sense of being ethically accounted for.  Instead of reading the novel as a scrim 
that obscures the truer history of Hannah Bond’s life, I show how The Bondwoman’s Narrative 
focuses the reader’s attention on the conditions of entry into the historical record.    
 
The Stranger Who Authenticates the Prayer 
Still’s version of Johnson’s escape focuses on one of the two trials in which Wheeler 
sought to re-enslave Johnson, the case in which Still himself was one of the defendants.  During 
those proceedings Johnson agreed to publicly testify after it became clear that the prosecution’s 
argument stood on the idea that she had been abducted unwillingly and was therefore not a 
fugitive but stolen property.  She entered the courthouse secretly by covering her face with a veil, 
and when her name was called, she calmly rose up and answered, stunning the entire room—and 
eventually all of Philadelphia.  “It was indescribable,” writes Still.7 He describes Johnson 
delivering her story with a straightforwardness and honesty that “would have been sufficient to 
cause even the most relentless slaveholder to abandon at once a pursuit so monstrous and utterly 
hopeless” and claims that only Wheeler’s special tenacity kept him from dropping the case.8  
Then in the penultimate paragraph of the section on Johnson, he writes, “Her title to Freedom 
under the laws of the State will hardly again be brought into question.”9  Each of the defendants 
																																																						
7 William Still, Still’s Underground Rail Road Records: With a Life of the Author... (William 
Still, 1886), 94. 
8 Ibid., 95. 
9 Ibid., 96. 
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in that suit was either acquitted or given a minor sentence for lesser charges, likely, as Still 
implies, thanks to the former slave’s speech.   
 Still gives less attention to the second of Wheeler’s trials, and the one that garnered more 
attention at the time, the trial of Passmore Williamson, which was far more complex.  As a 
representational strategy, Still’s triumphalism occludes some of the epistemological lessons 
otherwise thrown into relief when the archive is reexamined and history is written in the more 
encompassing context of Wheeler’s two property claims (to the book and to Johnson).  In 
Wheeler v. Williamson, Johnson’s “title to Freedom under the laws of the State” became a 
complicated issue and the status of her body as well as her speech were thrown into a kind of 
categorical crisis.  The Underground Railroad follows the slave narrative’s paradigmatic arc 
from subjection to formal self-possession and self-narration, but to do so, it must excise the 
messier case in which it became clear that Johnson was easily relegated to a kind of legal 
purgatory where her speech was rendered unintelligible before the law.   
In the Williamson case, however, the philosophical underpinnings of slavery were made 
unusually plain.  What started as a complaint about stolen property swerved sharply when 
Wheeler asked the judge to issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring Williamson to deliver 
Johnson before the court.  The remainder of the case, as well as the national controversy 
surrounding it, would become entirely about this one motion.10  It was a problematic request to 
begin with because habeas corpus is normally addressed to the state in order to bring an 
																																																						
10 See, for example, the coverage of the case in the New York Times, which published the text of 
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incarcerated person before the court system and judge the legitimacy of her imprisonment.  Thus 
the court acts as a sort of self-policing arm of the state—and as a reminder of the sovereign 
power’s legitimacy.  Defying the common law tradition of both the U.S. and Britain, Kane 
granted the prosecutors’ request and issued the writ to an individual.  At first glance, Wheeler’s 
strategy appears to be a massive concession to the defense, because it gives the impression that 
he was admitting to Johnson’s personhood (the corpus protected by the action is presumably that 
of a person) and therefore admitting that the case was not a property dispute after all, meaning, 
Johnson could never be legislated as chattel.  Even if Williamson were illegally incarcerating 
Johnson against her will, he still would not have stolen Wheeler’s property.  Wheeler would have 
no grounds for making any rights claim whatsoever, for the only rights violated in that scenario 
would be Johnson’s.  In short, Wheeler verges on arguing for Johnson’s freedom.   
But Wheeler’s lawyers and the sympathetic Kane knew precisely what they were doing.  
Their reasoning—an Olympic feat of equivocation, truly—demonstrates a sophisticated 
understanding of the law’s ability to recapitulate and naturalize the logic of enslavement.  On 
October third, 1855, Johnson’s attorneys submitted a petition contesting Kane’s use of habeas 
corpus: “Because, in truth and in fact, at the issuing of the said writ, and at all times since your 
petitioner left the company of said Wheeler…neither she nor her children have been detained or 
restrained of their liberty by said Williamson or any other person whatever.”11  And then striking 
at the heart of the judge’s abuse of power, they reminded the court that habeas corpus “is a writ 
devised and intended to restore freemen to liberty when unduly restrained thereof,” whereas 
“…Wheeler seeks to reclaim and recover your petitioner and her said children, and reduce them 
																																																						
11 John Kintzing Kane et al., Case of Passmore Williamson: Report of the Proceedings on the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Philadelphia: Uriah Hunt & Son, 1856), 166. 
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again into slavery.”12  None of this mattered, Kane decided; none of it, including the so-called 
prisoner’s sworn statement that she was never detained to begin with, could be taken into 
consideration, let alone taken as part of Williamson’s defense.  “Why cannot she be heard,” 
Johnson’s lawyer asked after issuing a long list of precedents supporting the idea that the ex-
slave’s petition was not only relevant to the issue at hand but that it was the issue at hand.13  One 
line of Kane’s reply stands out: “The very name of the person who authenticates the prayer [the 
petition] is a stranger to any proceeding that is or had been before me.”14 
The habeas corpus tactic accomplished two things: First, it introduced the idea that a free 
woman had been incarcerated (while remaining free)—that she could only be understood within 
the framework of an imagined imprisonment—and as a result freedom and captivity were made 
to appear indistinguishable.  Kane emptied both concepts of their meaning.  Second, while the 
court busied itself with the business of making freedom and incarceration the same thing, the 
meaning of habeas corpus metamorphosed in a very specific way that has significant 
consequences for our attempt to construct a narrative that includes both Johnson’s archival 
presence and Crafts’s archival elusiveness.  The entire history of the writ supports the notion that 
it serves and takes for granted the value of freedom, but when that concept effectively dropped 
out of the case, Kane was left with a habeas corpus to which any question of “rights,” “conduct,” 
or “freedom” were totally irrelevant.  It strictly meant that a body (a body that precedes any 
sentience, rights, will, or citizenship) must be made physically present in the courtroom—
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period.15  And because Johnson submitted her petition in writing, because the petition addressed 
the issue of her will, and because she was never physically present in front of the judge, she 
manifested as “a stranger” to the law.   
How could an individual whose presence has been requested by the court simultaneously 
be “a stranger” to it?  How does a court defend the rights of a subject that does not exist?  And 
perhaps most vexingly: How did the court sustain its commitment to rescue a person who 
professed to not need saving?  One cannot help but hear in this last question the echoes of 
another, the question Huck poses for Tom (a line discussed at some length in chapter one): What 
would it look like if one “managed to set a nigger free who was already free before?”  The act of 
emancipation that is also a technique of enslavement, the freed person who is yet to be free—
these are what Colin Dayan calls the “as yet improperly apprehended” legal categories that 
remain “sufficiently unreal to make claims on our habits of thought.”16 The seeming 
impossibilities spun by a racist legal equivocation deserve attention not in spite but because of 
their barefaced fictionality—their excursions into irrational ways of thinking.  For, however 
unreal, these flights of irrational reasoning are, to quote Dayan again, only “the reasonable 
extension of unspeakable treatment into an unknowable future.”17  
In other words, when denied attention and cast aside as history’s losers or outliers the 
predations of equivocators such as Wheeler and Kane pose a far greater risk of continuing to 
operate in the dark corners of “unreality,” where we relegate them in order to release ourselves 
																																																						
15 Ibid., 175. 
16 The Law Is a White Dog, 32. 
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from the obligations of ethical thinking.  Furthermore—and I think this is Dayan’s primary 
point—the nearly magical transformations they perform on the entities in question place them at 
an almost literal distance from those who enjoy the privileges of political and ethical salience.  
Turning Johnson into a “stranger” situates her in a world other than our own.  It makes the realm 
of citizenship, the world of the living, uninhabitable to her.  In his book Distant Suffering, Luc 
Boltanksi writes about the correspondence between distance and fictionality, arguing, “…when 
the spectacle of the unfortunate and his suffering is conveyed to a distant and sheltered spectator 
there is a greater likelihood of this spectacle being apprehended in a fictional mode the more the 
horizon of action recedes into the distance.  The distinction between reality and fiction loses its 
relevance for the utterly powerless spectator forever separated from what he views.”18  Boltanski 
demonstrates how viewing suffering from a distance feels very much like viewing or reading a 
fiction.  And I would argue that the inverse is true as well.  Reading fiction to some extent 
recapitulates the experience of seeing an object or scene from a distance, and if fiction gives us 
an object as though it were far away (certainly not as near as our own imaginations), it places us, 
the readers, beyond the domain of action. Paradoxically, then, the power we feel and exercise 
over literary characters originates in a position of near total but nonetheless reassuring 
powerlessness, the comfort of not needing to make a decision about how to act on behalf of the 
suffering entity because action is impossible anyway. 19    
What I am trying to get at by juxtaposing The Underground Railroad with Wheeler v. 
Williamson—and what is hopefully becoming clear from the readings in these first two 
																																																						
18 Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 23. 
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chapters—is that certain modes of anti-racist historiography cannot accommodate some of the 
more irrational and indeed insidious techniques for violating black bodies and personhood, not 
just because the violence is discursive but, more specifically, because it takes place within a 
devalued and under-examined segment of the discursive field.  Sometimes, I am suggesting, 
there are negative ethical consequences to posing history over and against fiction. 
The etched portrait of Johnson in The Underground Railroad takes advantage of the fact 
that at that point Johnson had been reduced to a willful and free person whose racialized body 
still excluded her from full citizenship.  In a way, her portrait depicts a corpus whose wholeness 
and visual presence cover over how partial her personhood still was.  (“Her title to Freedom 
under the laws of the State will hardly again be brought into question.”)  The Still book rehearses 
Johnson’s courtroom unveiling, strangely colluding with the law’s barely-veiled (as it were) lie 
about the perfect fungibility of embodiment and personhood, of physical and civic presence.  
Both Dayan and Bryan Wagner have convincingly shown that the slave was understood in this 
period not as a person or a thing, but as an entity suspended between the poles of pure thingliness 
and personhood, between pure materiality and immaterial selfhood.  Slavery relied not merely in 
the transformation of persons into things but upon the irresolution of this paradox.20  Though 
originally the product of a kind of mysticism, the in-between-ness of Johnson’s portrait—free but 
not, embodied and yet without the full rights of legal citizenship—gets mystified once over when 
Still states that unquestioned freedom is written on her body’s surface, leading the reader to 
believe that a visual representation of that body serves as the evidence.  By contextualizing 
Johnson within the Williamson case in addition to the Still case, it becomes apparent that her 
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freedom was hardly manifest and that her body was easily re-inscribed by the court as an object 
of white ownership—that she could be transformed into a body so divested of will that any 
expression of volition transformed her into an irrelevant entity in the eyes of the court.   
 
The Book of Gloom 
In contrast to The Underground Railroad’s linkage of material presence with freedom—
its assumption that willfulness and full citizenship and personhood are signified by the legally 
recognized body—what makes The Bondwoman’s Narrative remarkable is its resistance to such 
a logic of material and visual presence— its conspicuous fictionality.  The autobiographical slave 
narratives of Crafts’s period were often described favorably by reviewers as “windows” and 
“mirrors,” revealing the political and aesthetic imperatives for ex-slaves to write what could be 
read as an almost unmediated version of the reality of slavery.  Of course, what read as “reality” 
was often that which aligned with those preconceptions about slavery that abolitionist readers 
brought to these texts.  But what is important here is the fact that the intended public for these 
narratives sought descriptions that manifested a poetics capable of evoking the visual dimension 
of the represented scenes.  As one reviewer of the Narrative of James Williams put it, “It seems 
as if our northern citizens had determined to resist all evidence respecting the practical concerns 
of slaveholding, until they are ocularly convinced….”21  He goes on to describe Williams’s text 
as a “graphical painting” prepared to do this work of convincing.   
 The Bondwoman’s Narrative critiques this painterly discourse by descriptively distorting 
ekphrastic paintings, which I discuss at greater length later in this chapter.  But before discussing 
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those paintings themselves, it is important to discuss the larger visual world of the novel, a world 
very different from a transparent window or spotless mirror.  Crafts constantly unmakes the 
text’s descriptive landscape by refusing to describe in visual terms and by cloaking much of what 
the reader “sees” in darkness and shadow.  In this way, her literary aspirations are less like ex-
slave autobiographers and more in tune with writers working in the emergent genre of what 
Jonathan Arac calls literary narrative.22  Though she follows many of the slave narrative’s 
conventions, Like Poe and Melville, she writes about slavery in ways that are less manifestly 
connected to “real” contemporaneous social conditions and debates, and refuses to comply with 
the imperative to “ocularly convince.”  Instead—and in this way she aligns with Poe and 
Melville, too—The Bondwoman’s Narrative is concerned with race and visuality itself, and in 
particular shadow and darkness.23 
 For example, Crafts makes liberal use of the word “gloom” throughout the novel.  In one 
passage, she writes,  
Gloom everywhere.  Gloom up the Potomac; where it rolls among meadows no longer 
green, and by splendid country seats.  Gloom down the Potomac where it washes the 
sides of huge warships.  Gloom on the marshes, the fields, and heights.  Gloom settling 
steadily down over the sumptuous habitations of the rich, and creeping through the cellars 
of the poor.  Gloom arresting the steps of chance office-seekers, and bewildering the 
heads of grave and reverend Senators; for with fog, and drizzle, and a sleety driving mist 
the night has come at least two hours before its time.24 
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These sentences will be familiar because they borrow liberally from a famous passage in Charles 
Dickens’s Bleak House, but here Crafts has replaced Dickens’s famously omnipresent “fog” with 
her preferred “gloom.”  This subtle shift from one term to the other is telling insofar as it is a 
declension into further abstraction.  If fog is easy to imagine because it approaches the properties 
of imagination through its near immateriality and diffusion of light, then “gloom” is too abstract, 
too difficult to imagine. By definition the term connotes an absence of light, the result of matter 
cutting through and intercepting photons, as well as something more diffuse and intangible, a 
feeling, a mood, or, as the OED describes it, “a state.”25  More so than fog, gloom is everywhere 
and nowhere.  It is potentially also a state occupied by every object, cast over and shot through 
the following images, dampening the visual acuity of each thing it touches.  This slight 
amendment to Dickens’s language works to make the rest of the description less concrete, 
lending everything that proceeds the term the fuzziness of abstraction, making the reader’s task 
of imagining more difficult.   Two paragraphs later, Hannah states, “Just where the gloom was 
densest, and the muddy street the muddiest there was I, wrapped in a very thin shawl and 
carrying a very small box in my hand.”  Tellingly, just where the gloom collects with greatest 
“density”—where, paradoxically, the description has as little density as possible—stands our 
narrator.  The shawl and the box in her hand are the only objects that lend her body any firmness, 
and even so it is as if the shawl is draped over a spectral body.   
 Earlier in the text, Crafts describes her escape into a dark forest with her mistress.  
“Gloomy, indeed, was our walk, but gloomier were our thoughts.”26  Gloom here slides from a 
																																																						
25 “Gloom, n.1,” OED Online (Oxford University Press), accessed July 16, 2015, 
http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/view/Entry/79084. 
26 Crafts, The Bondwoman’s Narrative, 67. 
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descriptor of their wooded environs into a state of mind, showing Crafts’s awareness of the 
term’s indeterminacy and tendency toward abstraction.   Gloom also deforms and then reforms 
whatever lies within its reach: “Trees in the dusky gloom took the forms of men, and stumps and 
hillocks were strangely transferred into blood-hounds crouching to spring on their prey.”27  At 
another point, she describes slavery itself as a “thing utterly dark and gloomy.”28  It is not only 
shrouded in the proverbial darkness of terror; for Hannah, slavery as a knowable object is 
abstract, diffuse, and fuzzy—difficult if not impossible to “see” in one’s imagination.  The 
Bondwoman’s Narrative, then, writes against the discourse of the “window” onto the life of the 
slave, replacing the clear and hard transparency of glass with the suffusive, deforming darkness 
of gloom.       
 
A Diseased Fancy 
One of Crafts’s most remarkable inventions is the character Mrs. Wright, a former critic 
of slavery who has been imprisoned for trying to help a slave named Ellen escape the country.  
When we meet her, Mrs. Wright has been incarcerated for so long that she “strangely enough 
believed that these miserable cells were palace walls, in which she acted the character of hostess 
and received [Hannah and her mistress] as guests” when they are relegated to the same prison 
cell.29  Mrs. Wright’s hallucinations are compensatory mechanisms which allow her to survive 
the near total social death she experiences within the cell’s walls, where she is separated from a 
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husband, friends, and her children—all of whom have died, leaving her unspoken of “even by 
those who has experienced the most of her kindness.”30  Hannah finds herself fascinated by the 
“grand or beautiful semblances her diseased fancy has given to the hard coarse stones.”31  
Interestingly, Mrs. Wright displays a fleeting but distinct awareness of her own delusions, telling 
Hannah that she at first “couldn’t see” the necessity of her own imprisonment, “but after a time 
I—I—grew more reconciled.  And now I call it my palace, and that man, who comes in once and 
awhile is my groom of the ceremonies, and I have guests occasionally as I have now.”  “I used to 
hate slavery,” she explains, and “I could see no beauties in the system.  Yet they said it was 
beautiful, and many thought me a fool for not seeing it so, but somehow I couldn’t; no I 
couldn’t.”  Hannah responds by asking her if she sees its beauty now, but Mrs. Wright rebuffs 
the question because it would involve “a great deal of trouble,” saying, “I have learned what all 
who live in a land of slaver[y] must learn sooner or later; that is to profess approbation where 
you cannot feel it; to be hard when most inclined to melt; and to say that all is right, and good; 
and true when you know that nothing could be more wrong and unjust.”32 
 Mrs. Wright oscillates between believing in her hallucinations and seeing through them 
to the harsh reality of her imprisonment.  She draws the issue of fictionality to the surface of the 
text, and in doing so, raises questions about both the aesthetic and political dimensions of 
representation.  What does it mean to “see” and to “hate” slavery?33  What would make it 
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possible for one to speak of the “beauty” of the institution?  Wherein lies that (phantasmatic) 
beauty?  And how does the realm of the social pressure individuals to adhere to or enter into a 
regime of the sensible, into a certain aesthetic relation to slavery in order to produce a consensus 
about the “system’s” supposed benevolence and political necessity?  In order to think slavery, 
Crafts suggests, one must be able to aestheticize it, to cathect it into a knowable and even visible 
object, and this means having a phenomenological relation to it in which one either “hates” or 
sees the beauty in it.  These aesthetic experiences of slavery are social; they make slavery into a 
discursive presence.  But what is most intriguing about the chapter on Mrs. Wright is the way 
that she passes in and out of the knowledge of her own fabulation, the way that she can speak of 
both the prison and the palace.  Tavia Nyong’o writes about such scenes of fabulation in his 
essay “Unburdening Representation”: “The inauthenticity of the fabulist is of particular value,” 
he states, “insofar as his or her speech is not contained by a correspondence to its particular 
context, but carries over concepts, precepts, and affects from one regime of representation into 
another in a manner that is neither up-to-date nor out-of-date but truly untimely.”34  Crafts’s 
interest in drastic slippages of memory and hallucination call into question not just the 
“goodness” or “badness” of slavery, but the representational regime that establishes the ground 
for any debate about slavery whatsoever.  To speak about slavery’s goodness, badness, beauty, or 
ugliness requires one’s belief in an authentic image or set of images of what slavery is and is not, 
and Crafts’s fabulations relieve us of this burden of authenticity, the need to know what “really” 
happened.  
																																																						
Critique of Judgement, ed. Nicholas Walker, trans. James Creed Meredith (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 73. 
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 This relief we experience is not, however, that of escapism or of an infinitely multiplying 
relativism, as I began to argue in the introduction.  As Mrs. Wright surveys the extravagances of 
her hallucination, she also says, “but misery dwells in palaces.”35  She is visited by the 
melancholy that follows from knowing that even one’s fantasies are colonized, are never truly 
disconnected from the technologies of oppression that organize the landscape of the social.  She 
is not an escapist nor has she transformed into a supremacist.  She instead chooses a form of 
evasion when she communicates in what Édouard Glissant calls “errantry’s imaginary vision.”36  
Errantry, Glissant writes, “is not apolitical nor is it inconsistent with the will to identity, which is, 
after all, nothing other than the search for freedom within particular surroundings.”  Indeed, 
Crafts is interested in fiction because of its inherent possibilities for errantry, for wandering away 
from non-fiction’s impulse to possess the real, away from the animating desire to capture 
whatever is essential about the represented object.  To “live in a land of slavery” one must “be 
hard when most inclined to melt”—and melt the hard facticity of the real is precisely what Mrs. 
Wright appears to do.  As does Crafts.  We know solids to be melting when they begin to run.  
Crafts’s turn to fiction rather than autobiography evinces not an absolute freedom, nor does it 
express her de jure freedom once she escaped from Wheeler; rather, the fictive is her fugitive 
search for freedom within the confines of the literary.  Drawing upon Saidiya Hartman’s 
discussion of black counter-historical narratives, Nyong’o writes about something similar when 
he discusses “critical fabulation,” noting that it “is not a genre or a discourse but a mode by 
which both genre and discourse can be set into oscillating tension, through the upsetting of a key 
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demand of representational mimesis: the demand that a representation be either true or false, 
either history or fiction.”37   
 
On Being an Ignorant Thing 
 
At several crucial points in the novel, our narrator and protagonist, Hannah, describes her 
master’s gallery of paintings, a collection organized into heterosexual couplings that visualize 
the family genealogy.  At one point, the oldest of them ominously falls off the wall and onto the 
floor (very much like the portrait in The House of Seven Gables).  In her commentary, Hannah 
imagines a “stately knight in his armor” hanging the painting of this long-dead ancestor, Sir 
Clifford.  She fantasizes that the knight “breath[ed] anathema against the projector of its 
removal” but “dreamed not of the great leveler who treats the master and slave with the same 
unceremonious rudeness, and who touches the lowly hut or the lordly palace with the like 
decay”: Time.38  And later she returns to the house to find “that Sir Clifford’s portrait and its 
companions of both sexes, had been publicly exposed in the market and knocked down to the 
highest bidder.”39  It is difficult to read the latter quotation without thinking of the scene of the 
slave auction.  For Crafts, the portrait sale enacts a symbolic revenge, a fantasy of white slavery, 
whose power relies on the logic of the collection.  The “knight” who initiates the collection by 
hanging that first painting fails to foresee decay’s effects on the object because of the narrative 
produced by the portrait collection’s innate logic.  Even in that first portrait, before a second 
hangs alongside, the gallery asserts a certain narrative wherein the fact of kinship and lineage—
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generational teleology—displace any other ways of marking time.  As Susan Stewart has written, 
the collection discloses “the replacement of the narrative of production by the narrative of the 
collection, the replacement of the narrative of history with the narrative of the individual 
subject—that is, the collector himself.”40  The auctioning off of the portraits in Hannah’s 
imagination, the collection’s phantasmatic dispersal, manages to reverse this logic, replacing the 
narrative of the collector or the scion of the family with the narrative of production.  
Paradoxically, at the moment when they are most obviously commodified “in the market,” the 
portraits are returned to history because they no longer abide by the inward-facing logic of the 
collection.  If, as Stewart puts it, the collection presents its contents as a set of objects that do not 
refer to anything except each other, “replac[ing] history with classification, with order beyond 
the realm of temporality,” then Crafts imagines a return to the firm ground of temporality.41  And 
in breaking apart the normative ties of white kinship, she remakes the relationship between these 
aesthetic objects and history. 
The mimetic artifact’s objecthood—the fact that it is subject to the universal entropy of 
decay—is crucial to Crafts’s aesthetic philosophy.  After Hannah spends too long with the 
portraits, Mrs. Bry, the housekeeper, comes looking for her.  Finding her in front of the images, 
she scolds the slave not for dallying or ignoring orders, but instead for spending time with the 
paintings and making an effort to interpret them, what the housekeeper considers a white 
privilege.  Hannah, she says, has no business acting as though “such an ignorant thing as you are 
would know anything about them.”  The novel reminds us of the slave’s thingliness at the same 
																																																						




time as it asks: Who may or may not interpret; how are different modes of reading tied to the 
reader’s ontology; and what is it to “know anything” about a work of art when one is an 
“ignorant thing”?  Crafts suggests in this moment that Hannah’s own experience of 
objectification as an enslaved person allows her to see an alternative narrative to the one offered 
by the collection.  Perhaps because she lives with the constant threat of being “knocked down to 
the highest bidder” herself, she is able to imagine another way of looking, an alternative to the 
aesthetic experience that is specific to the collection.  
It’s evening when Hannah first stops to look at the paintings earlier in the novel.  As she 
stares and as “the golden light of sunset penetrating through the windows in an oblique direction 
set each rigid feature in a glow,” the pictures begin to move: 
Movements like those of life came over the line of stolid faces as the shadows of a linden 
played there.  The stern old sire with sword and armorial bearings seems moodily to relax 
his haughty aspect.  The countenance of another, a veteran in the old-time wars, assumes 
a gracious expression it never wore in life; and another appears to open and shut his lips 
continually though they emit no sound.42 
 
Next a bride dons a “halo of glory” and another figure’s hair begins to “float over the child she 
holds,” while yet another smiles and dimples her cheeks.  Here we see Crafts’ s indebtedness to 
the gothic tradition, of course, and a very specific trope within that tradition, and writers such as 
Russ Castronovo, Karen Sanchéz-Eppler, and Christopher Castiglia have given compelling 
accounts of the novel’s ekphrases.43 While scholars have noted the novel’s ekphrastic 
experiments, there is still more to say about Crafts’s place within the field of ideas about 
portraiture in nineteenth-century America.  In that instant, the paintings make themselves 
																																																						
42 Crafts, The Bondwoman’s Narrative, 16–17. 
43 See their contributions to Gates and Robbins, In Search Of Hannah Crafts. 
	 	
	 97 
available to Hannah with a wholeness that was previously inconceivable in the narrative; they 
present their two ways of being—as objects and as images—with a striking simultaneity, 
concordance, and dependence.  That is to say, the depth and motion clearly result from the 
encounter between, on the one hand, the translucence and movement of the shadows and, on the 
other, the solidity, opacity, and stillness of the objects’ surface.44  So, it is not precisely that the 
paintings come to life as it is that liveliness and what Descartes calls “extendedness” happen 
to—are produced upon as well as by—the material surface of the paintings, that liveliness and 
extendedness lodge themselves in the very unlively and durable two-dimensional plane of the 
paintings.  The shadow activates the surface and reveals a depth contained within flatness.  In a 
very Heidegerrian way, the painting reveals itself as a painting. 
 Through this embedding of depth in flatness, The Bondwoman’s Narrative bestows a 
special prominence and signification upon the physical phenomenon of the shadow.  More than 
simply animating or lending an excuse for uncanny portraiture, shadows carry both a theory as 
well as a history here. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Americans, especially those living 
in cities, began to experience shadows differently than they ever had before.  As Roberto Casati 
notes, a variety of new and affordable lamps entered the market between the twenties and the 
eighties, and these newer lamps burned coal or natural gas instead of oil or wax.  Once the older 
forms of lighting that used a flame for illumination were replaced by gas-fueled lights, which 
contained a chip of fireproof material warmed to incandescence by flame, artificial light stopped 
flickering.  And so did shadows.  “The nineteenth century didn’t just vanquish shadows,” writes 
Casati; “it created new ones.  They were frozen shadows produced by a fragment of material 
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heated to incandescence.  These were new shadows: static shadows had never existed in nature, 
nor were they ever before produced by man.”45   
The invention of the static shadow counts as a vital piece of the text’s historical context 
because the one other prominent portrait in the book takes the form of a photograph, and 
photography as a medium was understood (more so then than now) as the child of this innovation 
in illumination and shadow.46 Not only did photography require stable light and shadows; it also 
stabilized them both in a way other media can only simulate.  Because realist portraiture required 
more time to complete, the movements of the sun had long posed an obstacle to image-makers’ 
desire to represent a temporality unmoored from the inevitable cycle of diurnal time.  
Photographic technology’s relative speed eliminated the issue, not to mention the much-
commented-upon fact that the medium indexes, basically fixes, gradations of actual light instead 
of giving the illusion of illumination through pigment.   
The photograph in the novel appears during an embedded narrative of passing, where 
Hannah’s mistress, who goes unnamed, describes how she learned of her own slave ancestry and 
how the sinister Mr. Trapp instrumentalizes the knowledge of her kinship by blackmailing her 
(eventually to the point of insanity).  Trapp “drew thence a portrait” from a secret drawer.47 
… “Well now I wish you to look at this.” 
 I did so. 
 “Do you know it.” 
 “It resembles me” I answered “though I never sate [sat] for my likeness to be 
taken.” 
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 “Probably not, but can you think of some one else whom it resembles?” 
 [“]The slave Charlotte Susan.[“]  [her mother] 
 
Photography functions exactly as the painted portraits do not.  The paper records the mistress’s 
lineage and, despite not even being an image of her, it “resembles” and serves as a “likeness.”  It 
has an irrefutability or evidentiary quality.  If the paintings display animation, the instability of 
representation, a failure of indexicality, and the loss of kinship to time, then the photograph 
represents the reification of history and representation’s conquest over time.  Like other authors 
in the period, Crafts uses photography to express her concern about the consensus gathered 
around “realities” that have been coopted for the purposes of greed and violence.48 
 But the painted portraits stand out as a unique alternative, even if they are merely a 
refusal of photography’s imperatives to reality, normative kinship, and stable identity. The force 
of this negating gesture best comes through when we read the ekphrasis alongside the history of 
shadows, for only then do we reclaim the ideological work of stillness in the photograph, and 
perhaps see how the paintings’ instability allowed them to resist a visual regime that was rapidly 
enlisting photography in the service of more insidious forms of racialization that would fully take 
hold a few years later, after the formal end to slavery.    
 Crafts associates shadow—and especially moving shadows—with fictionality.  Both 
fiction and shadows create a kind of radical dissemblance which altogether opts out of thinking 
structured by dichotomies of person and thing, freedom and enslavement, reality and 
imagination, and even presence and absence.  Indeed, Trapp speaks one of the novel’s most 
chilling lines when he says, “Freedom and slavery are only names attached surreptitiously and 
often improperly to certain conditions.  They are mere shadows[,] the very reverse of realities, 
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and being so, if rightly considered, they have only a trifling effect on individual happiness.”49 
Freedom and slavery lose their meaning to the point that they might as well be the same thing, 
and we are left with “reality,” a realm “always already” conquered by Trapp—a world he 
naturalizes to an even greater degree a moment later when he calls it “circumstances.”  Through 
Trapp, Crafts suggests that when freedom and slavery look the same, and both take on the 
appearance of “mere shadows,” one must learn to train one’s attention on the most elusive and 
flickering ones—away from the direction of reality and toward the gossamer spectrality of 
“names attached surreptitiously and often improperly” to illusions.  That is, toward the fictive.    
Trapp is not ignorant of history, as he knows that there are real “conditions” or 
“circumstances” that determine actual lived experience.  More accurately, he misunderstands and 
perverts the relationship between the “names attached” to those conditions and the conditions 
themselves by believing in a historical reality in which names bear no reliable relation to the 
materiality of existence, where words are overwhelmed by the force of their own indeterminacy 
—where language, bereft of its materiality, becomes only an absence mistaken for the presence 
of the real.  This is ideology-as-false-consciousness.  The contradiction at the bottom of Trapp’s 
philosophy, then, is that, on the one hand, he claims to know of a realm of “conditions” and 
“circumstances” where “real” speech is possible, a place unlike the shadow-world of language, 
which is purely and arbitrarily symbolic; but, on the other, his act (of renaming the mistress as a 
slave) occurs within language and has more than a “trifling effect” on her circumstances.  While 
Trapp claims that language is too indeterminate to exert any force, he exploits that same 
arbitrariness precisely for its absolutely coercive force. The danger of language, for Crafts, is not 
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that we have too much faith in it (and don’t notice how restrictive and coercive it is); rather, the 
greater peril is that our enthusiasm for relativism has gone too far toward depleting our faith in 
language.  In her view, this instrumentalization of language’s arbitrariness is the more likely 
incitement to violence. Trapp does not vanquish shadows with truth or reality.  He isolates the 
shadow from the object that casts it and then declares the former relation to be incidental. 
As we have seen, this is not how Hannah understands shadow.  For her—and for Crafts—
shadow does not distort or obscure a pure, penetrating vision of reality, but instead it introduces 
the contrasts in color and transparency that condition the visual and its contribution to the 
experience of the real. As Deleuze writes of perspectivism, “It is not a variation of truth 
according to the subject, but the condition in which the truth of variation appears to the 
subject.”50 If, for the novel’s villain, shadows only reveal the infinite relativity of truth, Crafts 
proposes instead that we see shadow as the form that thwarts the split between visibility and 
invisibility—and that precedes the linkage of, on the one hand, visibility to the real and, on the 
other, invisibility to the fictive.  She warns the reader against materialism’s tendency to valorize 
a fully illuminated, demystified, shadowless “reality.” And in the place of this tendency she 
offers a visible world distributed into degrees of presence and absence by the play of light and 
shadow.  Regardless of whether he actually believes what he tells his victim about the 
indeterminate relationship between shadows and objects, between language and the world, 
Trapp’s trap proves as immobilizing as his name suggests only because he ushers Hannah’s 
mistress into a “fantasy frame” (to use Zizek’s term) where the one hope for social life is a world 
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of names that have been generated by and for capital’s obsessive arranging of a world divided 
into only two functions: a consumer function and a commodity function: master and slave.51 
I want to stress that The Bondwoman’s Narrative’s championing of shadow and its 
warning against the aspiration to luminosity is not only a metaphor for seeking truth. I take 
Crafts literally to the extent that I see her making an argument for the ethical value of attending 
to shadow as an aesthetic category.  For, as Jonathan Crary has recently written—and like her, he 
is being literal here—a world without shadows is not a vision of truth but a “mirage of post-
history…an exorcism of the otherness that is the motor of historical change.”52   By emptying the 
visual of alterity and nullifying the possibility of any perspective that is not exactly this one, a 
shadowless visuality collapses into a singular vision: the hell of an infinite and infinitely 
homogenous present.  Or: a world in which the only thing that may be said about fiction is that it 
is a lie. 
Reading for shadows allows for a greater attunement to what the novel has to say about 
identity, fugitivity, and reading.  As we saw in her treatment of the painted portraits, Crafts 
resists the structural logic and stability of identity, for she is interested in the possibility of the 
viewer or the reader’s failure to properly identify a figure.  Russ Castronovo calls the photograph 
of Susan an example of Crafts’s “ghost-writing”—a text “in which the departed, the vanished, 
and the disappeared return to flout any possibility of amnesia, aesthetic objectivity, or other type 
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of disconnection as they lay claim to their bearing on the present.”53  He argues that in ghost-
writing “the Emersonian pretension that art will ‘over-power the accidents of a local and specific 
culture’ finds itself overpowered by a rather specific set of material considerations, namely, the 
interconnections of black and white identities within American slave culture.”  When we return 
to the passage in question, however, this reading looks less convincing.  “I read and re-read but 
by degrees the mystery unfolded,” the mistress recounts to Hannah.54  “I perceived the worst and 
what I was, and must ever be.  Then I fell to the floor without sense or motion,” and with that she 
trails off into silence.  On the one hand, Castronovo is correct; this moment of racialization 
serves her self-possession and self-knowledge, and firmly, forcibly, situates her within American 
slave culture (“what I was, and must ever be”).  But, on the other, it releases the mistress from 
the bodily sensorium (leaves her “without sense”).  When Trapp places the image before the 
mistress, it “unfolds” the mystery of identity both in the sense that it reveals identity’s true 
structure and in the opposing sense that it reverses the perceptual folding in on one’s self, the 
reflexivity, that makes the speaking “I” possible in the first place.  Crafts is deeply ambivalent 
about identity, in other words.  Castronovo doesn’t notice that passing out “without sense or 
motion” is actually a rather good example of an amnesiac “disconnection” from the “present.”   
And he ignores that the character most exemplifying the anti-Emersonian position is Trapp, 
whose villainy derives from a perverted form of ideology critique—a philosophy of 
“circumstances,” which relies on the supposedly deeper, truer “material considerations” 
connecting black and white identities.  Trapp views those connections and the ties of kinship as 
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both his means and justification for terrorizing Hannah’s mistress, and so the primary search for 
identity in the novel serves a racist political agenda.  
 Hannah becomes abstracted; she forgets her own self.   Her consciousness escapes the 
reader’s reach.  And Hannah, too, runs the risk of forgetting herself, as we see when she 
discusses certain states of confusion that escalate into existential problems—“I soon lost all 
recollection of where and what I was”—or when she cryptically states, “I almost doubted my 
identity.” 55 Identity comes into view as a consideration at crucial moments only to recede, and in 
those moments, the character’s subjectivity leaks out of the text. 
These questions of coherent selfhood run through the entirety of Crafts’s novel, 
threatening to destabilize its mimetic ability at every turn.  At one point Hannah finds herself 
spying on a fellow slave, Charlotte, who is plotting to escape with her husband, when the 
narrator suddenly has an attack of something like conscience or prudence: “…I began to question 
the use, or necessity, or even the expediency of my instituting an espionage on the actions of one 
every way my equal, perhaps my superior.  Wherefore should I attempt to unravel a mystery that 
did not concern me, or to interfere in affairs, of which I should only be an observer.” 56 She 
decides to retreat and wait for Charlotte to come to her.  Throughout The Bondwoman’s 
Narrative the novelistic necessities of focalization and narration collide with the ethical need for 
privacy.  What cannot be represented here and what she attempts to write around is the very real 
possibility of violence that attends accumulating information about those whose safety requires 
secrecy.    When freedom becomes synonymous with the absenteeism and clandestinity of 
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fugitivity, any normative representation automatically contains the possibility of betrayal, 
coercion, and bondage, and therefore poses an ethical dilemma.  Description turns into an 
instrument for surveillance.  This is precisely why Hannah indicates her reluctance to describe 
any people whatsoever when she states, “…it is not my intention to draw their portraits. I could 
not do so if I wished.  I might, indeed, describe their size and figure, might enlarge on the color 
of their eyes and hair, but after all what language could portray the ineffable expression of a 
countenance beaming with soul and intelligence?” 57  This exaggerated display of modesty 
actually illustrates how serious of an ethical problem description is for Crafts.  She remains 
unwilling to draw anyone’s portrait because her skill supposedly comes up short, but far more 
interesting is the subsequent notion that, even if she possessed the talent, then language—any 
language—would prove too impoverished to do more than catalogue features detached from a 
countenance and disconnected from anything quite so essential as a soul.  The body of the 
passage degrades into a mere figure and then disperses into parts.  Her authorial fantasy supposes 
the alternative to traditional characterization to be a mode of description outside the logic of 
metonymy, an art of description that, rather than aspiring to convey identity, undoes its structure 
by decathecting essence and labeling it “ineffable,” unrepresentable.  The narrator’s 
performances of diffidence contain and control what would otherwise be a paralyzing artistic 
ambivalence toward the mechanisms of mimesis and narrative.  They signal an impulse to 
undermine the reader’s inclination toward metonymy.  If the body is the site where we first 
perform the metonymic operation—where we learn to draw together a diffuse and 
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undifferentiated non-entity into a discrete figure—the dis-figured (not remembered, but 
dismembered) character undoes the corporeal allegory in some small way.   
 Critics often argue for the psychological complexity of The Bondwoman’s Narrative, 
because psychological complexity is a sign of “good” modern Literature.  But I think Crafts is 
far more interested in the challenge of writing a romance without fetishizing the conflicts and 
paradoxes that signify a consciousness requiring excavation and the reader’s understanding.  
Motivations are not her subject.  No one in this novel really knows what she wants, including 
Hannah, who hates slavery and moves to escape it, but never gives a sense of what she imagines 
to be on the other side.  From the very beginning she knows only that what she wants is 
impossible: “something higher and better than this world can afford.”  The reader is hard pressed 
to see her behaving toward something, to see her behavior as properly political action.  Through 
its disfigurations the narrative unsettles the category of the subject and, in turn, normative 
conceptions of what constitutes political action performed by a subject.   
When one portrait in Crafts’s imaginary gallery opens and closes its mouth without 
making a sound and another assumes a “countenance” that it “never wore in life,” the novel 
represents aesthetic objects that in some way refuse to be read or drawn into the spectator’s 
present.  But the more remarkable thing is that by withdrawing into a fiction of Hannah’s 
making, they also release her from remembrance’s burdens:  
I was not a slave with these pictured memorials of the past.   They could not enforce 
drudgery, or condemn me on account of my color to a life of servitude.  As their 
companion I could think and speculate. In their presence my mind seemed to run riotous 
and exult in its freedom as a rational being, and one destined for something higher and 
better than this world can afford.58 
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By revealing the past’s inability to re-enslave Hannah, the shadow-world of the fictive grants her 
a kind of freedom: a liberty that can only be inferred from the experience of being ineluctably 
separate from the past, or the understanding that she and the dead could never act upon one 
other. Fictionality is often understood to be an evasion of history and sometimes even a form of 
negligence practiced upon the deceased.  But it could also be a gift that the dead give to the 




59 I draw on Roland Barthes, The Neutral : Lecture Course at the Collège de France (1977-1978) 







Persons and Things in the “Curious Realism” of 




What sort of political speech is this that 
transgresses the very boundaries of the political, 
which sets into scandalous motion the boundary by 





In an 1888 letter to Charles Chesnutt, Albion W. Tourgée praised Chesnutt’s conjure 
tales for breaking with the realism of popular writers like William Dean Howells.  Tourgée 
expressed admiration for the stories’ imaginative, often fantastical aspects and wrote that they 
were more “true to nature” for flouting the “fettering ideas” and “narrow rules” of northern 
realists like Howells, which, in his view, produced the “falsest and sorriest” literature.2  Tourgée 
had made a similar distinction earlier that same month, though with more subtlety, in a piece for 
the Forum entitled “The South as a Field for Fiction.”  There he singled out Chesnutt’s “curious 
realism” as an example of the emergent Southern literature that was rapidly turning the South 
into “the seat of intellectual empire in America” and transforming “the African [into] the chief 
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romantic element of our population.”3  In predicting where the next great American literary 
works would originate, he quickly dismisses the northern tradition, as in the letter, this time 
disparaging Howells alongside Henry James.  “Southern life,” he writes, “does not lend itself 
readily to the methods of the former.   It is earnest, intense, full of action, and careless to a 
remarkable degree of the trivialities which both of these authors esteem the most important 
features of real life.  Its types neither subsist upon soliloquy nor practice irrelevancy as a fine art; 
they are not affected by a chronic self-distrust nor devoted to anti-climax.”4  To Tourgée’s mind, 
the fiction of Howells and James attends to a scale of action ill suited for representing what he 
thought distinct about Southern life and the racial conflicts that plagued it.  Moreover, these 
realists’ obsession with the inner ambivalences of their characters led them to write novels with 
anti-climactic structures and an insufficient amount of action, offering a model of literary 
representation that necessarily valued the world of human interiority over the realm of politics 
and the interior world of the fiction over the world beyond the text.  As an alternative “The South 
as a Field for Fiction” envisions a form of “curious realism” more in line with the traditions of 
the Homeric epic and the sweeping historical romances of Walter Scott.  Writing about the 
cultural impact of the Confederate defeat, Tourgée states, “The downfalls of empire is always the 
epoch of romance.”5  While Chesnutt would go on to become more of a realist once he left the 
short story form behind and began writing novels, his early work exhibits a romanticism that 
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supports Tourgée’s hypothesis about the inability of the period’s dominant mode of literary 
realism to address important facets of the historico-political reality of the Jim Crow South.   
Chesnutt’s early work has often been written about as a desperate and to some degree 
politically suspect bid for literary celebrity.  Certain critics deem problematic his invention of 
Uncle Julius, a former slave who tells his white Northern employers fantastical tales about 
Southern life under slavery, sketching Chesnutt as a writer too willing to pander to Northern 
tastes and too quick to strategically forget the political commitments he espoused beyond his 
artistic work.  As Richard Brodhead writes in his Introduction to The Conjure Woman and Other 
Conjure Tales, “The 1890s were…the heyday of disenfranchisement acts, segregation laws, and 
the vicious breed of racial phobia that found issue in the lynching of black men.  Seen against 
this reality, the cultural preference for the reminiscences of old black Uncles was a preference for 
a fiction of racial history.”6  Like many others, Brodhead demonstrates an ambivalence about the 
politics of the conjure tales, noting that they can perhaps too easily be taken as nostalgic or 
primitivizing looks back at the ante-bellum past.7  In the best case scenarios, they are politically 
“subversive,” which is to say, underneath their apparently reactionary surface they conceal an 
underlying anti-racist ideology, giving the properly initiated reader a more radical political 
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message about the horrors of slavery, Reconstruction, and their aftermath.  While it is true that 
the stories carry with them the history of their form and echo many of the conventions of the 
genuinely nostalgic Uncle Remus stories in particular, the critical assumption that these works at 
best smuggle their true politics in through the back door ignores how overtly radical they are.   
Brodhead implies that the conjure tale is necessarily escapist and thus unethical by virtue 
of its fictionality. His logic would have us believe that the consumption of Chesnutt’s tales is a 
form of negligence or willful blindness practiced toward those who experienced the all too real 
violence of Jim Crow America.  In this chapter I take a different approach to four of Chesnutt’s 
short stories in particular— “The Goophered Grapevine,” “Po’ Sandy,” “Lonesome Ben,” and 
“Dave’s Nekliss” —arguing that they are not in fact opposed to history.  Instead, their “curious 
realism” dramatizes the insufficiency of both the northern realism that flourished around the turn 
of the century as well as realism in the broadest of senses, underscoring their inability to 
represent the modes of epistemological violence or patterns of thought that were the very 
condition of possibility for slavery in the first place.  Chesnutt’s realism, as Tourgée understood, 
has the benefit of representing the workings of racist politics because it focuses on a different 
scale.  Whereas for Brodhead what counts as “reality”—what counts as the appropriate subject 
for black literary culture—is the contemporary maelstrom of racist laws and physical violence, 
Tourgée sees that there are other forms of violence that require representation in American 
literature.  I want to argue that, in Chesnutt’s hands, the form’s conspicuous fictionality actually 
allows for some of the most radical political insights that he would make at any point in his 
career—insights about the difficulty of representing the slave as a figure without recapitulating 
the originary violence of her objectification.  
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  My own reading of the conjure tales, like many others’, is indebted to Eric Sundquist’s 
landmark discussion of Chesnutt in To Wake the Nations: Race in the Making of American 
Literature. There Sundquist draws a correlation between the art of conjure and narrative or 
signifying, which he sees as acts “of figurative metamorphosis.”8  “Chesnutt’s fictive seizure of 
the image,” he avers, “is itself an act of cultural conjure that reclaims and transforms its 
significance.”  I agree entirely with this reading, which conceives of conjure as a metaphor for 
linguistic practices, but I would also point out how such a reading—which much of the later 
criticism on Chesnutt takes for granted—emphasizes the importance of the frame narrative over 
the content of the embedded tales.  My own reading, in contrast, rather than suggesting that the 
the frame narrative mirrors the tales, distinguishes them from one another and shows them to be 
politically and ethically disjointed.  Like Matthew Taylor, I “examin[e] the tales’ exploration of 
the conjure cosmology without recourse to the hermeneutics of depth or symptom,” and in doing 
so, show how conjure “denatures the metaphysics of white privilege.”9   Whereas Sundquist 
begins his chapter of Chesnutt with a long discussion of dialect that emphasizes Julius’s voice 
along with the competing white voices of the frame, I want to take seriously the tales’ 
metamorphoses not as narrative acts but as reconfigurations of the imagined material world of 
the stories. 
 Because (as I have been arguing throughout this dissertation) literary critics tend to make 
the fictive subservient to the real, to material history, Chesnutt’s stories have been primarily 
																																																						
8 Eric J. Sundquist, To Wake the Nations: Race in the Making of American Literature (Harvard 
University Press, 1994), 381. 
9 Matthew A. Taylor, Universes Without Us: Posthuman Cosmologies in American Literature 
(University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 119. 
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discussed as realist and regional fiction.  Critics have argued for and explored with great insight 
their ethnographic function as well as their resistance to an ethnographic impulse in the form of 
their “culturalist orientation.”10  They have contextualized the stories within sociological, 
anthropological, political, and legal discourses as well as cultural histories of minstrelsy, 
exhibitions of plantation life, panoramas, Afro-American music, and of course writing in dialect.  
And while this commitment to the “real” of historical materialism, which motivates these 
contextual efforts, is important, it also often has the effect of dampening some of Chesnutt’s 
insights by making his work analogical to these other discourses and forms.  In Sundquist’s 
work, for example, the history and politics of the cakewalk serves as a model for the history and 
politics of the short stories, which also means that the cakewalk ultimately defines and 
determines the cultural orientation of Chesnutt’s work.   And while, again, I agree with and 
admire that assessment, I want to suggest that it may blind readers to the stories’ attempts to 
explore or think beyond the limits of contemporaneous political discourse and diasporic 
subjectivity.  Through their apparent anachronism—and this is the major way in which they 
depart from the rest of the local color tradition—they offer a critique of some of the normative 
categories that define the field of politics, in particular, personhood, agency, and the punctual 
temporality of the category of the event. 
 Chesnutt turns to the conjure tale at the start of his writing career not only because it is a 
familiar form to his white readers, and not solely because he is capitulating to white taste at the 
																																																						
10 Michael A. Elliott, The Culture Concept: Writing and Difference in the Age of Realism (U of 
Minnesota Press, 2002); Neil Matheson, “History and Survival: Charles Chesnutt and the Time 
of Conjure,” American Literary Realism 43, no. 1 (October 1, 2010): 3.  Matheson supplements 
Elliott’s reading by pointing to “the presence of the uneven time of cultural evolution in 
Chesnutt’s writing” and its insistence upon the “persistence of the history and culture of slavery” 
in the modern world (4). 
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expense of his true racial politics, but also because the realism that dominated the literary world 
he wanted to enter was insufficient for the political project that he had in mind.  Through the 
subject of conjure or “hoodoo,” he turned his critical attention to the readerly subjectivity that 
realist writing (in the broadest sense) fostered as it rose to the level of literary hegemony in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the emergence of the novel.11  In this realism there is a 
sense that the reader is like a character—that there is some continuity between the world of the 
reader and the world of the novel.  This is a major break, as Ian Watt teaches us, from the 
allegorical reading that predominated prior to the novel’s rise.12  But the scenes of reading (or, 
more precisely, listening) that Chesnutt gives us are not scenes of reading realism; in the conjure 
tales he is interested in scenes of reading that are very emphatically not realist.  They involve the 
supernatural and surreal transformations; they clearly distinguish the world of the story and the 
world of the reader.  They offer not a mimesis of the past but a mimesis of the past’s ineluctable 
alterity.  This may seem like an obvious point to make, but it remains important because realism 
always poses questions about exactness or plausibility—about whether something happened 
“like that” or could happen like that, or whether things “like that” happen in the real world.  
There is, as Susan Stewart remarks, a kind of mapping of one world upon another world that 
happens in the reading of a realist text—a mapping that the listeners find to be either difficult or 
impossible in the conjure tales.13   
																																																						
11 For a discussion of Chesnutt’s self-fashioning as author see chapter six of Richard H. 
Brodhead, Cultures of Letters: Scenes of Reading and Writing in Nineteenth-Century America 
(University of Chicago Press, 1993), 177–210. 
12 Ian P. Watt, The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding (University of 
California Press, 2001). 
13 Stewart, On Longing, 4. 
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 Finally, as the title of this chapter suggests, “things” such as plants are crucial to the way 
that the stories orient their readers toward the past of slavery, and so I have chosen to focus many 
of my readings on their representation of the lives of objects.  Whereas the previous chapter was 
most concerned with the legal status of the slave, the present one focusses on the financial status 
of things, including enslaved bodies, in the Southern plantation economy.  This chapter is about 
cultivation and commodification.  In the vines and trees of Chesnutt’s fiction—which mingle 
with the slave body in curious ways—there lies a theory of ethics unmoored or at least distanced 
from normative categories of the human, agency, and event.  The conjure tales reorganize the 
relationship between “our world” and the world of the past, as well as the human world and the 
non-human world. 
 
The Man Who Was a Tree 
“Po’ Sandy” (1899) is the story of an enslaved man weary of bondage and its 
rootlessness—of his master’s ability to hire him out at a whim and sell his wife at any moment, 
to dispossess him of both his body and his affective ties.  “I wisht,” he tells his lover, Tenie, “I 
wuz a tree, er a stump, er a rock, er sump’n w’at could stay on de plantation fer a w’ile.”14 Sandy 
gets his wish and morphs into a tree.  However, this tale about a strange kind of emancipation 
quickly reveals itself to be a tragic love story when Tenie is too late in attempting to stop 
plantation hands from chopping down her beloved and sawing him into lumber for a new 
kitchen.   She arrives only in time to see the saw rend the tree into pieces, a gruesome spectacle 
since the tree resists and cries with pain: “mighty hard wuk,” Julius comments, “fer of all de 
																																																						
14 Chesnutt, The Conjure Woman, and Other Conjure Tales, 47. 
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sweekin’, en moanin’, en groanin.’”15  Like many of his early stories, “Po’ Sandy” reveals 
Chesnutt’s understanding of the ontological paradoxes created by slavery and racism—the 
overlap of persons and property, human and inhuman—by imagining a world in which persons 
literally morph into animals and things, and indeed sometimes wish for such objecthood in order 
to exercise otherwise forbidden forms of agency or, in Sandy’s case, to preserve the sovereignty 
of his desire by firmly locating himself in space and time.  With the help of the conjure woman, 
Aunt Peggy, Sandy invents a form of fugitivity that would, paradoxically, keep him in place on 
the plantation but release him from the violence and indignity of enslavement there.  By quite 
literally setting down roots, he expresses a sovereignty that is otherwise impossible for him to 
imagine.  He exercises his own desire for locatedness in a way that would be otherwise 
impossible, since traditional fugitivity, running away, is in fact a negative expression of the 
fugitive’s desire, a wish to be “not there,” as opposed to what Sandy illustrates by becoming a 
tree, which is something more like a desire to remain “here” without the ever-present threat of 
displacement.  His flight from one type of embodiment to another is clearly an ontological 
fugitivity.   
But of course Chesnutt makes clear that such sorcery is not without its own perils.  The 
tree has its strange form of freedom by virtue of being misrecognized (by everyone but Tenie), 
and yet along with that freedom comes another danger.  The tragedy of the story lies in the fact 
that even as Sandy escapes one form of commodification by turning into a tree, he finds himself 
subject to the violent forces of capital again when he is transformed into a commodity once more 
as lumber.  In the squeaks, moans, and groans of the tree as it is cut down, and in the material 
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resistance of the wood against the saw, Chesnutt registers the violence that is inherent to the 
practices of commodification, which, as Marx suggests, robs the object of its thingliness in order 
to make room for its exchange value.16  He literalizes what is an otherwise abstract practice, 
emphasizing the magical quality of the fetish’s coming into being.  In another register, the story 
dramatizes the habit of mind by which a tree becomes its flesh, a source of raw material awaiting 
formation through external forces, and thus vulnerable to cultivation through fragmentation.  
Michael Marder identifies this same habit—“the regrettable identification of vegetal life with 
mute and inert matter”—as the impetus for taking “the first tentative steps toward 
acknowledging that this elusive vitality is the embodied limit of the metaphysical grasp,” that is, 
the basis for an expansion of metaphysical thinking.17  Chesnutt’s wailing tree is both an index of 
the slave’s objecthood and an opening up of that objecthood’s possibilities in that it 
philosophically reorients us, asking us to see the tree not as raw material but as a vital and 
discrete being—a mode of being from which it is all too easily violently separated.  This kind of 
thinking, which evokes rather than suppresses the tree’s vitality, not only remakes the object-
world of the story; it also potentially disrupts the hermeneutics we bring to literature about 
plantation life: how we read for evidence of the slave’s subjectivity, how we read the relationship 
between subjectivity and embodiment, how we identify and categorize violence.  The slave as a 
figure is dismembered. 
																																																						
16 Karl Marx, “Capital,” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McClellan (New York: 
Oxford, 2000), 472–73. 
17 Michael Marder, Plant-Thinking: A Philosophy of Vegetal Life (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2013), 31. 
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The slave’s personhood is all but erased in “Po’ Sandy” and his commodification is made 
complete by Sandy’s transformation into lumber.  The sentimental and humanist affirmation of 
the slave’s personhood, the idea that he can be represented as a full person without losing sight 
of his structural position within the political and economic system of the time, meets an alarming 
critique in Chesnutt’s short stories.  To represent the personhood of the slave as “reality” does 
nothing to illuminate the epistemic conditions that produced and reproduced the institution.  
Traditional realist characterization has nothing to say about those patterns of thought and 
representational practices that naturalized enslavement.  Those who cut Sandy into pieces of 
wood obviously do not hear human cries, nor do they imagine that the tree has a mind; they do 
not think in allegories or metaphors.  They only experience Sandy as flesh.  It has often been 
noted that realism usually tends toward demystification, but Chesnutt’s curious realism is about 
keeping intact and examining the mystifications, the seemingly irrational beliefs, that constituted 
slavery’s ideological underpinnings.   
The question that comes up again and again in the frames of the conjure tales—where 
Uncle Julius is telling the stories to white Annie and John, who have arrived from the north in 
search of an investment opportunity and temperate weather to treat Annie’s depression—is the 
question of belief.  In what sense are Julius’s stories true to life or in Tourgée’s phrase “true to 
nature” when they involve magical curses and people metamorphosing into objects and animals?  
Built into the structure of each of the stories, as part of the framing narrative, is a reflection upon 
the embedded tale’s fictionality.  On the surface, these exchanges between Julius, Annie, and 
John may appear to be simply a competition between rational empiricism and magical or 
superstitious folk traditions, but there is something more complex happening there having to do 
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with the ethical dimension of fictiveness.18   In “Sis’ Becky’s Pickaninny,” for example, Julius 
tells of an enslaved woman (Becky) who is separated from her baby when her master trades her 
for a racing horse.  Through the art of conjure, Aunt Peggy works to reunite mother and child by 
sending a hornet to sting the horse’s knees and cripple it while at the same time she leads Becky 
to dream (and believe) that her child is dead, casting the young mother into a debilitating 
depression that leaves her unable to work.  With both the horse and Becky incapable of labor, the 
slave owners reverse the original transaction, returning the baby to Becky’s care.  While John 
calls the narrative “a very ingenious fairy tale,” Annie disagrees with her husband, exclaiming, 
“the story bears the stamp of truth, if ever a story did.”19  John then wonders how she can think 
the story true given that it includes an “episode” in which the baby, Mose, is transformed into a 
humming bird and a “digression” in which he morphs into a mockingbird, but Annie disregards 
these as “mere ornamental details and not at all essential.”  “The story,” she explains, “is true to 
nature, and might have happened half a hundred times, and no doubt did happen, in those horrid 
days before the war.”  Usually the more sympathetic and generous listener, Annie strips the tale 
down in her mind, shearing off the ornamentation in order to hold up the “essential” truth of the 
story, the plausible part of the story, which is of course the portion that aligns with our 
knowledge of the history of slavery in the US, the story of an enslaved mother who is separated 
from her child.   
																																																						
18 Chesnutt famously disavowed and discredited the belief in fetishism and animism in his 
essays.  See for example Charles Waddell Chesnutt, “Superstitions and Folk-Lore of the South,” 
in Charles W. Chesnutt: Essays and Speeches, ed. Joseph R. McElrath McElrath, Jr., Robert C. 
Leitz, and Jesse S. Crisler (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 155–60. 
19 Chesnutt, The Conjure Woman, and Other Conjure Tales, 92. 
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However, Chesnutt does not necessarily suggest that the reader should take Annie as a 
model for how to consume Julius’s tales, for the exchange between the couple only makes those 
fantastical “ornaments” all the more conspicuous; we leave the story with a reminder of its 
fictionality.  John’s use of the term “digression” and Annie’s use of the term “ornamental” to 
describe Mose’s transformation into a bird are especially telling here because they raise the issue 
of the hierarchization that takes place through any practice of realist narrative.  For John, that is a 
moment where the story lingers on a detail unnecessarily, circling an object (the bird) as though 
it presented a detour, a forestalling of narrative closure.  As Stewart writes, “narrative digression 
articulates the narrative voice, its control over the material, and consequently its control over the 
reader’s passage toward closure.  Instead of offering the reader transcendence, the digression 
blocks the reader’s view, toying with the hierarchy of narrative events.”20  What John objects to, 
in other words, is the lack of power he experienced in that moment in the story—his sense that 
Julius was not only telling a story but also constructing a world, and indeed an ideological vision 
of the world whose hierarchy of details and events do not line up with his own experience.  He 
registers the loss of control that follows from the listener’s subjection to the teller, the embedded 
tale’s capacity to establish the pace with which he experiences the passage of one event to the 
next.    
 Similarly, Annie’s disregard for the “ornamental details” reveals her wish to shake the 
fantastical elements loose from the story and discover the historical reality that is the “essential” 
core of the tale.  Annie, who we know is a reader of novels, listens for that which is true to her 
knowledge of history and dismisses the rest as ornamentation.  Novelistic realism has trained her 
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to read for the continuities with her own experience of the world.  As Stewart puts it, “There is 
no point to the details in bourgeois realism aside from its function within the world of signs, its 
message that it is the trace of the real.  The ornament does not dress the object; it defines the 
object.”21  Annie understands that the story as a whole cannot be judged by the usual metrics of 
realism, but she expresses a longing for the realist essence hidden beneath the trappings of the 
conjure woman’s magic.   
 Ambiguity lingers after the couple’s exchange, ambiguity regarding where, then, one 
should draw the line between the ornamental and the essential detail, or what is considered part 
of the plot and what is considered mere digressive or unnecessary description—description that 
distracts from the tale’s attempt to establish the texture and rhythm of the real, what Barthes 
famously calls the “reality effect.”22  This ambiguity hinges on whether one sees the 
mockingbird as an object or as a metamorphosed character—whether one believes in the magic 
of the conjure woman.  For the skeptic, the detail is a matter of style: it dresses the object rather 
than defining it.  For the believer—and it is not clear whether Annie is a believer or not—the 
mockingbird is Mose and thus he is an individuated actor who is defined against the backdrop of 
the tale’s object-world scenery.  By failing to clarify this ambiguity, Chesnutt suggests that the 
tale presents a problem of how to read, for here the usual distinction between realism and fantasy 
does not hold.  In bourgeois realism’s semiotic system, where the use of descriptive language 
																																																						
21 Ibid., 28 My emphasis. 
22 In “The Reality Effect” Barthes demonstrates that “the ‘real’ is supposed to be self-sufficient, 
that it is strong enough to belie any notion of ‘function,’ that its ‘speech-act’ has no need to be 
integrated into a structure and that the having-been-there of things is a sufficient principle of 
speech.” Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language, trans. Richard Howard (University of 
California Press, 1989), 147. 
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defines the world of objects, “the material object is transformed completely to the realm of 
exchange value,” and as characters move through this realm, they are individuated through their 
relations with the landscape of objects.  The space of realism is personal space, the space of 
possessive individualism.  In contrast, Chesnutt’s fantastical realism troubles the line between 
world and character, between ornament and object, between the essential and the dispensable.  
Chesnutt’s “digressions” are never clearly digressive—never apart from the main action of the 
plot—and his “ornamental details” are never distinctly ornamental—never entirely pointless.  
The exchanges between John and Annie about the “truth” of the stories are not just a competition 
between two readerly paradigms.  More than that, they call attention to the ways in which 
enslavement, on the one hand, and characterization as it occurs in bourgeois realism, on the 
other, are incompatible.  After all, in a semiotic universe in which individuals are defined over 
and against a context of objects—a series of material “details”—how can the slave, who is 
somewhere between person and object, emerge out of the homogeneity of signs as a character?  
If all realist space is personal, is it not impossible for the non-person to emerge as a character?  
Chesnutt’s conjure tales reveal bourgeois realism’s reliance on the primacy of personhood and 
possessive individualism, which makes the representation of the slave impossible and fantasy 
and digression necessary.   
In the end, Annie refuses to resolve the question of what is true or false and, more 
significantly, what is contiguous with the “real” world of the reader/listener and what is not.  
This refusal, ambivalence, or what could be mere apathy toward the question of veracity 
distinguishes the conjure tale from other genres such as the gothic short story in which the 
supernatural or fantastical also plays a crucial function.  Unlike in the gothic mode, Chesnutt’s 
stories do not resolve their mysteries or provide epistemological closure, nor do they reward the 
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“rational” assessment of evidence and deductive logic.  Uncle Julius frames “Sis’ Becky’s 
Pickaniny” as an attempt to prove the value of carrying a rabbit’s foot for good luck, but, as John 
is quick to point out, “your story doesn’t establish what you started out to prove,—that a rabbit’s 
foot brings good luck.”23  Annie disagrees: “I rather suspect….that Sis’ Becky had no rabbit’s 
foot.”  And Julius affirms, “Ef Sis Becky had had a rabbit foot, she nebber would ’a’ went th’oo 
all dis trouble.”  Weeks later, after Annie’s health has shown a marked improvement, John finds 
a rabbit’s foot in the pocket of one of her dresses.  While John is only able to read the story as a 
digression or, at best, an example of the impoverished logic of superstition, Annie articulates the 
story’s strange force, betraying her belief in the talismanic power of the animal appendage and in 
the fantastical metamorphoses that take place in the story itself.  This desire to believe is, to 
someone like John, mere naiveté.  But, to a reader who takes in Julius’s story from one more 
degree of removal, the will to believe exemplifies a longing for a subjectivity outside of 
empirical norms—a wish to suspend belief rather than disbelief—and this is noteworthy because 
the rabbit’s foot signifies that Becky’s plight could have been otherwise.  It marks the past and 
present as hardly inevitable; it is, like all lucky charms, a testament to the inexorable forces we 
label as contingency.   
John’s interest in “proof” is important here precisely because no such thing is possible. 
The object’s power is a negative one, and so proof as a logical structure, as the end result in a 
chain of deductions, could never apply.  Nothing would count as sure proof of the rabbit’s foot’s 
ability to stave off misfortune, which explains why there is no rabbit’s foot in the tale itself.  
Chesnutt’s greater point here is that fiction, no matter how closely it seeks to mimic the real 
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world, does not ever prove anything and should not be invoked to do so.   Realism construed 
broadly attempts to close the ontological gap between the world of the fiction and the world 
outside of the text by claiming that places, events, and persons similar to the ones represented in 
the fiction do take place or could take place upon the firm material ground of reality.  And this 
possibility of proof was, as we saw in the previous chapter, encoded within the abolitionist 
literature of the nineteenth century in novels whose representations of slavery could be 
retroactively vindicated as well as in non-fiction that was taken to be proof of specific patterns of 
brutality that took place under slavery.  Abolitionists would often point out the congruities 
between slave narratives in order to bolster their claims about what types of violence were 
possible or commonplace.  In contrast, once we have entered into the realm of the conjure tale, 
the question of veracity is suspended.  As Elaine Freedgood has written about ghost stories, they 
“do not resolve [their] mystery, the ghost.”24  Unlike detective fiction—where proof is 
possible— 
we are left with two distinct ontological realms at the end of the ghost story: One in 
which ghosts do exist and the one in which they do not.  We inhabit the ruptured space, 
and so do many characters who do not know what they have seen, or if what they have 
heard of what someone else has seen is true.  The ghost story is metaleptically ruptured 
by intrusion of belief into disbelief, and of disbelief into belief.  There is a kind of play 
between these two levels, a heterotopia for which no resolution is offered, or even 
attempted. 
 
World fails to map onto world and, instead, “rupturing diegetic and ontological levels break the 
world into worlds.”25  
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 These ruptures are significant to the extent that they divide up the social world, revealing 
the cracks in the otherwise undisturbed consensus about what it is possible to know.  Sitting on 
the fence between belief and disbelief—not knowing whether what one has just seen or heard is 
true—in turn creates a whole slew of conundrums about how to act. At the end of “Po’ Sandy,” 
Tenie is left devastated, but no one understands why; her master assumes she is insane.   Julius 
remarks, “en dey ain’t much room in dis worl’ fer crazy w’ite folks, let ‘lone a crazy nigger.”26   
Tenie’s insanity highlights the necessarily social nature of capital’s machinations by ejecting her 
from the frame of the social itself.  There is no room in the world for her, no room within 
language, once she stops believing in the fungibility of all commodities, in exchange value, and 
mourns the loss of a tree.  Of all of the inhabitants of the story, only Teanie hears the sounds of 
the rending wood as a form of speech.  The story raises questions about knowledge that is 
unevenly distributed, about the nature of belief and specifically the social nature of belief, as 
well as about slavery and its relationship to characterization.  This last issue seems to me to be 
vital for understanding Chesnutt’s projects in his conjure tales and for understanding his choice 
of the conjure tale as a form to represent the past of slavery.  “What a system it was…under 
which such things were possible,” remarks Annie after hearing the story.  John then expresses his 
skepticism: “Are you seriously considering the possibility of a man being turned into a tree?”   
“’Oh, no,’ she replied quickly, ‘not that’; and then she murmered absently, and with a dim look 
in her fine eyes, ‘Poor Tenie!’”  I take seriously what Annie says about what was “possible” 
under slavery.  She is not merely naïve; she finds a form of truth in the story when she sees how 
they mark the ineluctable alterity of the South’s slave past—history’s ontological distance from 
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her own presence, a form of the rupturing that Freedgood identifies in ghost stories.  I want to 
suggest that John’s skeptical posture toward the story—which, as we will see, he takes over and 
over—may be the comfortable position to assume in the face of such fantastical details, but 
Chesnutt wants us to take Tenie’s plight more seriously, to wonder how such a tale is made 
possible by the realities of enslavement and the habits of mind that are the preconditions for 
slavery itself.  John wants to know what “really” happened, whereas Annie listens differently, 
not searching for the reality of the story or calculating its plausibility, but seeing it as a 
representation of history’s otherness.  Rather than differentiating the reality of dispossession 
under slavery from Julius’s aestheticized version, Annie is able to see the story as being about 
the aesthetic nature of the slave’s dispossession, or what the aesthetic has in common with the 
economic conditions that produced and reproduced plantation slavery in the south.   
So what does it mean to consider the possibility of a man being turned into a tree?  First 
one must consider the conditions under which that possibility is desirable—that is, when 
immobility rather than mobility become the preferred form of fugitivity.  Chesnutt asks us to 
imagine a mode of fugitivity that is not synonymous with displacement, with the escape to 
elsewhere, but rather with rootedness.  Central to this is the wish to stake a different ontological 
position under the existing regime of subjection rather than a wish to escape from the space 
occupied by the current regime.  The problem that the story highlights is the linkage of freedom 
with mobility.  To link freedom with immobility leads then to a rethinking of the embodied 
subject, a rearrangement of existing systems for organizing the body’s relationship to sentience.  
To uncouple those two things—to remove the arena of phenomenology from the confines of the 
sensible body—is to at once escape power and open one’s self up to the possibility of random 
violence.  Relations of power are always established upon the suspended possibility of physical 
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violence, and so power at once wields the threat of this violence as it exercises what appears to 
be the choice to refrain from it, which then can be reframed as protection.  Outside of any 
economy of subjection lies the threat of contingency—of randomized harm.   
 The story may be titled “Po’ Sandy,” but it is Tenie whose plight most moves Annie in 
the end.  Tenie is the character who ventures beyond the arena of normative politics, who 
witnesses the randomization of violence that exists outside of existing relations of power, and 
then must return to her old life, burdened with the knowledge that the most radical forms of 
fugitivity cannot shield her from catastrophe.  And yet, at the end of the story Annie decides that 
the aforementioned lumber should not be used to construct the new kitchen she and John plan to 
build. John begrudgingly agrees.  No one believes Tenie in her own time, but the story of her 
mourning affects Annie and leads her to keep up the wooden structure as a kind of home for and 
monument to Sandy’s ghost.  Julius’s tale effectively establishes a new ethical order, opening up 
the possibility that what counts as an ethical subject might change—might even extend beyond 
the human, beyond the living, beyond the dead, to what can only be understood in the present as 
an ingenious fiction.  
  
Grapevines and Parahumanity 
Chesnutt published his first conjure story in the Atlantic in 1887.  In “The Goophered 
Grapevine” Julius tells of “Mars Dugal’ McAdoo,” the former owner of the plantation John is 
interested in buying, who suspects that slaves are eating the scuppernong grapes that grow on 
many of the vineyard’s vines.  In an attempt to put a stop to this, he enlists Aunt Peggy’s help to 
“goopher” or curse the grapevines to prevent the slaves from devouring their fruits.  The goopher 
proves a successful deterrent until a runaway slave from a neighboring plantation comes along 
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and, not knowing about the curse, partakes of the scuppernongs.  Consequently, he is fated to 
have his health and vitality tied to the seasonal flourishing and withering of the grapevines.  In 
the spring, his hair begins to grow grape-like clusters, and in the winter, he loses his hair while 
rheumatism sets in.  McAdoo catches on and decides to take financial advantage of the goopher 
by selling Henry in the springtime, when he is energetic and capable of labor, taking him back in 
the winter only to sell him the following spring.  In Henry, Chesnutt creates a character whose 
life is cyclically bound to the seasons and whose fate is bound up in the logic of capital.  He is 
essentially human capital invested over and over in the service of producing surplus capital until 
McAdoo makes a bad investment in a new agricultural technique that ruins his crops and 
therefore kills Henry.    
What does it mean for a character’s life to be tied to the cyclical temporality of the 
seasons?  “The Goophered Grapevine” does away with something we often take for granted 
when reading realist fiction: the need for biographical time to structure the story.  As Lukacs puts 
it, the “essentially biographical” form of the novel is “a symptom of contingency.”27  “In the 
biographical form,” he states, “the unfulfillable, sentimental striving both for the immediate 
unity of life and for a completely rounded architecture is balanced and brought to rest: it is 
transformed into being.”  While, strictly speaking, the conjure tales are stories rather than novels, 
I would argue that the short story form maintains the novel’s grounding in the biographical, 
lending unity to a life and bringing it “to rest” in the sense that this unity naturalizes the 
individual’s experience as “being.”  For Chesnutt, however, enslavement and its transformation 
of persons into commodities makes traditional realist characterization inadequate for 
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representing the ways that the trade in chattel reconfigures the experience of time, overtaking the 
normative temporality of biography.  Bodily experience becomes a function of investment 
cycles, and the only thing that brings the story to an end is financial ruin—the loss of capital 
itself—as a result of contingency.    
But this reading remains somehow incomplete to the extent that it fails to account for the 
fact that the cycles of investment and return, of selling and buying, are inexorably tied to the 
temporal rhythm of the seasons.  Henry’s body, by becoming part grapevine or adopting some of 
the grapevine’s traits, disrupts the unity that the biographical form imposes upon time.  The 
goopher creates a narratological disturbance whereby the reader is no longer reading about 
human time but about something like planetary time.  This causes a temporary crisis when it 
becomes unclear how the story could end since our protagonist has the ability to, like the 
grapevines, outlive all of the human actors involved in his exploitation.  More to the point, as 
Marder writes, “…the spacio-temporal movement of plants, nonsynchronous with human time, is 
directed toward and by the other (light, the changing seasons, etc.) and therefore, unfolding as a 
hetero-temporality, is governed by the time of the other.”28  The goopher introduces this hetero-
temporality into the story, directly opposing the unity of (human) being that Lukács identifies as 
the central structuring aspect of realist literature.  The story itself, like Henry, can only come to 
an end, then, through an ecological disaster, which is exactly what happens when the crop is 
decimated by a northerner who arrives late in the story to convince McAdoo to adopt a number 
of bad farming practices. 
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As soon as Julius ends the story, Annie asks, “doubtfully, but seriously,” whether or not it 
is true, and he offers to show her Henry’s grave.29  Back in the properly realist frame, the 
gravestone and its inscription of the biographical end, marks the ultimate triumph of biographical 
time over the hetero-temporality of plant life.  “The Goophered Grapevine” is essentially a 
parable of cultivation and consumption, and it would suggest the inescapability of the speculative 
gaze, which has the power to transform everything in its purview into a potential source of 
surplus value by adapting hetero-temporalities into cycles of finance capital.  The story shows 
the inextricability of speculation and the rhythms of finance capital, on the one hand, and chattel 
slavery, on the other.  But it also suggests the possibility for insurgent temporalities and forms of 
embodiment that, though still vulnerable to the trade in humans, reconfigure the relation between 
the human and the non-human.  And this is not a reconfiguration that is unique to Chesnutt, but 
actually, as Monique Allaewert has argued, a result of the plantation form’s organization of labor 
power.  The plantation, she writes, “required that slaves (often of African descent) become 
deeply familiar with the properties of nonhuman animal and plant life.  This meant that Africans 
in the diaspora, whether slave or maroon (self-emancipated slaves), had especially deft 
imaginings of the forms of power and agency that developed at the interstices between human 
and nonhuman life.”30  She goes on to argue that the enslaved or fugitive body may be best 
understood in terms of its “parahumanity.”  The parahuman body is a “collation that comes 
together for a time but keeps open the possibility of other collations of parts” while never settling 
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into a new, unitary hybrid identity.31  Thinking about both Sandy and Henry as parahuman 
figures produced by the plantation system highlights at once the possibilities and the dangers that 
attend these configurations of personhood that are not opposed but orthogonal to the human and 
to plant life.  As we will see, Chesnutt’s later explorations of the conjure tale form would 
produce a different, and in some ways less despairing, pictures of speculation’s abilities to reach 
and reify the enslaved body.  Stories like “Lonesome Ben” and “Dave’s Neckliss” also suggest a 
link between the characterization of enslaved men and their commodification, insisting on the 
need to represent the dehumanizing effects of bondage, but they ultimately emphasize, at least in 
part, the new temporalities and forms of the human that this commodification engenders as well.  
If “The Goophered Grapevine” is about speculation’s triumph and the impossibility of a black 
body to escape commodification’s grip, then these later tales suggest something different. 
In a speech he titled “The Writing of a novel,” Chesnutt described the creation of 
characters as “perhaps the most important elements in a work of creative imagination.”   
As the Greek sculptors of the age of Pericles could produce a statue representing a 
perfection more ideal than could be found in any one human being, as the great masters 
of the art of painting can by combining the excellences of many models, infuse them with 
the fire of genius and make them live upon the canvas, the joy and the despair of those 
less gifted, so the master minds of fiction have created characters more real, more 
convincing than those of even the men and women whom we see around us.  Nowhere is 
the kinship of humanity to divinity more apparent than in its power to create out of thin 




31 Ibid., 99. 
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Speeches, ed. Joseph R. McElrath, Jr., Robert C. Leitz, III, and Jesse S. Crisler (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 551. 
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Chesnutt’s theory of character may appear simple at first glance, but the comparison that he 
makes between literature, sculpture, and painting, does not serve to collapse the distinction 
between media but instead reveals what is distinct about each medium’s mimetic capacities, or 
what counts as a mimesis in each case.  For the sculptor, success has been achieved when the 
ideality of form conveys the idea of perfection; for the painter, several models’ features may be 
combined in order to produce the sense of liveliness or vivacity on the two-dimensional plane of 
the canvas.  Great fiction writers are distinguished by their ability to create “convincing”—not, 
importantly, vivacious —characters, characters who are somehow more “real” than the human 
beings we encounter outside of aesthetic works.  In all three of these cases, Chesnutt draws 
attention to the ways that artistic representation does more than simply index or document a 
person or type; he is interested in the gap between mere mimetic representation of living humans 
and the vivifying work of the artist, who exceeds mimesis and produces, in the case of fiction, 
“characters more real, more convincing than those of even men and women whom we see around 
us.”  But how can a literary character be “more real” than those people who inhabit reality itself?  
How does the “real” manage to detach itself from the perceptual experiences that we think of as 
everyday life and to then exceed them?  In what sense does fiction depict an intensification of 
reality?  The final sentence of the paragraph appears at first blush separate from the preceding 
train of thought about characters and their reality effect, but I think it actually suggests an answer 
to those questions that are raised by the earlier sentences.   The answer depends upon the 
author’s power to produce “out of thin air” individuals who live lives very similar to yours and 
mine, who die deaths like yours and mine “—and yet live on forever.”  This ontological paradox, 
which defines fictional beings—creatures who are at once like us, have all the characteristics of 
human beings, and who are not human—allows for literary characters to be more real than reality 
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itself, even when they lack the material presence that normally signals for us a person’s realness.  
To write a character well is to successfully activate this paradox, and we know when this has 
been done because only then does the author’s God-like power appear (a power whose source 
continually works to conceal its historical origin).  That is, for Chesnutt, the goal of good 
characterization is to produce a character whose vividness serves as a testament to the power of 
the author and, by extension, the reader’s subjection to the author in the form of this greater form 
of belief that good fiction demands.  Like Tom Sawyer’s notion of “style,” which I discussed at 
length in chapter one, this philosophy of fiction hinges on the novelist’s own ability to be at once 
in control of the imaginative universe and conspicuously absent from it—to have, in D.A. 
Miller’s term, “godlike authority.”33  
 Two distinct temporalities emerge in Chesnutt’s theory of good characterization: the 
temporality of biography or the time of the human and the near-divine temporality of eternity.  
And it is in the gap between these two temporalities that one sits when reading a successful 
realist literary representation, perceiving both the familiar march of biographical time as it moves 
from birth to death and the eternal time of textuality.  As he goes on to say in his speech, “As a 
great portrait painter may so idealize the living face as to bring out all the good and leave out all 
the bad, so the great master of fiction may take a historical character and make of him or her a 
person much more vital than the real man or woman could ever, in our human experience, have 
been.”34  We see the two temporalities at work again as well as an emphasis on the “human” or 
sensory “experience” of reading about a character versus that of encountering a real person.  
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Realism for Chesnutt is, above all else, a particular phenomenology, a feeling that one is 
experiencing an intensification of vitality as opposed to a feeling of continuity between the world 
described by the narrative and the world beyond the text (whereby I feel characters to be equal in 
vitality to those I encounter in real life).  This conceptualization comes strikingly close to 
Frederick Jameson’s recent theorization of realism, where he writes about the two dialectical 
forces that constitute the mode: the narrative impulse and embodied affect.  Most relevant for our 
discussion here is his distinction between the two temporalities represented by these opposing 
and mutually constituting discursive forces.  The narrative impulse is of course characterized by 
the chronological passage of past into present and present into future—by the normative 
temporalization of the story into the past-present-future triptych.  Affect, in contrast, is 
experienced as an “eternal present,” as a shifting of intensities in the body that happens outside 
of chronology, outside of time.35  Realist characterization starting around the middle of the 
nineteenth century in Jameson’s view is a product of a tension between allegory and the body 
“which repel one another and fail to mix.”36  Allegory here means personification and “naming 
and nomination,” and it is the narrative impulse to produce a character by providing an allegory 
of a person who becomes intelligible, who is ultimately knowable, through language.   Affect, on 
the other hand, resists language; it cannot be easily named and incorporated into allegory.  
Drawing on Barthes, Jameson writes,  
This irreconcilable divorce between intelligibility and experience, between meaning and 
existence, then can be grasped as a fundamental feature of modernity, particularly in 
literature, whose verbal existence necessarily inclines it to idealism.  If it means 
something, it can’t be real; if it is real, it can’t be absorbed by purely mental or 
conceptual categories (the ideal of the “concrete” then attempting an impossible synthesis 
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of these two dimensions: clearly enough phenomenology conceived the most strenuous 
modern vocation to achieve it). 
 
In other words, realism registers the modern split between the intelligible (that which is 
conceptualized, speakable, and meaningful) and the ineffability of pure affective experience.  
One name Jameson gives to the latter—to that which resists rational conceptualization—is 
“contingency.”   
I note the similarity between these two notions of what realism is and does because, 
ultimately, Chesnutt’s curious brand of realism is a hyperbolization of realism’s antinomies.  The 
conjure tales stage the tug of war between affect and narrative as a divide between contingency 
and speculation, the latter being the attempt to contain, describe, temporalize, and ultimately 
overcome the former.  “The Goophered Grapevine” is emblematic of Chesnutt’s attempts to 
represent this conflict as it plays out on and through the body of a character, a character whose 
gravestone comes to signify finance capital’s victory over any kind of lived experience, over any 
kind of rhythms of life that might resist its imperative of productive labor and the creation of 
surplus value.  Those rhythms of life, as I have already begun to suggest, are uniquely vegetal in 
the conjure tales.  More precisely then, Chesnutt’s curious realism recalibrates the traditional 
antinomies of realism by situating affect not just in the realm of the human body but elsewhere 
as well, especially amid the flora of the plantation.  This is not to say that the self expands to the 
point that it subsumes what was once its environment, but that there is a blurring of the divide 
between self and other, and between normative temporality and hetero-temporality.      
 
Metonymy, Selfhood, and the Pine Knot  
However, a later story that was not originally included by Chesnutt and his editors at 
Houghton Mifflin in the 1899 collection, The Conjure Woman, provides an interesting 
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counterpoint to that first story.  “Lonesome Ben” is, like many of Chesnutt’s conjure tales, a 
retelling of a story from Ovid’s Metamorphoses, specifically, the myth of Narcissus.  In this 
reimagining of the story, the Narcissus figure is a slave named Ben, who manages to escape only 
to find that he cannot navigate his way to the North and to freedom.  He makes a circle back to 
the plantation, where he decides to hide in the woods, slipping out in the night to cross the creek 
and scoop up gobs of clay which he eats.  When Ben confronts his former master in an attempt to 
return to the plantation, his master fails to recognize him: “No, I doan know yer, yer yeller 
rascal!  W’at de debbil yer mean by tellin’ me sich a lie?  Ben wuz black ez a coal an’ straight ez 
an’ arrer.  Youer yaller ez dat clay-bank, an’ crooked ez a bair’l-hoop.”37  Confused, Ben goes to 
creek to look at his reflection and see what Marrabo is talking about.  At first “he didn’ reco’nize 
hisse’f an’ glanshed back ter see ef dey wa’n’t somebody lookin’ ober his shoulder—but dey 
wa’n’t.”  Then he realizes that his diet has indeed turned him to the color of clay, and at the tale’s 
end, he lies down to die, bakes into a brick, and crumbles to a dust that forever yellows the 
river’s waters.   
Clearly what interests Chesnutt about the myth is the misrecognition that Narcissus 
experiences as he stares at his own watery reflection and thinks that he is gazing upon the image 
of another.  In “Lonesome Ben,” Chesnutt rewrites that deadly misrecognition of self for other as 
a story about the outer limits of personhood, where an individual’s status as subject or object, as 
living or dead, comes into question.  As Julius puts it, Ben had felt loneliness before, but now 
“he felt mo’ lak a stranger ‘n he did lak Ben.   In a day er so mo’ he ‘mence ter wonder whuther 
he wuz libbin’ er not.  He had hearn ‘bout folks turnin’ ter clay w’en dey wuz dead, an’ he 
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‘lowed maybe he wuz dead an’ didn’ knowed it, an’ dat wuz de reason w’y eve’body run erway 
f’m ‘im an’ wouldn’ hab nuffin’ ter do wid ‘im.”38  Like Narcissus, Ben becomes estranged from 
himself, and by virtue of this estrangement, he dies, but not before he enters into a liminal realm 
between life and death—a space of social death he can only experience as a radical, atomizing 
loneliness.  But if Narcissus turns into a flower that stands at the edge of the riverbank where its 
image can be doubled on the surface of the water eternally, Ben dematerializes and literally 
dissolves to become an element in the water itself.  This liquefaction or dispersal of his body 
literalizes the unmaking of Ben’s personhood.  Ovid’s myth is, among other things, about how 
we acquire the knowledge of our own personhood—our immanence, our body as the site of our 
subjectivity—how, in other words, my body becomes the location of my self, the fantasmatic 
seat of that which is most precious to me, my own subjectivity.  “In a certain sense I only love 
[…] my body,” as Lacan put it, “even when I transfer this love onto the body of the other.”39  If 
the image of the body is where one learns to accept the preconditions of personhood, what does it 
mean for the body to break apart and become suspended in liquid?  Chesnutt dramatizes the ways 
in which fugitivity requires not only a breakage of kinship ties—loneliness—but also an undoing 
of the fugitive’s personhood, which had, prior to escape, depended upon a scene of visual 
interpellation in which black skin signifies diminished or compromised personhood.40    
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 Ben finds himself outside of the life/death binary, and so his dissolution is in fact not 
quite a death.  It is, rather, a transubstantiation of his body into social incoherence.  To borrow a 
couple of terms from Sharon Cameron, this particular “allegory of the body” illustrates an 
instance of “impersonality.”41  Indeed, the fact that Chesnutt rewrites the Narcissus myth is 
significant not only because of what the resulting tale has to say about the psychic violence of 
enslavement, but also because of what the story illuminates about narcissism and its imaginative 
possibilities.  The Narcissus myth is also of course about the unreality of representation, about 
art’s inability to provide the real thing, giving us instead a simulacum that, no matter how 
detailed, no matter how mimetic, is always removed from the grid of actuality. Chesnutt 
reimagines characterization in a way that amplifies his individual protagonist while sacrificing 
his discrete and punctual individuality.  The creek becomes the site for an expansion and 
rethinking of selfhood, perhaps even a jettisoning of selfhood in favor of something that more 
closely resembles Jameson’s idea of affect, which is not bound by beginnings and endings and is 
released from the body’s discreteness. 
 What makes Chesnutt’s realism “curious,” I am arguing, has everything to do with 
characterization.  He makes and unmakes characters, reconfigures them to the point that they are 
no longer recognizable as characters, and in doing so he produces a profound critique of 
normative personhood.  He explores what happens to persons under the rule of a slave master 
and, perhaps most importantly, offers a vision of fugitivity that does not move toward the ego-
anarchy of possessive individualism, but instead discovers new ethical possibilities in the very 
unmaking of the individual.  “Lonesome Ben” proffers a vision of a desire for freedom untainted 
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by the workings of capitalism, a vision of a desire for freedom that has yet to be seduced by the 
armor of identitarian political categories—a desire uncoerced.  Ben’s radical political move 
originates in the trap he finds himself in as a maroon between freedom and subjection.  With 
nowhere to go, no freedom to be had and no master to return to, there is nothing left to desire, 
and, without knowledge of one’s own desires, of what does the self consist?  What is left to 
defend?  “Knowing what one wants,” writes Adam Phillips, “is an incitement to violence.”42   
Alternately, not knowing allows for “a kind of reciprocal self-recognition in which the very 
opposition between sameness and difference becomes irrelevant as a structuring category of 
being.”43  In the end, Ben’s collapse into the river—his becoming part of the river—undoes what 
the original myth naturalizes: the discovery of difference and its triumph over sameness.  Only a 
curious form of realism could represent such an escape.44   
 Similar concerns regarding difference, sameness, and selfhood arise in another story left 
out of The Conjure Woman, “Dave’s Nekliss.”  This story is about a slave named Dave who is 
framed for stealing bacon from the plantation storehouse.  As punishment, his master whips him 
forty times and then ties a ham around his neck, a burdensome reminder to all of his supposed 
crime.  When the time comes for the ham to be removed, Dave appears lost without it and 
fashions a replacement by tying a pine knot to a rope, which he wears even in his sleep.  Over the 
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course of the story Dave begins to believe that he himself is becoming a ham, and when the true 
thief comes forward at last, the confession comes too late.  Julius finds Dave in the smoke house: 
“Dey wuz a pile er bark burnin’ in de middle er de flo’, en right ober de fier, hangin’ fum one er 
de rafters, wuz Dave,” strung up like a piece of meat in the process of curing.45  Unlike in a story 
such as “The Goophered Grapevine,” where there exists consensus about the truth of the 
goopher, here belief is distributed unequally among all of the characters within the tale, and 
Dave’s insistence that he is a ham ejects him from the confines of the real.  His bodily death is 
only the logical extension of his social death, his recession from the ambit of the socially agreed 
upon reality. 
One should note that Dave is the only slave in any of the conjure tales who is also 
explicitly a reader.  He is allowed to read the Bible up until the point that he is accused of his 
crime, when he is forbidden from reading and preaching any longer.  The ham and then the pine 
knot become replacements for Dave’s bible to the extent that he applies a biblical hermeneutics 
to those other objects, transforming them into loci of certainty, texts that hold the answer to the 
question of his identity.  This chain of replacements—the bible for the ham, the ham for the 
piece of wood—reverses the colonial narrative that moves from primitive belief in the fetish to 
civilized belief in the bible, a narrative perhaps most famously explored in Henry Louis Gates’s 
discussion of the talking book.  There Gates suggests that black authors who moved from a belief 
in the talking book to an Anglo-European technological understanding of the book used the latter 
paradigm and its basis in the subject-object split to critique the idea that black persons were 
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objects.46  Allewaert raises an interesting alternative to Gates’s teleological story of black 
biblical literacy when she writes that “it is possible to argue that this silence [surrounding 
fetishism in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century black Anglophone writing] suspends and even 
departs from transformational narratives.  Instead of disavowing fetishes and other material 
objects [these texts] refract the material world into biblical history, in the process transforming 
both materiality and biblical history as well as the linear notion of history and influence Gates 
presumes.”47  “Dave’s Nekliss” performs something similar to what Allewaert describes here by 
reversing the arc from “primitive” fetish to modern book.  It also illustrates an imbrication of the 
material object world and biblical history, which otherwise divides brute materiality from spirit.  
The fetish and the bible become analogues for one another, both mere products of belief.  Thus, 
Chesnutt critiques humanist arguments that hinge on the subjectivity, the non-objecthood, of 
black persons. 
More significant for my discussion of literary character, though, is the mediating function 
of the pine knot, which first stands in for the ham and, in turn, defines Dave’s understanding of 
his own ontology as the ham that speaks and thinks.  The knot, after all, is the site of the joint 
where a branch meets the trunk of the tree.  The story is a study in an alternative to metonymy, or 
an alternative to the way we learn to contain the uncontainable space and eternal temporality of 
affective life into the confines of the body.  To be sure, the pine knot replaces the ham as an 
instrument of psychic terror.  It also, though, suggests a scene of subjectivization different from 
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that which produces the “print-mediated subjectivity” of the literate ex-slave.48  For the enslaved, 
the body is not always the site where he learns the metonymic habit of mind.  Dave, the fictive 
ham that speaks, learns from the both/and logic of the joint a mode of personhood that is not 
predicated upon the subject/object divide.  In the end, the tragic tableau of Dave’s body 
discovered in the cure house, which inevitably evokes the familiar spectacle of the lynched black 
body of the 1890s, only raises more questions about the status of agency and desire in such a 
death—or about how we read agency and desire into the body.  Is this suicide simply the result 
of madness, a grave misapprehension of reality?  Or, is it a wish to inhabit a different mode of 
being?  Either way, Dave’s death is destined to be read as an act of self-destruction and not as he 
understood it, as a refashioning of the self motivated by a longing for a radically different future.  
Back in the frame narrative John sees Julius walking away from his and Annie’s house 
with a basket that contains the remains of their supper: ham.  The story, perhaps an elaborate 
scheme to procure some free food, leads Annie to lose her appetite and offer up the remains of 
her ham.  The tale becomes a tool for manipulating Julius’s white listeners and winning him 
what he wants.  However, too often critics have overemphasized this aspect of the stories, 
instrumentalizing the embedded tales and reducing them to a form of tricksterism.  Such readings 
overlook the tension produced by the juxtaposition of two very different economies of objects 
that are ultimately incompatible and irreconcilable.  The past may erupt slightly into the present 
when the ham becomes unappetizing to Annie, but, ultimately, it ends up contained in a basket, 
ready for consumption, an image that may stand in for the stories themselves: containers for the 







Surface Effects: William Faulkner’s Flat Land 
 
   
 I began this dissertation with a novelistic emergency: Jim held captive at Phelps farm while 
Tom and Huck attempt to "free" him—something that they bungle so spectacularly readers have 
frequently disavowed the ending of the novel.  And as I tried to suggest from the start, such 
readings assume a curious permeability between the inside and outside of the fiction, as though 
Tom and Huck cannot be trusted with the ending of Huckleberry Finn, and thus we, good readers 
that we are, should intervene on Jim's behalf.  We feel we ought to save him somehow, or at least 
mitigate the violence that results from Twain's aesthetic and moral failing by denouncing the 
ending or averting our attention.  My concern there and in the proceeding chapters has been the 
apparently fragile dignity of literary characters: that we often speak as though they are vulnerable 
to bad representations in the same way that real people are vulnerable to the reductions and 
indignities of bad publicity; that they are subject to an author who may choose to exercise his 
power over his creations in unethical ways or to a reader who, in the very act of reading, 
redoubles an author’s violations.  Writers and readers collude in creating and destroying, 
knowing and forgetting, regarding and discarding these entities that exist solely within the 
bounds of the text.  However, because critics tend to discuss characters either “as if” they are real 
people or as simply illusions encoded within the grammar of the text, the phenomenology of 
reading—our sense that characters are at once like real people and not—often gets lost in the 
critical writing on novels.  Readers know that Jim is a fiction, a mere function of a language 
game, and yet they also long to free him from slavery, from Tom’s horrible adventure game, and 
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from the text.  Together, these chapters reveal a counter-tendency in American fiction, a loose 
lineage that balances, on the one hand, an interest in interiority, psychological depth, and hidden 
meanings with, on the other, a focus on exteriors and surfaces, or what is manifestly present 
rather than what is absent.  Put simply, this dissertation is about description.  It is about what is 
merely said to be "there" by the novel and, more vitally, what it means for something to be 
“there” when that “something” is an unreal product of a reader’s imagination under the influence 
of a writer’s careful instruction (in the form of description). Twain, Crafts, and Chesnutt all write 
against the novelistic tendency to carry the reader deeper into the text, showing her more and 
more, for such a reader’s pleasures are purchased at the expense of a character’s privacy and 
integrity.  The phenomenology of novel reading usually tends toward a feeling of omniscience 
and a sense that very little of importance is unknowable if one only reads well enough—
anticipates, speculates, and looks deep enough—and Twain, Crafts, and Chesnutt all express 
concerns about the ethics of such a posture.  They show that embedded within realism’s 
obsession with interiority is an opposing force that keeps readers from entering too far, going too 
deep, knowing a character too well, and discovering the abyssal nothing that always lies at the 
bottom of fiction—the absence of reality or referents that make fiction fiction.   
Like Huckleberry Finn, the ending of The Sound and the Fury contains a kind of artificial 
emergency in which one character misguidedly sets out to save another character without a need 
for saving.  In the appendix, a piece of writing Faulkner actually considered to be a fifth section 
of the novel proper,1 a Jefferson librarian comes across a picture of Caddie in 1943, three years 
																																																						
1 See Faulkner’s letter to Malcolm Cowley regarding the “Compson Appendix.”   “I should have 
done this when I wrote the book,” Faulkner writes.  “Then the whole thing would have fallen 
into pattern like a jigsaw puzzle when the magician’s wand touched it.”  William Faulkner, 
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after she has disappeared “in Paris with the German occupation”: 
a photograph in color clipped obviously from a slick magazine—a picture filled with 
luxury and money and sunlight—a Cannebière backdrop of mountains and palms and 
cypresses and the sea, an open powerful expensive chromiumtrimmed sports car, the 
woman’s face hatless between a rich scarf and a seal coat, ageless and beautiful, cold 
serene and damned; beside her a handsome lean man of middleage in the ribbons and 
tables of a German staffgeneral.2  
 
The narrative describes a familiar and distinctly modern image: a celebration of those forms of 
freedom promised by consumption—freedom to move, freedom from worry and anxiety, and 
even freedom from time (she is “ageless”).  More to the point though, the photo links freedom 
with smoothness and surface itself.  The slickness of the page echoes the car’s chrome trim, the 
uniformity of the “backdrop,” Caddy’s seal coat, and her ageless face—all of which work 
together to produce an homage to the ideality of the modern surface as textureless, perfected, 
shiny, and without signs of human hands or decay.    
 The librarian brings the picture to Jason, who refuses to believe it could be an image of his 
missing sister.  “’It’s Caddy!,” the librarian insists.3  “‘We must save her!’”  When she carries 
the picture to Memphis to show the aging Dilsey, the old woman claims to be too blind to see 
what’s printed on the paper.  The librarian returns to the bus station in tears, and as she settles 
into her seat, the narrative begins to move closer to her consciousness.  Faulkner stops reporting 
her actions from a distance and subtly begins to focalize the bus ride through her perspective in a 
sentence that first describes the view from the window—where “she could look out upon the 
																																																						
Selected Letters of William Faulkner, ed. Joseph Leo Blotner (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 
205.   
2 William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury: The Authoritative Text, Backgrounds and Contexts 
Criticism (W. W. Norton & Co., 1994), 209–10. 
3 Ibid., 210. 
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fleeing city as it streaked past and then was behind”—and then transitions to what can only be 
understood as the character’s introspection: “and presently now she would be home again, safe in 
Jefferson….”4   Next, she is struck by a revelation, a fully interiorized thought which Faulkner 
sets in italics: “…Caddy doesn’t want to be saved hasn’t anything anymore worth being saved 
for nothing worth being lost that she can lose”.  This is the only moment in the appendix where 
Faulkner moves into a character’s mind, and he chooses to do so with a character who is, above 
all else, a reader—and surely an allegory for readers of The Sound and the Fury.  Interestingly 
though, he penetrates her consciousness in this characteristically realist way, as she gazes 
transfixed through a window, only to bring forth a kind of interpretive impasse: her inability to 
know anything more about Caddy than what she sees there in the photograph, which may or may 
not be a wholesale fiction.  Looking out onto the world only reveals her distance and alienation 
from it.  The city “streaks” as though her speed not only blurs the cityscape but flattens it as well, 
until the city passes and vision recedes from the narrative altogether.  The glass of the window, 
like the glossy surface of the photograph, stops being something from which one looks out into 
the world and instead becomes a medium that returns her to her own inner thoughts, like a mirror 
that reflects not her face but her own desires.   
 What interests me most about this passage is that the librarian takes the fictionality of the 
image as a sign of Caddy’s need for salvation.  Artifice becomes a signifier of coercion; the 
façade indicates falseness and fallenness, and telegraphs to the librarian a secret wish for 
freedom, as though Caddy is trapped within the mimesis.  In other words, the librarian performs 
a symptomatic reading in which the privileged object, the greater truth, is elsewhere, displaced 
																																																						
4 Ibid., 211. 
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and opposed to what is manifestly represented.  She conflates the artifice of the image with 
deception when she reads the too-slick paper of the magazine as an attempt to divert the viewer’s 
attention from the representational violence that makes the image possible: the truth hidden 
beneath the lie.  The photograph then becomes a demand for urgent moral action.  But what she 
realizes while looking out of the window of the bus is that the object of her moral concern should 
not be read or seen as making a plea for assistance.  As the city flattens and passes “behind”—as 
visuality itself recedes—the window returns to her gaze the very limits of her vision, that horizon 
that marks the division between the visible and invisible.  It also returns her to her own inability 
to act upon Caddy’s behalf, for the surface of the photo and the surfaces that echo within the 
image itself are not imprisoning; if anything, they are mirrors in which the viewer may look upon 
her own longings for freedom.  What Dilsey understood, and what the librarian comes to “see,” 
is that to respect the distance that separates myself and the other is to heed the fact that, as 
Stanley Cavell writes, “I am not now in the arena [of action],” and this, “the final fact of our 
separateness,” is the primary condition of all ethical thinking.5  In other words, Faulkner adds the 
Appendix in 1945 to address a problem of reception and to emphasize one of the novel’s major 
points about fictionality and ethics: that what fictions have to teach us about ethical life has less 
to do with the moral judgments we make about characters—judgments about how they should act 
and whether they should act otherwise, which is inevitably accompanied by the wish to save 
them from their unstoppable, tragic march toward fate—and more to do with the irreducible 
separateness that divides the reader from the world in which literary characters perform the 
actions that always already take the shape of destiny.  It has more to do with the fact that there is 
																																																						




no such thing as saving Caddy, for nothing would count as doing so.  
 The powerful irony of the librarian’s epiphany flows from the fact that just as Faulkner 
affirms his and the reader’s ability to enter into the interior lives of characters, he also reveals 
how problematic that access can be if it leads to assumptions about what characters “want” or 
“need,” as though characters aspire to the immanence, durability, and continuity of real-live 
personhood.  Like all of the writers in this dissertation, Faulkner critiques a possessive mode of 
reading that would make characters our own or of our world.  We are privy to the librarian’s 
realization at the end of the section, but that realization only reinforces the epistemological 
boundary between the novel’s characters and its readers.  
 Faulkner, this chapter argues, had a career-long interest in flatness and the surface of visual 
artworks.  When he was asked in later years what “Yoknapatawpha” meant, he replied, “It’s a 
Chickasaw Indian word meaning ‘water runs slow through flat land.’”6  Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
he made that up.  The correct translation, as several scholars have pointed out, is something 
closer to “split land.”  But whether the author was aware of his error or not, he obviously wanted 
the word to evoke the flat character of the world he described in his novels—and not only in the 
literal sense of the Jefferson, Mississippi topography.  Flatness and in general the concept of the 
surface suffuse his first major pieces of long fiction, where he perpetually returns to descriptions 
of shadows cast on planar surfaces, silhouettes, doors and windows, and the process of arranging 
flat surfaces into three-dimensional shapes.   
 Because I agree with Eric Sundquist’s assessment of Faulkner’s career, especially his 
contention that The Sound and the Fury is where the novelist worked out the formal maneuvers 
																																																						
6 Frederick Landis Gwynn and Joseph Blotner, Faulkner in the University (University Press of 
Virginia, 1995), 74. 
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that he would then use to explore the theme of miscegenation in following works, this chapter is 
divided into sections based largely (but not strictly) on three phases of his career.7  The first 
looks at the status of the surface in Faulkner’s early graphic work; the second explores the 
significance of flatness in The Sound and the Fury; and the third connects these discussions of 
form and figuration to Absalom, Absalom!’s meditations on the history of slavery.  Ultimately, I 
argue that Faulkner’s later masterpiece is concerned with geometry, cartography, and accounting 
as grammars through which slavery was established and its legacy sustained. 
 “[T]here is no study of character in Faulkner, no so-called narrative weight,” writes 
Édouard Glissant; “rather, we find a vertigo of striking, irremediable people.”8 The Sound and 
the Fury in particular, Glissant suggests, replaces realism’s traditional attention to character with 
an interest in the legitimacy of the Compsons’ claim to their land and in larger questions about 
the genesis of Southern identity that linger in the wake of the Civil War.  He ends his short 
summary of the book without a reference to any of its characters, writing instead about the 
parceling out of Compson property. “The geometrically artificial straight lines that mark the 
property decompose into a wild, mixed-up degeneracy,” he writes, “like putrefying vegetation no 
longer in regeneration but in steady annihilation.”9  Glissant’s use of the word “geometry” to 
describe the novel gets at something that will be important to my own discussion of Faulkner in 
this chapter, namely, that the novelist’s first major work subjugates character to fictional space, 
and that the work is interested in the cartographic imagination, or the way land is mentally 
																																																						
7 Eric J. Sundquist, Faulkner: The House Divided (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). 
8 Edouard Glissant, Faulkner, Mississippi (University of Chicago Press, 2000), 22. 
9 Ibid., 42. 
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shaped, navigated, and parceled by its inhabitants—all of which is conditioned by a desire for 
geometry, a longing for recognizably regular ways of organizing space.   The Sound and the Fury 
is not about who characters are or why they behave as they do; rather, it is concerned with how 
its characters and readers exist in and understand the fictional space they inhabit.  Ultimately, the 
novel replaces psychology and its imperative to look for answers deep inside characters’ 
interiority with geometry, and in doing so explodes into greater dimensions the reader’s 
hermeneutic wish for a singular fixed point of meaning.  In the following pages we will see how 
geometry, graphic art, technical drawing, and the legacy of black slavery all converge in the flat 
land of the Yoknapatawpha novels. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, slavery and the rituals by which it produces a new 
category of individual problematize some of the most basic assumptions underpinning realist 
fiction.  Certain authors writing in the wake of slavery often saw themselves as tasked with 
representing not the interiority of the slave but the forms of ontological violence perpetrated 
against and upon black bodies, and they often did this not by arguing for the personhood or 
sentience of blacks, but by writing characters who expressed the categorical uncertainty that 
made black slavery possible, characters who were not allegories for real, full persons.  Thus, the 
lineage of writers I describe in this dissertation recapitulate the ethical problems inherent in 
imagining the enslaved.  Because Faulkner’s true subject is Southern white identity and 
subjectivity in the wake of slavery, this chapter differs somewhat from the previous ones, which 
were concerned primarily with images of enslaved bodies as they are produced in the 
imaginations of readers.  The present chapter pivots away from the scene of reading and toward 
the scene of authorship, toward Faulkner’s complex relationship to his own characters and, more 
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generally, the relations of power that are mimicked by novelists’ production and manipulation of 
the individuals who populate their work.   
 
Faulkner, Draftsman 
The visual arts were serious passions for the young Faulkner.  He illustrated and bound 
his own earliest written works by hand and would go on to pay special attention throughout his 
career to the visual and physical presentation of his volumes.  In college at the University of 
Mississippi, Faulkner contributed illustrations to the student publications Ole Miss, The 
Mississippian, and The Scream.  Often derivative and amateurish but occasionally striking, 
nearly all of his drawings from the period are heavily indebted to the English art nouveau 
movement, especially to William Morris and Aubrey Beardsley, who Faulkner perhaps 
discovered through the famously stylized illustrations in Oscar Wilde’s Salome.10 Faulkner’s 
1920 play The Marrionettes, for example, is a bound and fully illustrated work in the vein of 
Wilde and Beardsley’s collaboration.  It draws attention to the physical object of the volume, to 
its own design, and generally obeys the compositional principles of the art nouveau style, with 
illustrations that replicate Beardsley’s generous serpentine lines, stark black-and-white contrasts, 
as well as the dramatic, sinuous proportions of his figures.11  But, as these homages to the fin de 
siècle decorative arts tradition show, what Faulkner may have loved most about Beardsley’s 
work was their flatness—the way that they clung to the plane of the page, never aspiring to a 
																																																						
10 He owned a 1912 edition in his library.  Joseph Blotner, ed., William Faulkner’s Library: A 
Catalogue (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1964), 77. 
11 Lothar Hönnighausen discusses Faulkner’s illustration work and their relationship to his 
development as a writer in William Faulkner: The Art of Stylization in His Early Graphic and 
Literary Work (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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third dimension of representational space.  This decorative flatness was a significant principle of 
the entire art nouveau movement, starting with its first great practitioner and theorist, William 
Morris, and Beardsley even further collapsed space onto the page’s surface, often wholly 
subjugating perspective to the arrangement of lines and shapes on the two-dimensional plane.  
Wilde encouraged this, publicly championing flat styles of illustration and attentiveness to the 
work’s objecthood.  He proclaimed in 1889, that, “there is a danger of modern illustration 
becoming too pictorial.  What we need is good book-ornament, decorative ornament that will go 
with type and printing, and give to each page a harmony and unity of effect.”12  In nineteenth-
century figures like Morris, Beardsley, and Wilde, Faulkner found a sensibility about literary 
works as a whole—notions about what they should look like as physical objects as well as more 
fundamental ideas about what a book is—that appealed to him.  Specifically, he discovered the 
surface of the page as a site for experimentation, and he became fascinated by flatness itself—
something that would preoccupy him in his mature literary works. 
 This is not to say, however, that Faulkner’s graphic works from the teens and twenties are 
merely documents of his nostalgia for late Victoriana.  Indeed, as Lothar Hönnighausen has 
shown, many of the drawings incorporate modernist elements as well, revealing Faulkner’s 
acquaintance with and interest in certain visual tropes of American modernist works of the 
period, such as checkerboard patterning.  One example of modernist painting’s influence on him 
is especially significant for our purposes.  An illustration from the Ole Miss student yearbook, 
Social Activities I (1917-18), combines three free-floating figures, which have little to do with 
the Beardsleyesque flatness of most of his other work, standing before a checkerboard 
																																																						
12 Oscar Wilde, “Some Literary Notes,” Woman’s World, 1889, 168. 
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background that lies flat on the page and gives no hint of perspective.  Between the checkerboard 
pattern and the figures is an interesting y-shaped field that “consists of a system of cubistically 
arranged surface segments resembling those encountered by an astonished American public” in 
the Armory show.13  And this, in a work preceding the Beardsleyesque illustrations he would 
create a few years later.  In discussing this drawing, Hönnighausen notes that the young Faulkner 
apparently did not intuit the epistemological crisis that the early analytic cubists tried to convey, 
instead seeing in their work an amalgam of “sharp lines and acute angles” that simply amounted 
to a set of “surface effects.”14 
 
 
Social Activities I, by William Faulkner, 1917-18 
																																																						
13 Honnighausen, William Faulkner, 62. 
14 Here Hönninghausen is quoting art historian Barbara Rose ibid. 
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But what Hönninghausen dismisses as a facile engagement with modernist art is precisely what 
interests me most about the illustration.  Faulkner may have come to modernist painting merely 
for its “surface effects,” but he was not deaf to some supposedly more profound statement about 
modernity that the cubists intended.  For cubism’s radical disruption of the representational plane 
(and of its newfound alignment with the support)—of the art work’s surface—is precisely the 
movement’s great innovation.  With cubism, “surface effects” become painting’s subject. 
 In the first edition of Absalom, published in 1936, Faulkner included his first map of 
Yoknapatawpha county at the back of the volume, and he would create a different version of the 
same map for Malcolm Cowley’s 1945 edition, The Portable Faulkner.15  Printed in black ink 
with red dots that indicate the location of specific plot points, the original 1936 map is all the 
more flat for the fact that it is composed on a strict grid: the roads, railroads, and rivers all relate 
to one another at perfect 90- and 45-degree angles and are all seemingly arranged around two 
roads which function as perfect axes dividing up the map into four equal quadrants.  The effect 
locates the viewer directly over this central intersection, perfectly parallel to the ground.  
Looking at the page, one’s eye is always drawn toward the center of the map, where the dots 
cluster and the roads meet, as if to calibrate one’s gaze to remain perpendicular to both the 
document and the land it represents.  Because of the exact geometry of the map, and because it 
resists any gaze other than a God-like one, it is hard to view the map as a representation of real 
space.  While it is easy to visually navigate a perfect grid when one is positioned parallel to the 
(upright, front-facing) plane, it is much harder to then imagine one’s perspective as a point 
																																																						
15 William Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom! (London: Chatto & Windus, 1936), Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library, Columbia University; William Faulkner, The Portable Faulkner (New 
York: The Viking press, 1946), Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University. 
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situated on the surface of the grid.  Indeed, the more regular and apparently flat a surface is, the 
harder it is to imagine oneself maneuvering as a human actually navigating the land.  
Topographical maps and different forms of projection all seek to correct this problem by 
introducing a third dimension to help render the map as a representation of inhabitable space 
rather than something more abstract.  Looking at Faulkner’s map, we are left with only an 
abstract idea of space—a perfect plane that coincides exactly with the surface of the page.   
 All of this is complicated by the fact that the 1936 map unfolds accordion-style out of the 
back of the book.  The act of unfolding serves to remind the reader of the materiality of the map 
as such, and so again throws into relief its abstract and planar qualities.  Furthermore, the 
accordion fold also works to redouble the flatness of the map.  Maps are unfolded to reveal their 
flatness, but they are also folded up into flat objects; they transition from one kind of flatness 
into another, and any three-dimensional state is transitional and leaves the map inoperable, 
incomplete, obscured, illegible, or vulnerable to damage (disfiguration here is anything other 
than flatness).  I would also suggest that this particular map challenges traditional conceptions of 
the book as an object constituted by an inside and an outside, because, as Deleuze is fond of 
saying about the fold, the inside is never more or less than a fold of the outside.16  The novel is 
no longer just a container for the world of the story and its characters—something whose 
opening coincides with and symbolizes the opening of the interiority that contains the world 
where the actions of the plot take place.  Instead, the plot gets reenvisioned, removed from time 
and redistributed upon the collapsed singular instant of the map; it is forced out of time and into 
space, but a space that, as we have seen, is hardly the space of the fiction’s universe and hardly 
																																																						
16 Deleuze, The Fold; Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (A&C Black, 2006). 
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naturalistic.  Faulkner’s maps are an example of what Leo Steinberg famously calls the “flatbed 
picture plane,” which he traces back to graphic art of the teens.  The flatbed picture plane “makes 
its symbolic allusion to hard surfaces such as tabletops, studio floors, charts, bulletin boards—
any receptor surface on which objects are scattered, on which data is entered, on which 
information may be received, printed, impressed….”17  This particular quality is especially clear 
on the 1936 map because of the two colors Faulkner uses for his drawing: black to produce the 
grid-like arrangement of roads, rivers, and railroads, and red to mark the specific sites of interest, 
creating the impression that the map in black is a primary receptacle or field for the arrangement 
of a secondary set of data in red.  Steinberg goes on to state that such an image “guarantees that 
the presentation will not be directly that of a worldspace, and that it will nevertheless admit any 
experience as the matter of representation.  And it readmits the artist in the fullness of his human 
interests, as well as the artist-technician.”18 Faulkner highlights this, too, by marking the page 
with his own name: “WILLIAM FAULKNER, SOLE OWNER & PROPRIETOR.”  These maps 
dramatize both the replacement of the fictional worldspace with the labor and subjectivity of the 
artist as well as the replacement of the law of genre with the rights of the author.  They suggest 
that this is not a book about characters in any traditional way, but instead an arrangement of 
information—of plot points—orchestrated by a single individual so that plot may not always 
correspond to its usual components of “character” and “action.”  The Aristotelian idea that plot 
and character are bound together begins to buckle when plot becomes distributed as a series of 
dots in space rather than a series of events strung together in time to produce characters.  What 
																																																						
17 Leo Steinberg, Other Criteria: Confrontations with Twentieth-Century Art (Oxford University 
Press, 1975), 84. 
18 Ibid., 91. 
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does one do with a map of a fake place, anyway?  Such a document can only ever provide a 
survey of the boundary dividing the reader’s “reality” from the realm of the fiction, can only ever 
banish the fantasy that there exists some vague continuity between the work of art’s world and 
our own.      
 The version of the map that Faulkner created for the 1945 edition is less grid-like than the 
earlier map, and instead of proclaiming himself the owner of Yoknapatawpha county, he has 
written a more modest note at the bottom, stating “Surveyed & mapped for this volume by 
William Faulkner.” 
 
Map from The Portable Faulkner, by William Faulkner, 1945 
He also added a new decorative element: a strip of faux bois on the top and bottom margins of 
the page. Similar to Picasso’s famous use of faux bois wallpaper on his early collages, 
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Faulkner’s wood grain drawings represent or refer to the wood’s texture at the same time as they 
call attention to their own referential gesture—the fact of their representing rather than actually 
being wood.  They paradoxically make the absence of texture that is the paper’s smooth surface 
conspicuous, once again, flattening the page.  It is unclear whether the wood strips are meant to 
be seen as part of a wood frame for the map—in which case they are themselves inside the 
fiction—or whether they mark the boundary between the fiction of the map and its other, that is, 
between the world of the novel and ourselves. What we are seeing when we look at the two strips 
of wood grain is unclear; our relation to the text’s fiction is impossible to determine.  Faulkner, 
like Picasso, is clearly interested in calling attention to the arbitrariness of the sign at the same 
time that he indulges the cartographer’s dream of perfect consonance between the signifier and 
signified.19  As we move from the inner space of the map out to the faux bois and then out one 
step further to the small plaque at the bottom, the only thing we can ascertain is Faulkner’s 
primacy over the entire arrangement and over “this volume” as a whole.  The map serves to 
orient us and help us to follow the intricate plotting of these confusing novels, but as we move 
outward, our only point of orientation is the author himself.   
 
Benjy’s Fence   
Faulkner’s power over the “volume” at hand results from his modernist cartographic 
experiment, but it also harkens back to his earlier interest in the Romantics and their search for 
perfect and perfectly whole artistic forms.  For example, as Cleanth Brooks notes, his 1925 poem 
																																																						
19 Borges famously invokes this idea when he writes about a map that perfectly corresponds to 
what it represents.   Jorge Luis Borges, “On Exactitude in Science,” Collected Fictions (New 
York: Penguin, 1999), 325. 
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The Marble Faun is heavily indebted to Faulkner’s favorite poem, Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian 
Urn.”20  And when Faulkner abandoned his wish to fashion himself into a (neo) Romantic or 
Symbolist poet, he held onto the Romantic and Symbolist propensity for thinking and writing 
about form in terms of a vessel whose surface articulates a volume of space.  In one of the two 
introductions he wrote for The Sound and the Fury, he describes writing the sections that follow 
Benjy’s as an attempt to clarify and “get completely out of the book”: 
There is a story somewhere about an old Roman who kept at his bedside a Tyrrhenian 
vase which he loved and the rim of which he wore slowly away with kissing it.  I had 
made myself a vase, but I suppose I knew all the time that I could not live forever inside 
of it, that perhaps to have it so that I too could lie in bed and look at it would be better; 
surely so when that day should come when not only the ecstasy of writing would be gone, 
but the unreluctance and the something worth saying too.21 
 
In writing the first section of the novel, he was exercising a longing to inhabit the mimesis in the 
same way that the speaker of Keats’s “Ode” longs to bring the beautiful mimesis closer and 
closer until there is no longer any distance left between the viewer and the art object (and the 
viewer finally becomes the immortal voice of the poem).  This longing is what gives first-person 
narration its allure, inviting both writer and reader to approach the condition of inhabiting the 
world of the fiction.  Of course, Keats’s thesis maintains that the desire to inhabit the aesthetic 
realm is always preceded by the unbridgeable distance between the space and time of the “real,” 
on the one hand, and the infinite space and eternal temporality of the scene represented, on the 
other.  From this perspective, Keats’s real interest lies with embodiment, or the condition of 
being other than and apart from the aesthetic, which fuels the poet’s wish to escape his own body 
																																																						
20 Cleanth Brooks, William Faulkner: Toward Yoknapatawpha and Beyond (LSU Press, 1989), 
5. 
21 Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury, 1994, 232. 
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through the disembodied voicedness of the poem.  I interpret Faulkner’s idea of being “inside” 
the book as something like inhabiting Benjy’s interiority and therefore escaping his own body in 
the way that focalizing a narrative through a character effectively permits an author (and a 
reader) to do.  As I suggested in the first chapter, when we talk about “style” and “voice” we are 
also speaking about the author’s will to efface any trace of his own body as he aspires to the 
omniscient status of a non-person.  For Faulkner, then, the final three sections and the appendix 
were motivated by an antithetical desire to recall the body of the author as a material and finite 
thing embedded within history.  The Roman who wears away his vessel’s perfection with kisses 
is expressing the opposite of the wish to fully incorporate or acquire, to be one with, the vase and 
to live forever in its timeless world: he must maintain between himself and the object the 
distance that allows him to, paradoxically, be proximal and wear it away kiss by kiss (to make it 
his beloved). As Faulkner tells it, writing The Sound and the Fury fundamentally changed how 
he understood his relationship to his artworks.  The novel may have begun as something one 
could inhabit and be “inside,” but as it grew, it became something to live with and engage, to 
touch and reshape.  He turns away from a form of writing that is a vehicle for speaking in the 
voice of the other and writes a work with which one must negotiate one’s relation.  Each kiss of 
the Tyrrhenian vase is both an act of love and an act of violence, and whatever remains of the 
vase becomes an artifact of an ethical relation that unfolds through time.  In other words, 
Faulkner activates the question of how one should live alongside the work of art, which is 
impossible to ask from the perspective of the Keatsian narrator, who wishes to be a self that also 
encompasses the aesthetic realm.    
 More than any of his other works, The Sound and the Fury explores what it means to live 
alongside, rather than “inside” or excluded from, a representational or fictive interior.  Tellingly, 
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his other major novels from this period take interiority and containment as their primary subject: 
Absalom, Absalom! is about a house; Light in August is about a pregnancy; As I Lay Dying is 
about a coffin. The Sound and the Fury is, in contrast, about a fence.  This is an emblematic 
distinction to the extent that those other, later works consider form as a vessel that gives shape or 
constrains—or gets punctured, crumbles, and spills—all of which is characteristic of a line of 
modernism that follows from a high realist tradition.  In another introduction Faulkner wrote for 
The Sound and the Fury, he refers twice to Henry James, who famously describes the novel as a 
house with a façade covered by many different styles of window.22  Dissimilar to James’s 
windows, the fence through which Benjy watches the world does not signify an opening out onto 
a “scene”; the fence's pickets create a pattern of negative and positive space that he perpetually 
confuses.  Unlike the realist’s emblematic figure, the house of windows, neither side of the fence 
is an inside or an outside.  And more to the point, nothing ever lies behind a picket; it is only 
ever the positive instantiation of a pure absence: Benjy “remembered not the pasture but only its 
loss."  Put another way, the logic of the vessel is replaced by the collage-like logic of adjacency 
in which everything is collapsed onto one plane and the naturalistic illusion of depth and visual 
displacement disappears.   
 Here are the first sentences of the novel: “Through the fence, between the curling flower 
spaces, I could see them hitting.  They were coming toward where the flag was and I went along 
the fence.”23  Faulkner begins the book with a familiar and characteristically realist gesture when 
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he invites the reader to look upon a scene through a window-like space between the flowers 
growing on the fence, and yet what we see on the other side is confusing nearly to the point of 
being totally opaque.  One must read almost the entire novel to figure out that Benjy is watching 
a game of golf on his pasture, land that has been sold to pay for Quentin’s Harvard education.  
“Through the fence” becomes a kind of red herring that suggests a relationship between the 
reader and the novel in which the reader is confronted with something like James’s house of 
fiction, while in reality the fence is nothing like the façade of a house through which one may 
view characters performing actions.  And the problem is not so much that Benjy fails to 
understand or narrate clearly what happens on the far side of the pickets and the flowers; the 
more fundamental narratological issue is that he sees no distinction between the framing device 
(the fence) and the action taking place within that frame, for he often confuses positive and 
negative space in ways that make such a distinction impossible in the first place.  Light and 
shadow often take on an almost material presence in the section focalized through Benjy’s mind, 
as when “Light came tumbling down the steps” or when he states that “We went down the steps, 
where our shadows were,” as though both are durable, physical things.24  He experiences the 
world not as a series of objects differentiated from one another and from himself by virtue of 
their being discrete, proximal, and reflective but as a Bergsonian series of “shapes” which 
“flow.”25  The shapes are often distinct from one another, but they aren’t experienced with any 
kind of constancy in relation to fixed space; Benjy’s narration works more like a film screen over 
which shapes pass, giving only the illusion of movement and depth.  And rather than standing 
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still and looking through the holes in the fence, he often describes himself walking “along” the 
fence, which creates an imaginative challenge for the reader: the frame does not recede as we 
move “into” the action of the novel, but instead we are asked to produce in our minds a series of 
scenes broken up by the vines and pickets that pass before Benjy’s eyes.  The fence and its other 
nearly become part of the same plane.  This descriptive strategy in which we are often reminded 
that Benjy is moving along the fence also creates a flickering quality that is cinematic, like a 
series of images sewn together into a strip of film that moves too slowly to produce the full 
illusion of an uninterrupted space “within” or “beyond” the screen.  The flat screen itself bodies 
forth, and the fictionality of the narrative announces itself. 
 At one point Benjy describes his experience of crying while a clock simultaneously begins 
to chime: “I could still hear the clock between my voice.”26  Like a sonic version of the fence, 
Benjy’s perception of his own continuous scream is broken up into a series of discrete sounds 
divided up by the chimes, producing a set of regular intervals out of what would otherwise be 
one continuous sound.  The interaction of shapes and sounds produce an effect of seriality (rather 
than an experience of layered perceptions) in which the world passes by as a sequence and not as 
a set of simultaneous phenomena.  Even Benjy’s own self becomes a series of shapes and sounds 
that lack continuity. This happens most dramatically when Benjy himself “disappears” at certain 
moments.  For example, when Caddy hugs Benjy and she no longer “smells like trees,” he states, 
“She put her arms around me again, but I went away.”27  Without being able to fully recognize 
his sister by her scent, her embrace no longer provides him with the comforting sense of a 
																																																						
26 Ibid., 38. 
27 Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury, 1994, 26. 
	 	
	 164 
bounded and present self, and he disappears unto his own consciousness and the narrative.  How 
does one imagine a narrator as he disappears?  What happens, in other words, when 
characterization stops?    
 There is an important distinction to be drawn between the examples of seriality—the 
division of a single “stream of consciousness” into more or less discrete parts—and the more 
absolute imaginative effect produced by Benjy’s “I went away.”  In The Aesthetics of 
Disappearance Paul Virilio discusses “picnolepsy,” which is something like a condition of 
frequent petit mal seizures which leave the sufferer without any memory of certain intervals of 
time.  In Virilio’s analysis, the philosophical consequences of picnolepsy are significant because, 
“for the picnoleptic, nothing really has happened, the missing time never existed.  At each crisis, 
without realizing it, a little of his or her life simply escaped.”28  He is interested in the freedom 
the picnoleptic fit affords the subject, who is then able to “invent his own relations to time and 
therefore a kind of will and power for minds….”29  When Benjy says “I went away” he performs 
something similar to the extent that he, as an “embodied” subject, slips out of our imaginations 
for an unspecified amount of time and in fact stops the image-making process altogether.  Going 
away in this sense—disappearing to one’s self—resembles the picnoleptic phenomenology and, 
more importantly, mirrors the picnoleptic’s epistemological relation to the world, since “going 
away” lifts Benjy out of the homogenous temporality in which the other characters exist; his 
disappearance expresses a form of freedom to live a duration entirely separate from the other 
characters and from the text.  Benjy’s statement has no preposition attached to its end because in 
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the instant we read it, he moves in relation to nothing, because in his absence simultaneity is 
impossible.   
 Furthermore, if traditional description differentiates objects by degrees of proximity and 
distance, presence and absence, Benjy’s narrative confuses these categories.  In the final 
paragraph of his section, he describes the experience of going to sleep next to Caddy: 
Father went to the door and looked at us again.  Then the dark came back, and he stood 
black in the door, and then the door turned black again.  Caddy held me and I could hear us 
all, and the darkness, and something I could smell.  And then I could see the windows, 
where the trees were buzzing.  Then the dark began to go in smooth, bright shapes like it 
always does, even when Caddy says that I have been asleep.30 
 
The darkness has an almost physical presence for Benjy, and there is no distinguishing between 
the dark of the closed door and the “black” of his silhouetted father.  Most importantly, the dark 
then takes on a quality of “smooth, bright shapes,” just as it does in his dreams.  The play of light 
and darkness make it difficult to say what is genuinely present for Benjy and what constitutes an 
absence, for the negative space he describes at the end has a kind of solidity—even a 
malleability—that it shares with the positive presence of his father’s body and the door.  And in 
taking on shapes and colors, the darkness assumes the properties of illumination.  Finally, when 
Benjy suggests that his experience of the dark is activated “even when Caddy says that I have 
been asleep,” he indicates that what he is describing is actually a dream.  However, he only 
knows of the experience of sleep from being told that he has been unconscious, and so we need 
to assume that there exists no hard distinction for him between dream life and “reality.”   
 All of this is to say that Benjy’s narrative is distinct for the way it overturns several 
hierarchies of experience, such as the privileging of presence over absence, light over darkness, 
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and wakefulness over sleep.  Each duality gets confused as the privileged term loses its positive 
valence and the negative term gains a positivity that it normally lacks.   These partial reversals or 
confusions of antithetical terms make it possible for Faulkner to say in the Appendix that Benjy 
does not lose Caddy “because he could not remember his sister but only the loss of her.”31  An 
absence untethered from a former presence is not a loss in the usual sense of the word.  It is a 
more radical form of absence—a hole in the fabric of the perceptual world that takes an 
unrecognizable shape.   
 Of course, when presence and absence, waking and dreaming, no longer structure 
experience, the narrative also veers toward an anti-sociality in which it is difficult to say that 
there exists any singular, shared realm of reality and in which language risks losing its meaning.  
Benjy’s narrative performs a kind of solipsism in which the risk of unintelligibility that the 
novel’s title first alerts us to is never very far off.  Writing “inside” the novel and from “inside” 
Benjy’s consciousness is an anti-social move that dramatizes the near collapse of signification 
and in turn of sociality.  And thus the return to more traditional forms of narrative in the 
subsequent sections carries the reader back from this brink and back to the world of language.   
 We need only look at the first sentence of each of the proceeding sections to see how the 
flatness and confusion of positive and negative space that suffuses Benjy’s section slowly 
transforms from a flat plane of “shapes” and “colors” that do not necessarily signify presence or 
absence, proximity or distance, into the three-dimensional space of novelistic interiority.  
Quentin, Jason, and Dilsey’s sections begin this way: 
 “When the shadow of the sash appeared on the curtains it was between seven and eight 
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oclock and then I was in time again, hearing the watch.”32  
 
 “Once a bitch, always a bitch, what I say.”33 
 
 “The day dawned bleak and chill, a moving wall of gray light out of the northeast which, 
instead of dissolving into moisture, seemed to disintegrate into minute and venomous 
particles, like dust that, when Dilsey opened the door of the cabin and emerged, needled 
laterally into her flesh, precipitating not so much a moisture as a substance partaking of the 
quality of thin, not quite congealed oil.”34 
 
As we saw previously, in Benjy’s section, rather than signifying an absence, shadow and 
darkness have a distinct and durable presence.  In opening Quentin’s section as he does, Faulkner 
signals that shadows function differently in the second section of the novel.  They appear or are 
projected “on” objects like the curtain rather than having the more independent, almost material 
character that they do when Benjy narrates, “We went down the steps, where our shadows were,” 
speaking as though the shadow is not a contingent image that moves with the object that casts it 
or as though shadows do not refer to an illuminated object.35  Quentin, on the other hand, 
understands that shadows are plastic images that change in time, and so the appearance of the 
shape situates him “in time again”—within duration.   What Faulkner emphasizes in this initial 
sentence is not the shifting immateriality of the light and shadow that Quentin perceives but the 
way that the shadow’s transitory and translucent qualities allow him to experience his own 
durability and immanence.  Over and against the translucent shadow that simply appears (from 
nowhere), Quentin reports the feeling of his own vitality or the phenomenology of solid, 
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embodied, subjecthood that results from the encounter with the fleeting negativity of that which 
does not attain durability and solidity.  Shadows, in other words, are not “in time”— constant 
within the flow of time—when they move and mark the passage of time itself, as the shadow 
does here.  This sudden emphasis of the narrator’s embodied position within the world of the text 
marks a major shift from the first section, where Benjy appears and disappears to his own 
consciousness as if he himself were merely a shadow.  Even when Benjy’s body is finally 
described in the fourth section of the book, he looks “to have been shaped of some substance 
whose particles would not or did not cohere to one another or to the frame which supported it.”36   
 The opening of Jason’s section continues to reconstitute characters and to insist on their 
presence and durability.  If in Quentin’s section the first sentence needs to do the work of 
situating the narrator “in time” and establishing his immanence, Jason’s “Once a bitch, always a 
bitch” is a paean to identity’s triumph over time.  And finally, the first sentence in the Dilsey 
section draws attention to the embodiment of the section’s main character, establishing the 
materiality of her skin’s surface by first evoking the “bleak” “wall of grey light” that comes into 
contact with her “flesh” to produce the texture and sheen of her skin.  Dilsey has a visual and 
haptic presence in the novel that none of the other characters ever attain.  In this way, and in the 
descriptions of space, the fourth section of the novel exaggerates realism’s strategies for 
producing the imaginary world of the novel, anchoring the reader on firm ground or, more 
precisely, within a solid structure populated by equally solid and durable individuals.  Dilsey 
constantly moves into and out of doors, looks out of windows, walks up and down stairs and in 
and out of rooms, and all of this movement shores up the interiority of the novel’s fictional 
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world.   
 What I am trying to suggest by tracing a certain arc from the beginning of the novel to the 
end is, first, that the characterization in the earlier sections of the novel do not give us characters 
in the realist model, and, second, that the successful production of characters in the later two 
sections amounts to a pastiche of realist characterization.  In the Dilsey section, Faulkner gives 
our imaginations the security of clearly embodied individuals who move through a world that is 
always safe for our imaginative projections because of its walls, windows, doors, and hallways—
all of which collude to create a coherent sense of solid space in which we can imagine action 
taking place within and through clearly defined space without fear of the vertiginous falling 
inward we feel when we try to adapt to the placelessness of Benjy’s section.  The novelistic 
world maintains a feeling of wholeness throughout the Dilsey section, even when the action 
leaves the Compson house.  As they drive to church, the third-person narrator describes  
a scene like a painted backdrop.  Notched into a cut of red clay crowned with oaks the road 
appeared to stop short off, like a cut ribbon.  Beside it a weathered church lifted its crazy 
steeple like a painted church, and the whole scene was as flat and without perspective as a 
painted cardboard set upon the ultimate edge of the flat earth, against the windy sunlight of 
space and April and a midmorning filled with bells.37 
 
The flatness of the “backdrop” secures the imaginative landscape even to the point that there is 
no real perspective in this image: the road stops “like a cut ribbon,” so what would normally act 
as a line intersecting a point of infinity, a point that signifies the threshold of the visible, falls 
short of reaching a vanishing point.  Instead of disappearing into infinity, the road ends with a 
blunt edge, securing the periphery of the hermetic space Faulkner keeps from expanding in any 
direction.  He fortifies the novel, keeping it from bleeding into any other real or imaginary space 
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that the reader might envision.   
 And inside the apparently flat, interior-less church we find a “visitor” preparing to preach.  
At first he “sounded like a white man” as he speaks beside “the reading desk,” his body “reft of 
all motion as a mummy or an emptied vessel,” and “the congregation sighed as if it waked from 
a collective dream and moved a little in its seats.”38  When the preacher begins to move his voice 
takes on a new timbre.  “With his body he seemed to feed the voice that, succubus like, had 
fleshed its teeth in him.  And the congregation seemed to watch with its own eyes while the 
voice consumed him, until he was nothing and they were nothing and there was not even the 
voice that, succubus like, had fleshed its teeth in him.”  Inside the flat church we find a body that 
is less a body and more a voice that overtakes both its speaker and its audience until there is, 
according to the narrator, “nothing” or no one inside the church except for the voice itself, a 
voice whose power is uncoupled from any body.  The voice is Faulkner’s.  It is the author who 
gives a version of his voice in place of himself and in exchange for his body.  It is the author 
whose voice constitutes his medium and which speaks through the body of another—Benjy or 
Quentin or Jason or the impersonal no-one who narrates Dilsey’s section—while effacing his 
own self along with any other reminders of a world outside of the text.  The flatness of the 
“painted cardboard” church “set upon the ultimate edge of the flat earth” is an image of a world 
like Benjy’s, collapsed into two dimensions of shapes and colors.  However, here we find planes 
that function like retaining walls for the action of the story, creating a bounded interiority.  When 
we enter into this façade, this surface, we find a nearly disembodied voice that explodes the 
planar description into the three-dimensional fullness of real, inhabitable space.  The realism of 
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the Dilsey section culminates here in the church, where Faulkner shows us the magnitude of his 
authorial powers—of every novelist’s potential power—to call a world into being and populate it 
through the God-like voice of a narrator who exceeds the constraints of personhood. 
 The minister next begins speaking in a black dialect (“I sees de light en I sees de word”), 
and one cannot help but think of Faulkner writing the novel’s dialogue in Dilsey and her 
children’s voices.  When Faulkner says that he wrote himself “out” of the novel he means that he 
constructed the book as an arc that moves from ventriloquizing a character, as if he is reporting 
from the deepest and most private recesses of the novel’s interior, out toward the third-person 
position of the traditional nineteenth-century realist narrator.  But he must also go one step 
further than that, if only because this latter position is never quite outside of the text; the 
omniscient narrator that Faulkner creates is never in any one place and never confined to any one 
body.  It is the voice of power, which always works to efface its origins.  Therefore, he writes 
himself into the novel as an act of self-revelation—to remind the reader of the author’s near 
absolute power over the world of the fiction, a power that is in fact localized in a single body.  
When we read the black voices in this novel, they come to us mediated by Faulkner’s own ear 
and voice.   
 
Sutpen’s Fiction   
Of the Yoknapatawpha novels, the one that most penetratingly investigates this 
ineluctable boundary between reader and character is Absalom, Absalom!, which constantly 
brings to the reader’s attention its many layers of fictionality.  Most of what is told in the 
narrative is second- and third-hand, and even when an event is reported by a first-person witness, 
questions about invention, verifiability, and plausibility swirl about, undercutting any sense of a 
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stable set of events anchoring the center of the story.  But here Faulkner is not so much interested 
in creating a completely nonobjective artwork as he is in representing the social nature of the 
fantasy we call “reality.”  Absalom is the story of Thomas Sutpen’s appearance in Mississippi, 
seemingly, at first, out of nowhere; his attempt to break from the past and invent himself as a 
member of the land- and slave-owning Southern aristocracy; and the inevitable tragedies that 
mar his quest for what he grandly refers to as his “design.”  If there is an artist figure in 
Yoknapatawpha, it is Sutpen, who carves a plantation, “Sutpen’s Hundred,” out of the map of the 
county and in doing so produces the tragedy of the novel almost out of thin air.  He is an artist in 
the Romantic model, who builds a grand house for himself before the forces of history, and in 
particular the racial history of the US, destroy his dream of living within an autonomous fantasy 
of his own making.   Faulkner structures the novel so that Sutpen’s past and the tragedies of his 
legacy are revealed slowly over the course of many first-, second-, and third-hand tellings, which 
also increasingly raise doubts about the existence of a singular set of events and even about the 
veracity of anything reported in the whole of the text.  As the story unfolds, one does not feel an 
ever-increasing clarity of revelation but instead a piling up of disbelief.  
 While in the cosmos of the novel, Sutpen’s sin might initially appear to be his wish to 
author something like a fiction, his error is actually the opposite: he attempts to participate in the 
production of a durable reality.  Around the middle of the book, we learn about Sutpen’s life 
prior to his migration to Mississippi, including his decision to go to Haiti to make the initial 
fortune to fund the first stages of his design.  He learns of the Caribbean slave economy and the 
wealth to be made there in school, but he worries about the veracity of what he has heard: “I 
asked [the teacher] if it were true, if what he had read us about the men who got rich in the West 
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Indies were true.”39  Desperate to know that he has not been lied to, he violently accosts the 
teacher with his demand for truth until the schoolmaster begins to cry for help.  Sutpen is 
preoccupied by the verifiability of what he has heard—paranoid that he will discover that the 
story he has been told will prove untrue.  The same problem arises when he boards a ship and has 
“no more way of knowing whether the men who said the ship was going there were lying or not 
than he had of knowing whether or not the school teacher was telling the truth about what was in 
the book.”40  Sutpen embodies the epistemological obsession—How do we know what we 
know?  Will my knowledge be verified?—in a world that can no longer afford answers to those 
questions.  The house he builds with slave labor serves as a monument to a material reality 
immune from the destabilizing effects of uncertainty.  It is a wish for something other than 
fiction.  As Rosa puts it, “He was a walking shadow” descending “from abysmal and chaotic 
dark to eternal and abysmal dark” while “trying to cling with vain unsubstantial hands to what he 
hoped would hold him, save him, arrest him.”41  In her complex image, Sutpen is a shadow who 
falls from one darkness into an even deeper darkness while trying to keep himself from 
dissolving into indecipherability by groping for something solid enough to “hold him.”  His 
acquisition of the knowledge of slavery marks a kind of primal scene in the novel which sends 
him hurtling toward his fate.  Slavery is the thing toward which he will grope, attempting to hold 
himself, save himself, arrest himself in certainty through the reality of coerced labor.  Faulkner 
here distills the idea that slavery is not simply an economic relation in which whites participated; 
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far more essential than that, as a discursive entity, it serves as the “real” against which Southern 
white subjectivity sought to define itself and establish its own immanence.  Of course, what 
Sutpen finds in Haiti is not only the band of black men who will build his house, but also his first 
wife, who has racially mixed blood; he discovers that an economic relation that is built upon an 
ontological divide between the races also occasions the sexual relations that will simultaneously 
blur that divide.  And he will spend the rest of his life trying to recapture the certainty of racial 
purity that is the phantasmatic foundation of American slavery.   
 Throughout the novel Faulkner uses the idea of shadow to emphasize the immaterial and 
unverifiable quality of characters who may be—who almost certainly are—more fantasy than 
reality.  Judith is just a “blank shape”42; Charles Bon is “a shape, a shadow”43; Henry is “more 
shadowy than the abstraction” that is Bon’s buried body44; women are said to live in “some 
beautiful attenuation of unreality” full of “the shades and shapes of facts.”45  The novel 
constantly undermines any wish for verisimilitude by flattening out its characters into planar 
blank shapes that, like all two-dimensional objects, can never attain solidity.  What makes 
Absalom so difficult to read is, in part, the overwhelmingly abstract quality of its characters, 
which is descriptively figured as a flattening out and an evacuation of materiality.  Rosa 
describes a photograph of Charles Bon before saying, cryptically, “But I never saw it.  I do not 
even know if my own knowledge that Ellen ever saw it, that Judith ever loved it, that Henry slew 
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it: so who will dispute me when I say, Why did I not invent, create it?”46  The photograph 
becomes an illusion before it also seems to become Charles himself—the man who Judith may 
have loved and Henry eventually kills—and finally she asserts that the question of facticity itself 
does not even matter.  Because she can never know what the man meant to Ellen or Henry—
what it meant to love Charles or to kill him—she cannot say what it means to discover a picture 
of him; it might as well have been invented wholesale out of her own imagination.  She clarifies 
her odd logic when she next describes “a machine” that produces images “which would adorn 
the barren mirror altars of every plain girl” with a “pictured face.”  These images “would not 
even need a skull behind it; almost anonymous, it would only need vague inference of some 
shadow-realm of make-believe.”  The photographs she imagines on young women’s dressing 
tables are not the indexical signifiers of the real that we normally conceive of when we think of 
photographs but completely flat, anonymous surfaces upon which to project certain desires.  She 
might as well be describing all of the characters in the novel that she herself inhabits, all of 
whom share these properties and do indeed radiate and move within a “vague inference of some 
shadow-realm of make-believe” rather than a sturdily constructed three-dimensional 
representational space.    
  The other way that Faulkner figures the condition of imagination is through the idea of 
“projection.”  “You can not even imagine [Charles] and Judith alone together,” one character 
comments.47  “Try to do it and the nearest you can come is a projection of them while the two 
actual people were doubtless separate and elsewhere—two shades pacing, serene and untroubled 
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by flesh, in a summer garden….”  In his book about Faulkner and film, Peter Lurie writes about 
moments like these as evidence for his argument that “Faulkner’s modernism is inflected by 
what we might call the ‘film idea,’ the manner of impression and visual activity his novels 
emulate from the cinema.”48  Lurie’s claims are compelling, and his reading of Absalom 
especially makes sense given that Faulkner had started his work as a Hollywood screenwriter by 
the time he was composing that novel.  However, in addition to the cinematic quality of the 
“projecting” that characters undertake in the novel as they try to envision a past that may or may 
not have happened, I want to suggest an additional context that I think informs the novel’s 
representation of fictionality: geometry.  As we have already seen, Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha 
novels return again and again to the idea of flatness and geometry as metaphors for fictionality as 
well as to simply describe the phenomenology of reading—of confronting a page of text and 
imbuing it with a mimesis and of producing figures in one’s imagination when verisimilitude 
fails to round out and solidify the bodies of those figures.  And indeed, questions of 
epistemology and Euclidean geometry are often bound together by Faulkner, as when he says 
that Charles Bon’s wife was carried out of “whatever two dimensional backwater (the very name 
of which, town or village, she either never had never known or the shock of her exodus from it 
had driven the name forever from her mind and memory).”49  Similarly, when Quentin 
approaches the Sutpen house he “saw completely through it as if the house were of one 
dimension, painted on a canvas curtain in which there was a tear.”50   
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 This linkage of geometry with literary subjectivity has a history that stretches back to the 
end of the nineteenth century, where it begins most famously with Edwin Abbott’s novel 
Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimension (1881), which is set in a two-dimensional world and 
narrated by a character named A. Square.  I am reluctant to suggest that Flatland and Absalom 
share some kind of literary heritage, but I do think that, for the first time, Abbot’s book ushered 
some of the representational concerns of modernist visual art into literary fiction, and that this 
serves as a precedent for writers who wanted to import questions of representational space, 
surfaces, and the flatness of the canvas/page into their work, allowing them to explore 
fictionality in an unprecedented way and making it possible for E.M. Forster to famously 
distinguish between “round” characters and “flat” characters.  Mark McGurl writes that the 
“plane-being foregrounds the curious fact about fictional characters that their physical existence 
is realized in real space only as ink on a page, as collections of letters.  Otherwise they are as 
invisible as spirits.  From this substrate the character is ‘raised’ into a virtual three-dimensional 
existence that seems to leave behind its crudely material origins.”51  Moreover, the attempt to 
think about the world in two dimensions (and failing to perceive the third) serves to explore by 
analogy the condition of human beings who move within three dimensional space even as 
mathematicians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century increasingly popularized the 
notion that there existed a fourth dimension beyond our perception. 
 At the turn of the century “many authors were touting the superiority of thought that was 
based on an understanding of four-dimensional geometry,” Tony Robbins states, “and 
collectively they established in popular culture the once-esoteric mathermatical idea of the fourth 
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dimension.”52  The fourth dimension held a special appeal for a culture in search of ways to 
suture the idea of a transcendental realm with an ever-more scientific, materialist vision of 
reality.  However, it was not until later in the century that a new way of conceiving of the fourth 
dimension would popularize a strategy for visualizing the fourth dimension, which would be 
hugely influential for visual artists like Picasso—and, in turn, for Faulkner.  For Abbott and the 
mathematicians who theorized the fourth dimension around the turn of the century, the preferred 
way of thinking visually about n+1 dimensions was through the “slicing method.”  In this 
imaginative operation a three-dimensional object, a sphere, for example, is passed through a two-
dimensional plane so the plane bisects the sphere, creating a circular “slice” at the site of 
intersection.  As the sphere moves through the plane, the size of the circle changes depending on 
where the sphere is in relation to the plane, so if the sphere has one hemisphere on top of the 
plane and the other is on the bottom, then, from the two-dimensional perspective, we have the 
largest possible circle or slice in view. As the sphere continues to pass through the plane, the 
slices get progressively smaller.  This accumulation of two-dimensional slices is one way that 
beings in Flatland, for example, are able to encounter three-dimensional objects.  A little later in 
the century, however, mathematicians would begin to favor the “shadow” or “projective” method 
for visualizing three- and four-dimensional objects.  A projection of a three-dimensional cube 
that shows every edge of the object, even the ones that are hidden from view (a now familiar 
geometric figure), became the preference for representing three-dimensional shapes in two-
dimensional drawings, and this method was also employed to conceptualize four-dimensional 
shapes.  Projective geometry actually originates in art with early developments in perspectival 
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painting, but it didn’t become the preferred way of thinking about a fourth dimension of space 
until after the turn of the twentieth century.   
 Once it did however, the cultural influence of geometers' theories about a dimension of 
space that we cannot perceive by the human eye exploded.  As Robbins writes, following the 
work of art historians Josep Palau i Fabre and Linda Henderson, “artists developed a view of the 
figure as geometry” and “culture developed a philosophical and mystical approach to the fourth 
dimension, n-dimension geometry, and non-Euclidean geometry, an approach so general that no 
real distinction between these very different geometries was made.”53  As Henderson has 
proposed, amidst this very general and usually confused artistic fascination with turn-of-the-
century developments in geometry, there exists one outlier who had a much more rigorous 
understanding of projective methods for representing four-dimensional shapes and who would 
rely heavily on an intense study of these projections: Pablo Picasso.  As she influentially argues, 
cubism was born from Picasso’s engagement with the writing and especially the technical 
drawings in Esprit Jouffret’s Traité élementaire de géométrie à quatre dimensions (1903).     
 Whether or not Faulkner was aware of Picasso’s influences, he was one of the most 
influential artists of the twentieth century to be fascinated and influenced himself by projective 
geometry, and in the canted surfaces of cubism he very likely found a painterly analogue for the 
kind of novel he wanted to develop—a novel that somehow referred to another dimension of 
representational space just as it flattened out that space onto the plane of the page, an operation 
similar to geometric projection.54  As Picasso’s works lie flat on the surface of the canvas, 
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Faulkner’s characters exist only in two dimensions; as Picasso manages to refer through this very 
flatness to a higher dimension than the one we perceive in everyday life, so too do Faulkner’s 
characters manage to move within another dimension of space that is not bound by the usual 
rules of visual displacement and simultaneity.  In their Harvard dorm room Quentin and his 
Canadian roommate Shreve piece together a coherent version of the Sutpen family tragedy, and 
they are transported elsewhere: “Because now neither of them was there.  They were both in 
Carolina and the time was forty-six years ago, and it was not even four now but compounded still 
further, since now both of them were Henry Sutpen and both of them were Bon, compounded 
each of both yet either neither, smelling the very smoke which had blown and faded away forty-
six years ago….”55  They are carried through time and space, but, significantly, neither of them 
occupies just one role, one other character.  There is instead the strange compounding that 
Faulkner describes as a compounding of “both yet either neither”—as if they are each capable of 
being both Henry and Bon as well as themselves (Quentin and Shreve) at the same time.  This 
representation of the ability to simultaneous inhabit and be outside of multiple characters at once 
bears a remarkable resemblance to the representational revolution that the four-dimensional 
projection model inspired by giving Picasso a way to represent the “odd way in which spaces are 
both inside and outside a four-dimensional figure,” which is precisely the subject of one of 
Jouffret’s illustrations that most inspired the early development of the cubist method.56  “For 
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seven hundred years Western painters have been concerned with the skin of objects: how light 
reflects off the surface, how the surface defines volume.  The four-dimensional projection model 
freed Picasso of the tyranny of the surface….”   
 In an analagous way, the idea of projection freed Faulkner from the duality of interiority 
and exteriority that structured the novel on several levels: at the level of the material book, the 
level of representational space, and at the level of character.  His Yoknapatawpha works 
emphasize “flat land,” flatness, the two-dimensionality of the page, and shadow in order to 
entirely upend the hierarchy of interior over exterior and to remake the reader’s relationship to 
fictional characters.   
 Faulkner, we now know, often took the opportunity to pore over a nineteenth-century 
plantation diary that belonged to family friends, a diary that includes records from the sale of 
slaves.57  The logic of the plantation diary have been explored especially in critics’ assessments 
of Go Down, Moses, where a plantation ledger actually appears.58  To some degree, scholars 
have noted the influence of the diary on Absalom, pointing out the ways it may have inspired 
Sutpen’s obsessive accumulation of furnishings and other appurtenances which launch himself 
into the class of planter aristocracy.  Here, however, I am more interested in the ways that the 
plantation diary as a form influenced Faulkner’s narratological and characterological thinking in 
the novel.  Quentin’s father describes the production of historical knowledge to his son, stating,  
we exhume from old trunks and boxes and drawers letters without salutation or signature, 
in which men and women who once lived and breathed are now merely initials or 
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nicknames out of some now incomprehensible affection which sound to us like Sanskrit 
or Chocktaw; we see dimly people, the people in whose living blood and seed we 
ourselves lay dormant and waiting, in this shadowy attenuation of time possessing now 
heroic proportions, performing their acts of simple passion and simple violence, 
impervious to time and inexplicable—Yes, Judith, Bon, Henry, Sutpen: all of them.  They 
are there, yet something is missing; they are like a chemical formula exhumed along with 
the letters from the forgotten chest, carefully, the paper old and faded and falling to 
pieces, the writing faded, almost indecipherable, yet meaningful, familiar in shape and 
sense, the name and presence of volatile and sentient forces; you bring them together in 
proportions called for, but nothing happens; you re-read, tedious and intent, poring, 
making sure that you have forgotten nothing, made no miscalculation; you bring them 
together again and again nothing happens: just words, the symbols, the shapes 
themselves, shadowy inscrutable and serene, against that turgid background of a horrible 
and bloody mischancing of human affairs.59 
 
 The past here reads very much like fiction—a sensually impoverished version of the real thing, a 
collection of names which, if one looks too closely, simply dissolve into black marks on a white 
page, leaving no other material to grasp.  Reading an archive quickly turns into a form of 
accounting when Mr. Compson “sees” the “people” as figures, lists them by name, and then 
confirms, “all of them” as if he has just called roll.  The “something missing” becomes apparent 
when he compares this form of reading to a formula that fails to balance no matter how often the 
proportions are checked, no matter how carefully the calculation is done.   
 The notion of the formula or book that won’t balance or that “no longer balanced” 
appears throughout the novel, betraying the haunting presence of the plantation ledger, 
suggesting that such a ledger is still somehow in process or that its business is unfinished.60  As 
Mary Poovey shows in her study of sixteenth-century merchants, the balancing of the ledger 
requires, in the end, an imaginary sum of money in the form of either credit or debit, attesting to 
the significance of balance as a formal element which, she argues, produces the factual quality of 
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the ledger’s contents.61  The encounter with the formula or ledger that fails to balance is, 
therefore, an encounter with a fiction; it produces the feeling that Quentin’s father describes at 
such length: that of being in the presence of a “shadowy” realm of human affairs that do not 
properly add up to a singular reality. 
 Furthermore, the organization of the balanced ledger’s surface evinces the same 
“grammar” that Hortense Spillers famously describes in American slave codes: “we are stunned 
by the simultaneity of disparate items in a grammatical series: ‘Slave’ appears in the same 
context with beasts of burden, all and any animal(s), various livestock, and a virtually endless 
profusion of domestic content from the culinary item to the book.”62  Balance, in the case of the 
ledger, also gives rise to the ultimate fungibility of all its items, including enslaved persons.  The 
ledger that fails to balance contests this logic of absolute equivalency, and this is both important 
for understanding what the novel has to say about slavery and for conceptualizing its economy of 
character.  The ledger’s grammar, which was so central to plantation life and remains a primary 
source for knowing that past, also structures the production of history in the novel’s present.  It 
serves as a structure of thought for Quentin, his father, Shreve, and Rosa—all of whom 
obsessively narrate the events of the past with the hope of getting it “right” or balanced, of 
lending it facticity’s weight.  To know a collection of people becomes akin to assigning them 
exchange value and deeming them possessions.  Because every attempt to know the past is 
determined by the forms through which we encounter that past, the plantation ledger’s ideology 
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conditions the relation Faulkner and his characters have to the past of slavery.  They are doomed 
to an accounting that will never add up not simply because the past can never have the vibrancy 
of the present, but more significantly because in the wake of formal emancipation, the ledger 
itself has been transformed into a fiction.            
 At stake in all of this is how we understand the relationship between fiction and history—
where we locate history when we read a novel that seeks to wrestle with the very real violence of 
the past through the unreality of fiction.  Absalom, perhaps more than any other novel by 
Faulkner, is about the legacy of slavery, but it does not attempt to locate slavery within novelistic 
time and space—to “represent” slavery in any normative sense of that word.  Sutpen’s slaves are 
present in the novel, but they are the epitome of “flat” characters.  Slavery as experienced by 
enslaved persons is not Faulkner’s subject.  The novel is instead about the way that the real 
historical, physical, psychic violence of slavery only exists in far more abstract forms that are 
difficult to see or even imagine.  How difficult it is to think “the paradox of peaceful greenery 
and crimson flowers and sugar cane sapling” that springs from “a soil manured with black blood 
from two hundred years of oppression and exploitation.”63  Quentin recalls his grandfather 
saying that man rides “peacefully about on his horse…not knowing that what he rode upon was a 
volcano” and believes “that earth was kind and gentle and that darkness was merely something 
you saw, or could not see in; overseeing what he oversaw and not knowing that he was 
overseeing it.”64  The history of slavery is essentially a question of visuality in Faulkner.  And 
darkness is never simply the absence or presence of light, the ability to see or not see, but the 
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very condition of all vision, and to actually see darkness for what it is—to see it as always a 
shadow of something else, of some unknowable absence—is to encounter one’s own implication 
in that darkness, one’s own failure to connect to the past.  As Quentin’s grandfather puts it, a 
blindness to the history of slavery manifests as a form of “overseeing.”  By this I take him to 
mean that “man” looks upon the land as an overseer does—with a possessive gaze.  I also take 
him to mean that man oversees in the sense of looking closely, too closely, for evidence of the 
past, as this kind of vision privileges a certain kind of presence; it seeks the material evidence of 
history and does not account for the paradox of the past’s ineluctable alterity, for the fact that this 
past will always remain obscure no matter how well we “see.”  Rather than overseeing, the 
grandfather is able to connect “two hundred years of oppression and exploitation” with the 
“sugar cane sapling.”  To not “oversee” history, then, would be to resist cathecting it into a solid 
object to be redeemed but to see it instead as an ungraspable shadow.65  
 
Coda: Faulkner in Paris 
While in Paris in 1925, the young Faulkner made a pilgrimage to Père Lachaise, 
“particularly to see Oscar Wilde’s tomb, with a bas-relief by Jacob Epstein,” as he wrote in a 
letter to his mother.66  Many critics have noted the Decadent author’s influence on Faulkner’s 
first known writings, such as his 1920 play The Marionettes.  They also note Faulkner’s mention 
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of Wilde in Absalom, Absalom!, where Quentin’s father describes the afternoon in 1870 when 
Charles Bon’s mistress sojourns to Mississippi to mourn at Bon’s grave: 
It must have resembled a garden scene by the Irish poet, Wilde: the late afternoon, the 
dark cedars with the level sun in them, even the light exactly right and the graves, the 
three pieces of marble…looking as though they had been cleaned and polished and 
arranged by scene shifters who with the passing of twilight would return and strike them 
and carry them, hollow fragile and without weight, back to the warehouse until they 
should be needed again; the pageant, the scene, the act, entering upon the stage—the 
magnolia-faced woman a little plumper no, a woman created of by and for darkness 
whom the artist Beardsley might have dressed, in a soft flowing gown designed not to 
infer bereavement or widowhood but to dress some interlude of slumbrous and fatal 
insatiation, of passionate and inexorable hunger of the flesh, walking beneath a lace 
parasol and followed by a bright gigantic negress carrying a silk cushion and leading by 
the hand the little boy whom Beardsley might not only have dressed but drawn—a thin 
delicate child with smooth ivory sexless face….67 
 
Like so much of the novel, this is a second-hand account.  Mr. Compson is actually describing 
what Quentin’s grandfather would have seen during that afternoon at Sutpen’s Hundred.  In its 
retelling the scene becomes stylized, and the description, rather than opening up the fictional 
world and attempting to lend it solidity, depth, and durability, flattens everything into a shallow 
scene staged in proscenium, complete with props—hollow reproductions of the real things.  
Faulkner gives us the aestheticized, Wildean version of the image: the world represented as 
something second-hand, unreal and yet more beautiful and memorable for its unreality.  Judith 
stands to the side of the main action, “inside the cedars,” wearing a “shapeless” dress “in the 
attitude of an indifferent guide in a museum” until Bon’s mistress rises up in order to return to 
the house, at which point Judith follows the other figures “with that face like a mask or like 
marble.”68  As she moves from outside the scene to the inner space of action with the other 
characters, her unmoving face collapses into a mask or marble rendering of her head, and she too 
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becomes an aesthetic object, a shapeless mass wrought into form.  Faulkner invokes Wilde and 
Beardsley’s fin-de-siécle aestheticism for its championing of artifice and ornamentation, and 
more specifically for their interest in surfaces, both in the sense of surface-as-appearance and in 
the literal, material sense of the word.  Also note that the invocation of Wilde’s writing is more 
an invocation of Wilde himself, more a reference to the cultural idea of the person than to any 
specific element in his work.  And indeed, naming another writer is unusual in Faulkner’s fiction.  
Rather than alluding to any one story or character, for example, Faulkner asks us to recall a 
general essence of the writer’s ouvre, an overall feeling or affinity for pageantry simply evoked 
by his name. (Of course it has always been said of Wilde that his greatest theatrical invention 
was himself.)   
These Wildean grave-markers recall the emphatically frontal theatrical effects that 
Epstein used to memorialize Wilde himself in the Père Lachaise monument, which had been 
unveiled to much controversy eleven years prior to Faulkner’s visit.   
 
Oscar Wilde’s grave by Jacob Epstein 
Like the graves in the passage, Wilde’s tomb emphasizes a certain surface-ness and frontal 
	 	
	 188 
orientation that is distinctly modernist and, in particular, emblematic of the European avant-
garde milieu in which it was produced.  Epstein was a New York-born artist who went abroad to 
continue his artistic education in Britain and France, where he would meet Picasso, Brancusi, 
and Modigliani, all during the period that he worked on the commission for Wilde’s tomb.  
Carved out of a 20-ton block of stone, the grave marker retains much of its original shape.  Even 
the flying figure on its face nearly fills the tomb’s rectangular façade from corner to corner, 
drawing attention to the hulking dimensions and density of the stone, and subordinating 
figuration and artistic skill to the properties of the raw material.  While, upon its completion, 
many found the figure’s nudity indecent, some critics praised Epstein’s bas-relief as an excellent 
exercise in “direct carving,” which privileges the eloquence of the material over the artist’s 
preconceived design.  Recalling a monumental Assyrian carving that Epstein had studied in the 
British Museum as well as the African and Ancient Egyptian art that he collected, the figure 
reveals the sculptor’s belief in the special aesthetic powers of “primitive” iconography.   Most 
significant for our discussion here, however, is the emphatic flatness of the tomb’s front.  
Viewed straight on, the relief is remarkably shallow and hews close to the supporting stone, with 
most of the façade taken up by the sheet-like wings that are almost perfectly rectangular and 
minimally ornamented.  Their scalloped edges and shallow striations from left to right both 
suggest feathers and give the sense that the figure is moving perpendicular to the viewer’s line of 
sight, as though streaking through her visual field.   
Those scholars who have written about Faulkner’s development as a novelist 
underemphasize his early visit to France because he failed to fraternize with many of the other 
major Anglophone writers who were there, in addition to the fact that he spent less time in 
Europe than planned. But while Faulkner’s time in Paris may not have ensconced him within the 
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literary avant-garde in the way he desired, it almost certainly marked the moment when what we 
think of as his mature work began to germinate.  Carvell Collins has written that, according to a 
friend with whom Faulkner corresponded during his time abroad, the short piece of writing about 
a young girl and her two brothers that would grow into The Sound and the Fury was written 
during this period.69 
While the young writer may not have made his way into the center of literary society 
during those months, according to his correspondence home, he spent much of his time looking 
at art.  In letters to his mother decorated with self portraits, he wrote about seeing works by 
Picasso and Matisse in private collections and spending many of his days at the Louvre enjoying 
paintings of Manet, Degas, and Cézanne.  These visual works made a significant impression on 
Faulkner, and, I argue, were vital to the modernist experiments he would begin to fully explore 
as The Sound and the Fury took its earliest form.  In the paintings and sculptures he saw in Paris, 
Faulkner further developed his interest in the flat surface or support and in the way modern 
painting and sculpture used them to forward the Greenbergian project of persuing a “pure” 
manifestation of painting itself—work that was “about” its own ontology rather than whatever it 
referred to in the world outside of the work.  He would transpose this preoccupation with 
artifice—with the non-referential aspect of visual art—into his fiction.  And in doing so, he 
would call the status of literary character as a category into a crisis.  If we are accustomed to 
thinking about literary modernism in terms of its disruptions to traditional narrative, I want to 
draw attention to the ways that Faulkner’s modernism very self-consciously disrupts the novel at 
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the level of characterization as well.  For thinking solely in terms of narrative experimentation 
obscures the ways in which personhood gets destablized and terms like “subjectivity” become 
nearly irrelevant to the novels at hand.  So much has been written about loss in Faulkner, but 
rarely have critics addressed what gets lost to the genre: the radical loss of character that is 
experienced by readers of these texts.  Part of what makes them difficult is their demand that the 
reader address her attention to entities whose fictionality overrides her ability to imagine stable, 
durable, solid, embodied characters.  Benjy’s stream-of-consciousness is not an invitation into 
the interior life of a literary character—a representation of the phenomenology of his 
consciousness—but an attempt to throw a wrench into the mechanisms of interiority itself.  And 
this, I argue, demands a form of reading not oriented along an inside/outside axis, but instead 
attuned to the cubist logic of adjacency and folding.    
 In As I Lay Dying Darl lists the reasons why he constructed the joints of his mother’s coffin 
“on the bevel.”70  Reason number one: “There is more surface for the nails to grip.”  Reason 
number three: “The water will have to seep into it on a slant.  Water moves easiest up and down 
or straight across.”  Reason number nine: “The animal magnetism of a dead body makes the 
stress come slanting, so the seams and joints of a coffin are best made on the bevel.”71  
Narrowing the narrative’s focus dramatically, Darl calls our attention to the minutiae of two 
planks fastened together to create a beveled joint.  If we are accustomed to thinking of coffins as 
whole vessels, that is, in terms of their interior volumes and what they hold, Darl’s list makes a 
claim for the importance of the exterior surfaces, joints, densities, and physical forces that keep 
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the coffin together and allow it to articulate a space for death.  He directs our attention at rather 
than into the object, encouraging us to imagine only a hypothetical body—“a dead body,” as in, 
any dead body—whose identity is as hollow as the coffin itself.  This hypothetical corpse, this 
mere shape and weight of a person who lacks all particularity despite the “real” body held in the 
coffin, is interesting for its potentiality; it is emphatically no-body.  Like the coffin, novels are 
carefully crafted containers completely empty of real people.  They carry no real-world 
signification, and yet, in the sometimes vast empty spaces that they articulate, we imagine there 
to be something resembling persons within.  Darl’s coffin is, I suggest, a figure for the 
Yoknapatawpha novels themselves in that its meaning moves along and through the formal 
construction of its surfaces, and because the more we look for breaks in those surfaces, the more 
surface area we discover: the beveled joints maximize the flat surface area at the site of the seam, 
serving to strengthen the overall surface of the hollow structure.  The fact that Addie Bundren’s 
corpse lays with its head at the wrong end of the box makes the point clear: the coffin is among 
other things a figure for the arbitrary, non-referentiality of fictional description, which always 





72 My discussion of As I Lay Dying is indebted to Joseph Urgo’s reading of the novel.  He 
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Faulkner and the Drama of Meaning: The Discovery of the Figurative in as ‘I Lay Dying,’” 






What does it mean to represent the very real historical violence of slavery and its 
aftermath through the unreality of a novel?  What are the ethical implications of reading about a 
fictional slave? The question of literary character took on a special urgency in the nineteenth 
century as novelists sought to represent the enslaved, who stood outside the privileged realm of 
personhood.  While we are used to thinking about the slave as an individual simply transformed 
into property, recent scholarship has complicated that view, showing how, in law, the slave was 
actually suspended between the poles of person and thing.  This neither/nor status allowed for 
slaves to be, for example, held culpable for crimes without holding the other legal privileges that 
come along with full personhood.  Through legal reasoning, the status of the slave was 
constantly reinvented as hybrid or liminal.  The writers I look at in the preceding pages saw this, 
the imperiled personhood of the enslaved, as an aesthetic challenge to the conventions of 
traditional novelistic characterization: How might one write a character who is refused 
recognition as a person?  What happens when literary character does not correspond to what we 
understand to be a person?  Thus, a political and ethical problem became a literary one.  Crafts, 
Twain, Chesnutt, and then, in the twentieth century, Faulkner, produce or fail to produce the 
imaginary bodies and subjectivities of literary characters.  Their fictions often resist the reader’s 
desire to appropriate black characters and imbue them with the fullness of interiority.  In other 
words, instead of making a more familiar sentimental argument for the humanity of the slaves 
they represent, these authors all render the ideological violence through which black individuals 
were relegated to the margins of humanity.  Their radical new forms of characterization seek to 
make visible the denial of personhood to slaves. 
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Fiction was not what nineteenth century American readers wanted from formerly 
enslaved writers.  The slave narratives of the antebellum period were designed to telegraph their 
absolute truth and authenticity as pamphlets for abolitionism.  From the authenticating 
documents written by prominent white abolitionists to the etched portraits of the author that 
decorated the fronticepieces of slave narratives, the reader was meant to feel assured that the 
bodies described therein corresponded to actual bodies in the real world. In a literary landscape 
where black authorship, authenticity, and the “real” were so linked, there was little room for 
black fabulation.  And while authentication was a hugely important political tool for black 
writers to shore up the legitimacy of their testimony and have their stories circulated, the need 
for an unvarnished truth also had the effect of reinforcing the idea that black writers had or ought 
to have a special purchase on authentic experience.  In turn, there has been a long history ever 
since in which the imaginative and aesthetic accomplishments of black writers have been 
ignored.  This history, which extends into our own moment, poses blackness and imagination 
against one another, often turning attention to the body of the artist herself rather than the work 
of art or the bodies of her characters.    
Of all the terms literary critics regularly rely upon, “character” is perhaps both the most 
heavily used and the least examined.  Our criticism often presumes that there exists a consensus 
about what a character is, about what we speak of when we say the names “Hamlet,” “Emma 
Woodhouse,” or “Ahab.”   But apply the slightest critical touch to the concept of character and 
out tumble a set of puzzling ontological and epistemological questions: What, exactly, is a 
character?  Where do literary characters begin and end?  With the text?  In our imaginations?  
How do we know we are in the presence of a fictional character?  What is the difference between 
persons in our memory and the characters who populate our fictions?  What is the relationship 
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between characters and real-world people?   “Character,” writes John Frow, “is not a substance 
but the literary or dramatic or filmic instance of an operation within a social assemblage, by 
means of which the reader is inscribed into the terms of a particular formation of personhood.”73  
To be intelligible, every character relies upon a certain set of historically specific assumptions 
about what constitutes a person, about the basic conditions of the human as it is defined against 
the non-human.  Thus, the history of character can only be understood alongside the history of 
the production of personhood through different ethical, legal, religious, and civic modes of 
thought.  Drawing on Foucault’s terms, Frow contends that “the person is less a concept than a 
dispositif, an evolving apparatus for the shaping of social arrangements.”74  
Traditionally, the problem of character has been defined by the failure of any univocal 
language to bridge the gap between the discourse of fiction and the discourse about fiction.  In 
other words, one can speak about Ahab as Ishmael does, as if he were a person in a world 
contiguous with our own, or as a character who inhabits a novel, as a formal function of a text.  
Whereas philosophers of aesthetics usually attempt to resolve this hybridity in order to name 
what characters are, I want to insist along with Frow that “[w]hat counts is less what they are 
than what we do with them: the historically, culturally, and generically various ways in which 
the reader or spectator or listener endows them with specular personhood, and on that basis finds 
them of interest.”75  Characters do not precede our understanding as one or another kind of 
object; rather, they come into being in the moment of reading, hearing, or seeing.  In other 
																																																						
73 John Frow, Character and Person (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), ix. 
74 Ibid., 71. 
75 Ibid., 31. 
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words, my account of literary character bends toward the phenomenological, thinking of 
character as an effect of one’s encounter with a text.  
Along with the work of theorists of character and fictionality such as Frow, Diedre 
Lynch, Elizabeth Fowler, Catherine Gallagher, Michael McKeon, Mary Poovey, and Alex 
Woloch, “Prisoners of Style” attempts to move beyond what once seemed like the two primary 
critical options: to discuss characters as though they were real people or to take the strict 
structuralist position that character is a ruse of the text.  Of course when we read we know that 
characters are always both—we feel for them as we do people but know that they begin and end 
with the text—and my approach, like these other critics’, honors that fact, taking the paradox of 
characters’ quasi-personhood as a premise of my analysis.  What makes the recent work on 
character and fictionality exciting and distinctive from much of the criticism in the vein of New 
Historicism is its attempts to historicize not a single character but character as a formal category.  
If historicist criticism that attends to character often asks, where does the idea for a particular 
character come from, I and these other critics want to know what makes a particular regime of 
character (and indeed of personhood) possible.  What ideas about the constitution of the self, 
truth and untruth, the human and its others coalesce at a particular moment to produce the kinds 
of figures that populate a text? 
Revealing character and the history of personhood to be inextricably bound together 
invites us to envision new relationships between literature, history, and the law.  For the writers I 
discuss, the historical fact of slavery was not only something to be represented in fiction; it also 
posed a formal problem, prompting a rethinking of characterization.  Each chapter in this 
dissertation dwells on the relationship between character and personhood to show the literary 
expression of personhood’s systematic unmaking under the institution of slavery.  There is, in 
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other words, an underbelly to the narrative that aligns character with personhood: a history of 
representations of dispossession and exclusion.       
“Prisoners of Style” is also about the experience of reading.  It points to the 
discontinuities—the negative spaces in the reader’s imagination—that destabilize personal 
identity and modernity’s nearly sacred sense of self; it is about the impersonality at the heart of 
the person.  In the cases I have presented, representations of fog, shadow, forgetting, and flatness 
all disrupt the reader’s ability to imagine characters.  They unmake imaginary persons.  To read 
about a fictional character is, as Gallagher has argued, one way of feeling the immanence of 
one’s own self.  But character can also be a technology for throwing selfhood into question in 
order to remake its contours, in order to question the primacy of personhood—in order to make 
strange the privilege of one’s own humanity.  Placed side-by-side, the categories of character and 
person are shown to be linked and yet opposed.  Together, they vibrate.  If characters are 
allegories for persons, attending to literary character means confronting the history of 
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